Talking about Suicide

29 04 2009

The Tyranny of Silence

When my son Bruno killed himself in January 2007 my first impulse was to talk about it. I, my partner, and the rest of my family, came up immediately against the press guidelines that do not allow mention of suicide as a cause of death in the mainstream media. Naively we thought that since the Labour Government had reformed the legislation and suicides were now designated as “accidents” with burial costs covered by ACC, that suicide was a disease like any other. When someone dies suddenly it is only natural that people want to know why. To say that the death was “sudden”, “tragic” or an accident” leaves them guessing and perpetuates the “tyranny of silence” that surrounds suicide. I got around that partly by publishing a tribute to my son on Aotearoa Indymedia two days after his death.

My instinct was to share the knowledge of his life and death with many of those I had met, discussed and debated with on Aotearoa Indymedia as a “community”. Here was a politically engaged, mainly youthful audience that was actively concerned about social issues. I wasn’t aware at that time suicide has a ‘profile’ that should not be raised. The discussion that followed this posting reinforced for me the disconnection between the official code of silence and the openness of the internet where suicide is spoken of in all of its aspects from the sublime to the horrific. I discovered that the press guide lines were designed to stop copycatting.

The question then arose: why if silence was supposedly “evidence based” and therefore a “best practice” designed to stop copycatting, had no one at various Ministries surfed the social sites frequented by young people where hundreds of Youtube or Bebo tributes to dead young people are watched and commented on profusely and sometimes profoundly and realized that their social policy prescriptions are on a different planet?

I then looked for evidence in the published research that backed up the claim that silence was a means of suicide prevention. I couldn’t find it. Nor I discovered could others like Keith Newman who have been active in documenting suicide and its prevention over many years and who runs the internet site SOSAD (Save our Sons and Daughters). Newman saw the government’s policy of clamping down on suicide “awareness” as “politically correct”, an attempt to “censor” youth, stopping “open and sensible dialogue” and undermining youth initiative.

“Surely this should be a matter for youth to decide themselves. Youth are far more broad in their thinking than we give them credit for. Putting the right information in their hands and encouraging them to talk about their hurts and frustrations can be an important part of getting their thinking back on track and realising they are not alone.”

Newman also pointed to Australian evidence that showed that “raising awareness” caused suicide was a “myth”.

I was by this time very suspicious of the counter-intuitive claim that “talking” about suicide makes it “contagious” as if it were a virus. What made things even more strange was the fact that no evidence was cited to prove that talking about suicide would ‘normalize’ it or increase the danger of copycatting. It seemed that in the place of evidence there were patronizing assumptions that young people are impressionable, easily influenced and even uncritical consumers of fashion. This week it is this band, next week its cluster-suicide. Who at the Ministries knows anything about youth culture and why this model of youth consumption of death is supposedly held in such high regard? (McGorry and Robinson)

All the evidence of copycatting shows that its incidence is low (less than 5% of suicides) and that it may have nothing to do with “awareness” or “profile” or “contagion” but may be part of modern consumer capitalism. This research finds that those who suffer suicides of close friends or family tend to try suicide themselves more often than those who do not. However when other social factors such as alcoholism are considered, the “contagion” factor disappears, leaving other social and psychological factors as the most likely cause. In fact, the only significant finding is that knowledge of friends’ suicides after a period of at least a month is more immunizing than contagious as it leads to less “copycatting”. This high quality ‘anecdotal’ evidence supports the argument that the best suicide prevention for those affected by suicide may be active involvement in suicide prevention (Mercy et al, 2001).

In the age of the internet and global roaming the cat is out of the bag and pretending otherwise will not prevent suicide. Knowledge of suicides spreads like the ozone hole among peer groups and throughout the wider society despite the code of official silence. There is something unhealthy about adults pasting on ultra suicide block when their sons and daughters are grieving or morbidly fascinated by the latest suicide online. Internet bullying is now cited as a growing threat and cause of youth suicide. But like copycatting there is no way that the internet can be silenced or policed by parents and schools, nor should it as an important site of freedom of expression.

Internet bullies cannot be silenced on the internet but they can be exposed by identifying them publicly and building support in schools against the competitive culture that promotes bullying.

So logically, if silence doesn’t stop the talk of suicide, then maybe shouting might. This was the view of Maria Bradbury whose son Toran Henry committed suicide on March 20 2008. Ms Bradbury organized a march up Queen St, Auckland, to promote her view of the need to raise public awareness of the causes of suicide. Metaphorically speaking, this is what the Youth Suicide Prevention Trust and its Yellow Ribbon program in schools did between 1997 and 2005 when it was forced to shut down.

Who Killed Yellow Ribbon?

Yellow Ribbon was a self-help suicide prevention group founded by parents and friends of youth suicides who formed the Youth Suicide Awareness Trust in NZ 1997. Its basic approach was to enlist and train young people as ambassadors in schools to promote the Yellow Ribbon message that “It’s OK to ask for help”. Its members handed out yellow cards with the words “Its OK to ask for help” and referred young people who asked for help to health workers and counselors. Each school had a procedure for referral and for keeping their ambassadors safe from risk. Yellow Ribbon was initially modeled on the organization of the same name which was founded in the US in and which has since spread to many US states and to Australia, Canada, Scotland and Africa. By 2002 Yellow Ribbon NZ had over 1400 ambassadors in more than 140 schools.

Yellow Ribbon’s existence, however, was strongly contested. In NZ, Yellow Ribbon was consistently opposed by a number of academics and researchers in the field mainly associated with the New Zealand Youth Suicide Prevention Strategy, formed in 1998 after Yellow Ribbon, who argued that it could not prove that it did not ‘harm’ young people. Endorsements on the US Yellow Ribbon websites from suicidal young people who said they owed their lives to Yellow Ribbon and the many personal testimonies made to those involved in Yellow Ribbon in NZ did not fit with the orthodox “evidence based” approach to suicide prevention. Yet the case of a young Yellow Ribbon ambassador who committed suicide was cited informally as evidence of “harm”. The Minister in charge of NZYSPS, Jim Anderton, stated categorically:

“The literature is very clear – if you raise the profile of youth suicide, you get a higher rate of suicide”

(Collins).

As a result Yellow Ribbon had to look elsewhere for funding. When it went to ‘Fight or Life”, a charity boxing contest which featured “celebrity” matches, for funds it was heavily criticized for promoting a violent sport that could lead to bullying a recognized cause of suicide. Yet many of the ‘celebrities’ such as former league personality Tawera Nikau have a strong record in youth work. Another was the current Deputy Prime Minister, Bill English, who has yet to be shown up as a playground bully.

The question as to why Yellow Ribbon was closed down has yet to be answered. Those who were involved argue that it was deliberately shut down. They point to the claim made by the leading NZ suicide researcher Anne Beautrais who stated correctly that there was no evidence to prove “beyond doubt” that Yellow Ribbon did not cause harm.

In the face of this official criticism, Yellow Ribbon was more than ready to evaluate its approach to suicide prevention and correct any shortcomings. It commissioned Professor Ian Evans and Dr Narelle Dawson to design and implement a research project precisely for that purpose. This was the most advanced and robust study of Yellow Ribbon devised that I have seen anywhere. It was specifically designed to meet the requirement that: “the programme must demonstrate that it is “safe, effective, and evidence based, in a rigorous and scientific way.”

Thelma French wrote in response to Government concern that the Yellow Ribbon programme “lacked a robust evaluation framework”:

“Government is very aware of the evaluation design prepared by Prof Evans and Narelle Dawson in August 2002, the implementation of which we have been asked to delay, despite our seeking specific ring-fenced funding for evaluation studies. In order to ensure our evaluation plan would meet Ministry requirements, we initiated several meetings in which Yellow Ribbon requested from the Ministry representatives more detailed specification as to what in their view would be minimally required for a sound evaluation. To date they have been unable to provide any such guidelines. That safety issues have not been dismissed and are taken very seriously by Yellow Ribbon.”

However this was followed by a more serious criticism in a draft report of the IPRC at Auckland University:

“… the lack of evaluation evidence makes it extremely difficult to substantiate the impact of the program, and the level to which programme aims have been achieved. Consequently, respondents strongly questioned the probable contribution of the Yellow Ribbon program to young people’s help seeking behaviours and in particular to preventing suicidal behaviours among young people. Yellow Ribbon has no right whatsoever to claim that they make any positive contribution to suicide prevention.”

Yellow Ribbon replied:

“This type of comment places Yellow Ribbon in a classic double-bind. Obviously a programme cannot produce outcome evidence until it has been implemented for a period of time. Clearly the general thrust of the Yellow Ribbon programme is based on reasonable principles, and as already explained, work is under way to evaluate both process and outcome. Some initial efforts at review of processes have been initiated, for example in the above-mentioned questionnaire to ambassadors in January 2003, the majority (45.5%) said the training increased their knowledge a lot; and 27.5% said the training increased their knowledge somewhat. The majority of ambassadors said training increased their knowledge of where to seek help a lot (40.9%) and 29.6% ambassadors said the training increased their knowledge somewhat. In addition Youthline has recorded a 500% increase in calls and relationship services have also seen a marked increase. Whenever asked if we believe we have contributed to the drop in youth suicide we state that our belief is that education and awareness is very important, but we always reiterate if there is a significant decrease, it is due to the efforts of many organisations and strategies.”

In fact, as the reference to the survey of ambassadors points out, despite claims to the contrary, Yellow Ribbon was responsibly cooperating in an evaluation by the Injury Prevention Research Centre at Auckland University to establish an ‘evidence base’. This survey found a large majority of the ambassadors strongly approving of, and supporting, the work of Yellow Ribbon. A small number expressed doubts about its value, but these were of not sufficient ‘concern’ to warrant being followed up by the research project. A larger minority thought there should be more professional backup and support. However, as the researchers point out, most of those who responded (in fact a very low response rate of 37%) had been ambassadors for less than one year. This reflects the fact that Yellow Ribbon was by 2002 barely 3 years into its operation and was feeling its way and very willing to learn from the “evidence”. Moreover, the concerns of the researchers expressed in this report (lack of training, reported failure to refer young people at risk to adults or professionals etc) were clearly echoing the concerns of those ambassadors who wanted better training and more professional backup. Overall, the project endorsed Yellow Ribbon as a sound approach to youth suicide prevention.

However, the “concerns” that surfaced in the survey of Ambassadors were then used in the Ministry funded research on peer based programs as “evidence” that Yellow Ribbon’s program was “potentially harmful”. The results of this research were leaked to the Sunday Star Times which sensationalized YR as “dangerous”. Yellow Ribbon had its own evaluation of the research done by Professor Ian Evans and Dr Narelle Dawson, who found it to be “unscientific” and “unprofessional”.

The Evans/Dawson critique makes it clear that Yellow Ribbon is under attack by Government agencies. I would add that it was “unscientific” to misuse the survey of ambassadors based on a small sample in which an overwhelming endorsement of Yellow Ribbon by its ambassadors as cause for “potential harm” where suicides may results from promoting “awareness”, and Ambassadors put at risk in taking too much responsibility for counseling suicidal peers. It is clearly “unprofessional” in its cynical misrepresentation of Yellow Ribbon as lacking a theoretical base, and not interested in evaluating its methods, when it had initiated, designed and planned a world beating outstanding evaluation project and willingly collaborated with the University of Auckland Injury Prevention Research Centre to do the survey of its ambassadors.

While the survey of ambassadors was a world first in actually asking ambassadors (and not gatekeepers) to at least talk about their role, the obvious next step was not taken. Young people at risk were not asked if Yellow Ribbon had reduced their suicide attempts. Nor were those who did commit suicide tracked to see if their suicide was in any way caused by the “awareness” generated by the Yellow Ribbon program. Such critical questions were addressed by the Evans and Dawson evaluation plan. Moreover, the anecdotal evidence of testimonies of both ambassadors and young people helped by Yellow Ribbon and conveyed to the organizers was ignored as invalid and unreliable.

Yet, during the years of its existence from 1996 to 2005, suicide rates for the younger age groups (15-24) showed a decline of around a third. This was no doubt due to a combination of factors the most important of which is social inequality. But on the face of it, the “evidence” speaks for the efficacy of Yellow Ribbon rather than against it. So why did the IPRC researchers base their evaluation of Yellow Ribbon on the opinion of professionals (teachers and health workers) and not ask the young people who “talked” to the ambassadors, whether they thought suicide “awareness” prevented suicides or not? If Yellow Ribbon was at risk of doing “harm” why not ask the very people thought to be at risk? Why not fund the very good research project initiated by Yellow Ribbon that would have answered all these questions?

Suicide Prevention orthodoxyy

New Zealand has the third highest (behind the Russian Federation and Finland) suicide rate for young males, and the third highest for young females. The male rate is high because of the rate for Maori males in the youth age group 15-24 is up with Australian Aboriginal youth at 3 or 4 times more than non-Maori and non-Aboriginal respectively. The 2006 statistics Read the rest of this entry »





How the ‘Labour left’ sold out NZ workers in the 1990s

20 05 2008

Book Review

No Left Turn: The Distortion of NZ’s history by Greed, Bigotry and Right-wing politics

By Chris Trotter. Random House, NZ, 2007

Part One: Keeping the social democratic torch alight

Chris Trotter’s new book is an attempt to revive the flagging hopes of the social democratic left in New Zealand. He sees NZ history as a long struggle of the working class majority to win state power and bring about the ideals of an egalitarian democracy. That they have been prevented, as the subtitle of the book says, is down to “greed, bigotry and right-wing politics”. Basically the right-wing minority with the power and wealth conspired to keep the worker majority out of power for most of NZ’s history. But it the periods when workers did win parliamentary support for progressive legislation that Trotter uses to hold up hopes in the ‘pot of gold at the end of the rainbow’ and boost our hopes of taking power some happy day.

Trotter borrows heavily from the late Bruce Jesson, the left republican intellectual and journalist. He paraphrases Jesson:

“So it is in these shaky isles. While the successors of those who came to these shores in search of power and wealth remain locked in bitter conflict with those who came in search of equality and justice, nothing of enduring worth can be constructed in this country.”

But he couldn’t be more wrong. To say that conflict between these two forces is un-necessary and prevents real progress, is to reduce class struggle to the megalomania of ‘extremist’ and ‘undemocratic’ leaders who herd workers as if they were sheep. This is an insult to workers, especially as it is not true. In fact Jesson understood clearly that class struggle was not an epithet for ‘extremists’ pissing on the workers, but a real force that pushed people to extremes to fight for their class. Yet he could not see that the middle class is a potentially fascist force unless it is won over by a powerful working class.

Jesson made the mistake of seeing classes as a colonial hangover which could be overcome, or pushed to the margins, in a republican Aotearoa. Founding the republic was the task of the middle class socialist intellectuals. He died disappointed. He argued in his last writings that the new right won in the 1980s because the ‘left’ intellectuals did not put up a fight. The sad irony was that it wasn’t a failure of the revolutionary left to fight. It was Jesson’s ‘left, the social democrats in the Labour Party and unions who didn’t fight. They were not the vanguard of a republican anti-imperialism after all. They were part of the middle class who had always been in an alliance with international finance capitalism.

Historically they had earned their money dividing the working class and isolating the militants so they could be more easily smashed by the farmers and the bosses. This was the pattern in 1912, WW1, 1930s, 1951 and in the 1980s. Despite the arguments of Jesson’s one-time political ally, Owen Gager, that the Labour Party under Harry Holland betrayed the anti-war movement during the First World War, Jesson never recognized the historic treachery of social democratic intellectuals. Today, when a new fight against the new right is emerging, Trotter follows in Jesson’s footsteps, parading the petty bourgeois social democrats as the salvation of the working class.

Why another old Labour Party Story?

Or to put it another way, Trotter in following Jesson, is retelling the old story of the sell-out Labourites for today’s consumption so that the new layers of militants will reject revolution and stick with the worldwide ‘socialist’ utopia of the reformist World Social Forum. To do this he has to render the outright betrayals of the Labourites in the past as necessary, just and strategic, isolating the militant wreckers and rendering the completion of the democratic socialist project possible today.

This means patching together a ‘democratic socialist’ version of NZ history from the books of the petty bourgeois intellectuals who provided the ideological smokescreens for the ‘good’ men Trotter worships – the men who straddled the great divide between the greedy and the needy – Dick Seddon, Micky Savage and Norm Kirk. The first is W Pember Reeves the author of ‘Aotearoa: Land of the Long White Cloud’.

Reeves was the first Minister of Labour in Seddon’s earth-breaking Liberal government until he was sacked and sent off to London as High Commissioner. He was a ‘Fabian Socialist’ – the first official current of petty bourgeois intellectuals who saw the British Labour Party as the vehicle for democratic socialism.

Before he was removed for his ‘extremism’ Reeves was responsible for the Industrial, Conciliation and Arbitration Act which created a state Arbitration Court as ‘referee’ between labour and capital. But the great divide opened up again when the Court refused a wage order and the Red Fed broke from the Court in 1908 and began a strike wave that ended in the defeat of the General Strike of 1913. Of course Jesson was right up to a point. Working class militancy between 1908 and 1913 was imposed by British imperialist shipowners and mineowners.

But if NZ workers were going to defeat British owners they had to lead the national struggle to socialism –to nationalize industry, banks and the land – and not capitulate to the local capitalist agents of the British bosses and the militant petty bourgeois farmers who enlisted as Massey’s ‘Cossacks’ to break the General Strike. The militant left was defeated by the bosses’ state which used scabs and the military to impose the class alliance of the middle class and the bourgeoisie on the unions. This defeat was compounded by the jingoistic rallying of workers into the colonial class alliance that went to fight the bosses’ war.

But wait! The great hope for the future which could build a majority from the left and centre in the image of the Liberal Party (which had united workers and small farmers) was about to be born from the battle of the extremes – a social compromise in its conception –the Labour Party. Here of course Trotter has to argue that something good came out of an un-necessary class confrontation. Yet, almost every historian has recognized that the Labour party was an attempt to reconcile militant and moderate wings of the labour movement in the aftermath of the outbreak of class struggle. It gave birth to the vehicle of democratic socialism – the Labour Party, its main ideologues like Bill Sutch, and provided its leaders like Savage, Semple and Fraser.

Bill Sutch was the giant of social democracy from the 1930s to the 1970s. All social democrats in NZ are at heart Sutchites and Jesson and Trotter are no exception. The ‘golden age’ of NZ is period from the election victory of 1935 to 1949 when Labour was defeated in a right wing backlash linked to the onset of the Cold War and of US hegemony in NZ.

The issue is whether this period creates the template for re-founding democratic socialism in NZ, or a historic settlement that would only last so long as the middle-class and capitalist class profited from it.

‘State socialism’ or bust

The Sutchites take the first view. The workers and working farmers now formed the majority in NZ. Labour’s victory was a triumph for social democracy. It insulated the economy and nationalized the critical productive and distributional sectors, and introduced social security for the working class. What Jesson and Trotter after him call the ‘post-war settlement’ was a class compromise in which workers, petty bourgeois and capitalists all appeared to all benefit from economic growth. It was ended when Labour swung to the right to keep the centre onside after the war.

FP Walsh the leader of the FOL was backing Fraser’s rightward shift to keep the bloc of workers, poor farmers and manufacturers in power and to stop a right wing government from breaking the settlement and smashing the labour movement. He almost succeeded in 1949. What went wrong? As Trotter says: “Had the militants held their fire during the ‘scoundrel years’ of 1946-49, it is more than conceivable Fraser and Walsh could have made it across the churning waters that separated wartime stringency from peacetime plenty.” Labour lost 47.2% to National’s 51.9%.

The right wing National government, aligned to the rich farmers and foreign capital, came to power in 1949 determined to smash the unions so that they did not gain from the post war economic boom. Workers had fought the war on behalf of capitalism, suffered the losses, and now demanded a better share of the new wealth. When Labour and the FOL under Walsh denied them that victory bonus, the same unions that formed the backbone of the Red Fed in 1908 split from the FOL to form the TUC.

Now, according to Trotter, Walsh had his own stabilization plan to allocate fair shares in postwar wealth, but it would be allocated centrally from above by the FOL tops, the Government, and the bosses representatives in committee. He was determined to drive through this corporatist plan. He would smash the militants to save the whole labour movement and the prospects of selling his ‘stabilisation plan’ to Labour or National governments. He made sure the militants would rise up against the FOL by baiting Jock Barnes to force a confrontation that could only end in their total defeat. Unaware that they were pawns in this plan their struggle was “heroic but futile”.

For Trotter then, the militants let down the moderate majority by resisting Labour’s right swing, and were then sacrificed for the sake of defending the gains of the whole labour movement. Trotter tells us that not only Barnes but the whole militant wing of the movement brought their defeat on themselves for breaking with the moderates. Had it not been Walsh who did the dirty deed, National would have done it by breaking the Labour class alliance and smashing the post-war settlement for good. The Labour Party could never have recovered from such a defeat. Oh Dear!

Revolution and decolonization

Trotter is adamant that workers had no choice but to huddle inside the Labour Party to shelter from the rampages of capitalism in this period. The evidence is that post-war attempts at socialism outside the Soviet sector did not survive. But it was the Stalinist bureaucracies that played the main role in the defeating the socialist revolutions in Greece and Italy. When Trotter says that any attempt by the left to push towards socialism in NZ would have been smashed by an anticommunist bloc of local capital, the US and sections of the petty bourgeoisie, how does he know this? The evidence shows that the traitors were not the militants who went into fight to defend the interests of the whole working class and won the support of most workers and small farmers, but the leadership of the FOL and Labour Party who sided with US imperialism and the NZ capitalists, to split the militants from the moderates to then smash them.

The revolutionary Marxist argues that the war was an imperialist war which drafted workers to kill one another. But the war also had the effect of arming and radicalizing workers and in some countries such as Yugoslavia, Greece and Italy popular armies routed the Nazis and took power. These were not isolated ultra-left insurrections, but mass movements of workers and poor peasants. The imperialists had no means of defeating these movements by themselves. The Stalinists were the only force that could do this because they dominated the mass Communist parties and the unions. The US and Britain did a deal at Yalta in which the SU would get control of Eastern Europe in return for containing and defeating the revolutionary movements in Western Europe. The SU did this with ruthless efficiency justifying it in the name of workers joining with ‘progressive’ national capitalists to form ‘democratic socialist’ popular front governments.

The pattern in NZ is very similar. The working class was impatient for ‘its’ government to deliver on its promises. But this government was a bloc of workers, small farmers and manufacturers. Its purpose was always to subordinate the workers to the interests of national bourgeoisie; to put profits before people. So workers would have to wait until the bosses had their full dividend before claiming higher wages.

When F.P. Walsh was a burning revolutionary in the US in 1917, the workers of the world were afire with enthusiasm for the Bolshevik revolution. By the 1940s Walsh was a rightwing labor bureaucrat operating hand in glove with the Labour Party leadership of Fraser. The FOL was a bureaucratic machine with its numbers bolstered by compulsory unionism. Walsh collaborated with Fraser to suppress rank and file militancy during and after the war. When the big one blew up in 1951 he could be trusted by the bosses to isolate and smash the militants in an alliance with the National government’s emergency regulations and US imperialism’s backing. His role as the leader of the ‘responsible unions’ was warmly appreciated by both the Auckland Chamber of Commerce and by the National Party. http://eprint.uq.edu.au/archive/00000935/01/tb_bchp_04.pdf

What we see here is evidence that the Labour Party, while based in the unions, had to first protect the profits of the bankers, manufacturers and farmers, before it could pay out to the workers. To retain any hope of being the government Labour had to promise to control the labor movement on behalf of the capitalists. To do this it had to defeat the militant unions who objected to wage cuts when profits were climbing.

Walsh played the same role in NZ that the Stalinists did in Europe, blocking with the capitalists to smash the militant left to stop them winning the support of the majority of the working class to defeat the National Government and the rotten leadership of the Labour Party and FOL. Of course this was the position of Jock Barnes and is argued forcefully by Tom Bramble in his Introduction to Barnes’ memoirs Never a White Flag. http://communistworker.blogspot.com/search/label/Jock%20Barnes

For Trotter though, Barnes did not represent the interests of the working class at all. He was an embittered maverick. The defeat of 1951 was the lesser evil; the militants could never have won, and the vehicle for democratic socialism survived, if tarnished and burned off on the left. The Labour Party could live to fight another election and implement the ‘corporatist’ Walsh Plan where the union, government and bosses representatives collaborate to develop the economy and share out the increased productivity of the workers. Labour can bide its time with its structures and historic gains intact until a new opportunity to push forward the boundaries of democratic socialism arises.

That opportunity will not come until the postwar boom is over. Then facing a massive economic crisis, it is Labour that rejects its social democratic past and openly embraces imperialism with Rogernomics.

Part 2: Social Democracy fails the test of neo-liberal reforms

The first part of this review ended with Trotter’s claim that the Savage model of the Labour Party survived the post war cold war and attacks on the ‘left’ and lived to fight another day. That day was the Rogernomic revolution in the 1980s. This became the key test of social democracy. If the Fourth Labour government betrayed the workers in capitulating to the ‘new right’ what was left of democratic socialism?

The standard argument of the democratic socialists is that the party was hijacked by Treasury and the right wing cabal around Roger Douglas and Richard Prebble. The left and centre of the party are portrayed as victims of this hijacking along with the rest of NZ workers.

This is the story that Trotter retails with a few more twists. But the serious analysis of the failure of the ‘left’ to defend the workers from Rogernomics is conveniently overlooked. Especially since the ‘left’ around Anderton had more than a third of the party delegates in support of a program of nationalization! The centre under Helen Clark and the SUP/FOL was trying to do a deal with the Rogernomes along the lines of the Australian ‘compact’ i.e. a form of neo-corporatism where the government, unions and employers would run the economy together. This required that the unions remain a strong centralized organization with a compulsory membership.

However the ‘left’ remained dependent on the centre and was stopped by the centre from expelling the right. This was revealed most clearly when the Engineers union bosses stopped Matt McCarten from rolling Prebble in Auckland Central. To avoid Prebble taking the Labour Party to court, the centre threatened Rex Jones of the EPMU to end compulsory unionism. Jones used this threat to bring the ‘left’ into line. This tells us that the left was just as much part of the centralized labour bureaucratic machine as the centre.

The pretext that Anderton used to split was his opposition to the sale of the Bank of New Zealand [BNZ]. He was sacked by caucus but reinstated by the Party Council. But rather than stick around to fight in the unions and the Labour Party organization, he resigned on May1st 1989 to form the New Labour Party. This left Lange and the centre to battle on against the Rogernomic machine. Despite removing Douglas and Prebble from Cabinet, Lange could not oppose Douglas when he was re-instated to Cabinet by caucus on August 3. Without the left he was too weak to stop the Rogernomic machine from rolling on.

Anderton’s split allowed the right to use its dominance of the parliamentary caucus against the Party to undermine and destroy Lange and force his resignation on August 7, 1989. Trotter makes no criticism of Anderton’s decision to split clearly agreeing that Anderton made the right move. Trotter was himself a leading figure in the formation of the New Labour Party.

Isn’t it incredible that the left would abandon the party of Savage just because the Rogernomes had taken temporary control of the parliamentary party? The core working class did not abandon the party. Even at its lowest point of 1993 Labour support never went below 34.7% of the electorate. And as we will see in the core labour seats it fought back and rejected New Labour.

Thus Anderton showed absolute contempt for the rank and file organization of the party where he claimed he had a large minority. By turning his back on the Party he showed that the left had no confidence in the union movement, especially the more blue-collar Trade Union Federation [TUF] that had refused to join the state union dominated Council of Trade Unions [CTU]. It was also tactically stupid as the left knew that it was handing the party to the Rogernomes when there was no visible groundswell of support in the union ranks for a split or the formation of a new Labour Party that could quickly replace the old.

Worse, the left knew that the majority of Labour voters were not abandoning the party. In 1987 Labour was re-elected with an increased majority, despite some Labour abstentions, because non-Labour voters swung over to Labour on the strength of Rogernomics.

Yet the Anderton ‘left’ didn’t split then –it stayed on inside Labour for nearly two years. The reason was that Anderton hoped to reclaim some control at the top of the Party. He resigned after being narrowly defeated for the Presidency and still with support from the NZ Council which backed his stand against the sale of the BNZ. It wasn’t a split that took into account the left’s actual support inside and outside the party. It was a bureaucratic split designed to allow time to prepare an electoral challenge to Labour when it seemed to be heading for inevitable defeat.

But this gamble was based on a miscalculation. Anderton’s desertion wasn’t matched by Labour supporters. In 1990, 14% of 1987 Labour voters abstained, 13% went back to National (having switched to Labour in ‘87), 7% went to New Labour and 6% to the Greens. Overall, 35.1% voted Labour, 6.9% Greens and 5.2% New Labour giving a total for the combined left of 47.2% to National’s 47.8%! Put another way, Labour lost over 230,000 votes, while between them New Labour and the Greens got almost 220,000 votes. Yet, despite the abstentions and defections to New Labour and the Greens, Labour’s core constituency of over 640,000 voters remained intact.

What if the ‘left’ had stayed and fought inside?

The question that Trotter doesn’t ask is this: would the level of Labour voters’ abstention have been as high had the left stayed in the party fighting to the bitter end?

Would voters have left Labour in the same numbers if New Labour had not existed? New Labour supporters were those who opposed Rogernomics most strongly. They should also have been most committed to democracy within the party. But they rejected democracy inside the party when they walked out 18 months before the 1990 election effectively disenfranchising many party members and delegates.

Many of the Labour voters who abstained in 1990 were not prepared to vote for New Labour. A survey of Labour supporters found that 51% who abstained stated that they retained their loyalty to Labour compared with 37% of those who voted for New Labour (Vowles et al Towards Consensus? 165). These amounted to several thousand Labour supporters who abstained yet instinctively rejected the bureaucratic New Labour split.

Evidence that their political instincts were correct comes from The Great Experiment by Castles et al. They argue that Labour supporters in NZ reacted strongly against Rogernomics and wanted a return to ‘interventionism’ and ‘collectivism’. This suggests that when New Labour failed to stay and fight for these principles, especially after the defeat and resignation of Lange, the Government was seen as still committed to de-regulation and Rogernomics. In taking the defence of collectivism outside the Party, the New Labour split undermined the already weak labour movement and its fight against Rogernomics. (207-8).

The second question that Trotter does not ask is this: did those who switched from Labour to vote New Labour or Green split the Labour vote and lose Labour seats?

In 1990 National won by a massive 38 seats. How many of those were lost because of the split? In a number of core working class electorates the Labour, Green, New Labour and Democratic vote combined was more than that of the National winner. In a few of these the New Labour vote alone exceeded National’s majority and was likely to have lost the seat for Labour; [in Gisborne (Labour missed by 618; NL vote was 804); Horowhenua (Labour lost by 413 votes; NL got 744 votes); Miramar (Labour lost by 178; NL got 996); Onehunga (Labour lost by 679; NL got 880 votes); Onslow (Labour lost by 396; NL got 687); Roskill (Labour lost by 722, NL got 876); Te Atatu (Labour lost by 587, NL got 1086); Titirangi (Labour lost by 116, NL got 1160); Western Hutt (Labour lost by 532, NL got 645).]

So the New Labour vote alone cost Labour 9 seats. If we include Anderton’s own seat of Sydenham, NL cost Labour 10 seatsl. The total switch to New Labour, Greens and Democrats (the future Alliance) accounted for at least another 11 Labour losses. [Birkenhead, East Coast Bays, Eden, Glenfield, Hastings, Heretaunga, Manawatu, New Plymouth, Timaru, Waitakere, and Wanganui.]

So Labour lost 21 seats to voters who switched to the parties that would soon become the Alliance. A loss that would have been around 40 to 46 became as a result 19 to 67!

Thus when we look at the received wisdom as to why Labour was soundly defeated in 1990 we find that it was only due to National winning support, but Labour losing it to abstentions and defections to the ‘left’ i.e. New Labour and the Greens. For the majority of defectors it was a protest non-vote or vote to the ‘left’ to punish Labour for its betrayals. But what a way to punish Labour, to leave it with only 29 seats in parliament facing an more draconian Rogernomics attack, Ruthonomics, that saw benefits slashed by 10% and the imposition of the ECA to smash the unions.

The National Minister of Labour, Bill Birch, conceded that he expected the strong union fightback outside parliament to force him to concede more to the unions, but this fizzled when Ken Douglas did a deal with Birch to ensure that the ECA would allow unions to be ‘bargaining agents’.

In other words, the ‘left’ New Labour Party had split the Labour Party and weakened it severely inside parliament, yet did almost nothing to put up a strong fight outside to lead the rank and file in the unions against the sell-out CTU leadership of Ken Douglas et. al. It was doing what the parliamentary party always did, refusing to support extra-parliamentary strike action, and keeping its powder dry to fight another day in parliament.

Moreover, the New Labour Party failed to mobilize much more than 5% electoral support. With the formation of the Alliance a few more former Labour voters and swingers moved to the Alliance whose share of the vote went up to 18.2% (4% more than the combined 1990 vote of the constituent parties).

Yet there is no evidence that it was core Labour voters that swung to the Alliance in 1993 after 3 years of National’s Ruthonomics, and the Rogernomes had been defeated inside the party. Labour’s share of the vote reduced marginally from 35.1% to 34.7%. But its tally of seats went from 29 to 45. That is, Labour won back 16 seats without any significant increase in the number of those voting because National’s support had greatly evaporated. What counted against Labour was the role the Alliance played in the marginal, mixed class seats in the smaller cities and provinces.

How the ‘left’ kept National in power through the 1990s

So the next question Trotter fails to ask is: was the NLP (which had formed the Alliance with Mana Motuhake, and the petty bourgeois Greens, Democrats and Liberals) responsible for this loss in 1993? If these parties had cost Labour 21 seats in 1990, how many did they cost in 1993?

Even though Labour’s vote remained static, the big loss for National meant Labour had the chance of winning many more seats. So how many seats did the Alliance cost Labour?

It seems that the New Labour component of ‘collective’ workers was itself was not a key factor. The most obvious result of 1993 is that in its core seats particularly in South Auckland, more workers rejected the Labour/Alliance split. In Otara for example Philip Field reclaimed the seat that New Labour and the Greens had cost Labour in 1990, with the SAME VOTE, while National lost nearly 7000 votes and the Alliance lost 1000 votes. Other core working class seats where the Labour vote held or went up while the Alliance, i.e. the New Labour vote, went down were: Christchurch Central; Eastern Hutt; Mangere, Mirimar, Mt Albert, New Plymouth, Pencarrow, Porirua, Roskill, Timaru, and Yaldhurst.

So while the New Labour component lost votes in the core Labour seats, reflecting the class wisdom of the rank and file Labour supporters in its urban heartlands, the Alliance cost Labour an electoral victory in many marginal seats where it would have won without increasing its vote, or even with a reduced vote: Awarua, Birkenhead, Eastern Bay of Plenty, Glenfield , Heretaunga, Kaimai, Kaipara, Kapiti, Marlborough, Matakana, Papakura, Raglan, Rangiora, Rangatikei, Rotorua, Selwyn, Waikato, Wairarapa, Waitakere, Wellington-Karori, Western Hutt and Whangarei.

So, despite Labour’s overall static vote, and the collapse of National, it was clear that almost two thirds of the electorate had voted against Rogernomics. A class re-alignment took place when the working class core of one-third of the electorate stuck by Labour, while National was reduced to its core one-third bourgeois support. The petty bourgeois Alliance and NZ First were now sharing a ‘balance of power’ in relation to the two main parties. So, for 10 days parliament was hung on the middle class.

Mike Moore, then Labour leader, tried to break this class deadlock by embracing the middle class. He said that National had no “moral authority to govern” and proposed that Labour, the Alliance and NZ First form a loose coalition around a 5 point Xmas present.

The 5 points in this plan were; to bring MMP forward to 1995 (looking at an early election!); reverse the privatization of health and the Accident Compensation Corporation; repeal the Employment Contracts Act, and abolish the 26 week stand down for the dole (which punished the unemployed by not paying up for 26 weeks after they lost their jobs). And all of this by Christmas!

Anderton played the Grinch and rejected this plan. Instead he offered Alliance support to the party had the most seats if it abandoned Rogernomics! Not repeal anything, just do nothing! A recount gave National another seat and Labour offered Sir Basil Arthur as speaker to allow National a majority. A by-election in Selwyn in 1994 saw National come within 346 votes of the Alliance winning the safe conservative seat! This confirmed what the ‘93 election had shown, that the Alliance had picked up the majority of its votes in mixed class electorates, because the Greens and Democrats appealed to middle class, self-employed and small business people.

Workers Power [a revolutionary Trotskyist group] wrote at the time:

“Opposition Collapses: the 1.2 million who voted against National last November have seen their votes go down the dunny [toilet]. All the opposition parties have refused to oppose National. The Alliance in the days after the election promised to use its two votes to keep National in power if it did nothing. This was a total betrayal of its supporters. The Government by ‘doing nothing’ could allow its radical reforms already in place to continue to destroy workers lives. The bosses would continue to see a ‘recovery’ in their profits but at the expense of a further collapse of the labour movement.” (Workers Power, “New-age or age-old exploitation?” #98 February/March 1994)

Here, then, we have the complete bankruptcy of the Labour Government of Savage that stays aloof from real class struggles so that it can supposedly defend the collectivist politics supported by the majority of moderate workers in parliament. When it gets hijacked by the new right which attacks that majority, the ‘left’ abandons it to rebuild the ‘Savage’ party. When that fails, it then forms an electoral Alliance with middle class Greens, Liberals and Democrats, while the core working class majority it claims to protect remains loyal to the Labour Party.

So, during the 90’s when two thirds of the electorate opposed Rogernomics, Anderton preferred to keep the lame duck National Party in power rather than allow the working class majority to put Labour’s promises to repeal major planks of Rogernomics like the ECA to the test. Instead, a decade of defaults and defeats accumulated while the labour movement marked time inside and outside parliament.

Communists don’t expect any capitalist government, including Labour Governments, to legislate for socialism. That’s something that can only come from a workers revolution that overthrows the state including parliament. But while workers have illusions in social democracy we need to re-elect Labour Governments in order to expose them and the futility of parliamentary reforms.

Trotter is an apologist for reformism, and seeks to cover up and prettify its betrayals to prevent workers from breaking with it. His failure to confront the betrayal of Anderton and the Alliance in serving the ‘new right’ for a decade in the 1990s clearly reveals this cover up.





Saint Jacques: Derrida and the Ghost of Marxism

2 03 2008

Derrida

Introduction

For the bourgeoisie, the collapse of “communism” made the world-historic victory of capitalism seem certain. Yet the contradictions of capitalism immediately called the new world order into question as globalisation brought with it what Jacques Derrida calls the “10 plagues”. Apologists for capitalism are now fearful of the return of Marx’s ghost. George Soros sees the ghost in the form of the anarchy of finance capital. Anthony Giddens sees the ghost in the rise of left or right fundamentalist ideology. Without realising it, they pose the problem in terms familiar to Marxists: the contradiction between dead and living labour and the rise of the dead reclaimed by the living. But is there a way out for capitalism?

2. Jacques Derrida enters the fray with his book Specters of Marx. He returns to Marx, or at least, “one spirit” of Marx in the German Ideology. This is the “spirit” of Marx which became lost to totalitarian Marxism — the “spirit” rediscovered in the extreme individualism of Max Stirner, who deluded himself that he was a free floating “unique” ego not subject to any social laws. By reclaiming the powers of alienated social being from the Hegelian god, Stirner worshipped his self as his personal god. By rediscovering this formerly unnoticed “spirit” of Marx, Derrida claims to find a way out of capitalism’s plagues with the call for a “new International”. Not a Marxist International on the side of living labour, but rather a reworked messianism of the religion of the abstract ego. This is the path of individual redemption, an expression of the alienation of dead labour that can never reclaim itself as the spirit of living labour. In appropriating Marx, Derrida provides the ultimate apology for capitalist reaction in the name of a “Marx” — an ideology of personal religious salvation which serves as a philosophical left cover for the “Third Way”.

3. In a recent reply to a number of responses to his book, Derrida re-asserts his messianic claims when he accuses his strongest critics of being “proprietal” and “patriarchal” under the ghostly influence of “Marx the father”.1 While this is undeserved, I argue that Derrida’s Marxist critics nevertheless fall short of conjuring away Saint Jacques because they represent the flawed tradition of Western Marxism — the failure of materialist dialectics grounded in the ontology of living labour. Therefore, the Marxist counter to Derrida’s apologetics for capitalism is to be found in reclaiming the dialectical method that Marx applies in the German Ideology and which Lukacs, Lenin and Trotsky attempt to develop in the unity of theory and practice of the revolutionary party.

Post-Marxist Apologists for the New World Disorder

4. George Soros, one of the richest men in the world, has spent millions trying to restore capitalism in Russia. But he lost much of his money with the collapse of the Russian economy in August 1998. He claims that the global finance system is out of control and needs to be regulated. His calls for a return to an “international” like Bretton Woods, or some body attached to the IMF, have been echoed with increasing frequency after the so-called Asian “meltdown”. His fear is that the casino of finance capital will bring an end to the new world order and the return to anarchy and revolution.2 If Soros fears the collapse of the new world order, Tony Giddens, the apostle of the post-scarcity global society, claims that the new world order can be managed by social scientists as advisers to the politicians of the “Third Way”.3 The recent discussions between Soros and Giddens about the unstable state of the world are premised on the “death” and “burial” of socialism.4 Giddens believes that socialism has been banished: “. . . the spectre which disturbed the slumbers of bourgeois Europe for more than seventy years . . . has been returned to its nether world”.5

5. Yet it seems that these speeches at the graveside of Marxism are premature. The ghost of Marxism continues to haunt the big bourgeoisie despite every effort to exorcise it. The Communist Manifesto is being fleshed out as never before by a capitalist world system out of control. The end of the cold war and collapse of “communism” has allowed capitalism unrivalled domination over its “other”. Yet everywhere the forces of disorder manifest themselves — from the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the former Soviet Union, the instability of the “Middle East” and Central Asia, to the renewed worker and peasant uprisings in Latin America and South Asia. It is in the face of such rampant disorder and deepening divisions that a more robust defence of capitalism is required. In order to exorcise the ghost of communism, it is necessary to provide a philosophy of rebellion and redemption that can empower the intelligentsia to confuse and disorient the masses. Post-Marxism and the new liberalism of the centre need an anti-foundationist foundation. Post-Marxism needs a new priesthood.6

6. If Soros is its financier and Giddens its sociologist, then perhaps Derrida is the philosopher of post-Marxism.7 His mission? The “new middle” needs to pre-empt the left not merely by declaring Marx dead (since who has seen the body?), but by res-erecting the body of the father as the son — Derrida! From the safety of “After the fall” (of “communism”), Jacques Derrida, darling of the post-structuralists writes Specters of Marx, claiming that we are all in “debt” to Marxism as the New World Disorder crumbles.8 Derrida asks, “Where is Marxism going? Where are we going with it?” He recounts how he re-read The Communist Manifesto after some decades. “I knew very well there was a ghost waiting there, and from the opening, from the raising of the curtain. Now, of course, I have just discovered, in truth I have just remembered what must have been, haunting my memory: the first noun of the Manifesto, and this time in the singular, is ’specter’: ‘A Specter is haunting Europe ­ the specter of communism’”.9 Derrida’s salutes Marx and reveals his desire to reclaim at least “one spirit” of Marx by de-totalising Marx-ISM.10

Upon re-reading the Manifesto and a few other great works of Marx, I said to myself that I know of few texts in the philosophical tradition, perhaps none, whose lesson seemed more urgent today, provided that one take into account what Marx and Engels themselves say (for example in Engel’s “Preface” to the 1888 re-edition) about their own possible “aging” and their intrinsically irreducible historicity. What other thinker has ever issued a similar warning in such an explicit fashion? Who has ever called for the transformation to come of his own theses? Not only in view of some progressive enrichment of knowledge, which would change nothing in the order of a system, but so as to take into account there, another account, the effects of rupture and restructuration? And so as to incorporate in advance, beyond any possible programming, the unpredictability of new knowledge, new techniques and new givens? No text in the tradition seems as lucid concerning the way in which the political is becoming worldwide, concerning the irreducibility of the technical and the media in the current of the most thinking thought — and this goes beyond the railroad and the newspapers of the time whose powers were analysed in such an incomparable way in the Manifesto. And few texts have shed so much light on law, international law, and nationalism.11

7. Derrida repeats the familiar refrain that Marxism is transformed as society is transformed. But what social transformations is he talking about? The power of Marxism to predict the changes Derrida talks of — in politics, technology and media — comes from the method of abstraction which uncovers the developmental dynamic of capitalism and its laws of motion. Marx expected that Marxism would disappear along with the withering of the state under socialism. Yet neither capitalism nor Marxism has been fundamentally transformed despite the rush of ex-Marxists into the post-al camp.12 However, Derrida believes that there is a “Marxism” that can be true to transformed capitalism. It was the “Marxism” that Marx denied at birth. So Derrida wants to magically “transform” Marxism at its inception. He wants to reclaim the “memory” of Marxism from the doctrinaires, and to produce a new Marx for the “future”.

It will always be a fault not to read and re-read and discuss Marx — which is to say also a few others — and to go beyond scholarly “reading” or “discussion”. It will be more and more a fault, a failing of theoretical, philosophical, political responsibility. When the dogma machine and the “Marxist” ideological apparatuses (States, parties, cells, unions, and other places of doctrinal production) are in the process of disappearing, we no longer have any excuse, only alibis, for turning away from this responsibility. There will be no future without this. Not without Marx, no future without Marx, without the memory and the inheritance of Marx: in any case a certain Marx, or his genius, of at least one of his spirits. For this will be our hypothesis or rather our bias: there is more than one of them, there must be more than one of them.13

8. Derrida recognises that the end of “official” Marxism has left a political vacuum to be filled. He is appalled at the apparent victory of the new right and wants to reclaim Marxism to bolster the appeal of deconstruction.14 He will do this by recouping “one of [Marx's] spirits” conjured up from his youth which will bear a striking resemblance to deconstruction. Derrida recognises the “inheritance” of Marxism that cannot be wished away by the “end of ideologists”. He knows because he opposed official Marxism in his youth, and it still haunts him.

Nevertheless, among all the temptations I will have to resist today, there would be the temptation of memory: to recount what was for me, and for those of my generation, who shared it during a whole lifetime, the experience of Marxism, the quasi-paternal figure of Marx, the way it fought in us with other filiations, the reading of texts and the interpretation of the world in which the Marxist inheritance was — and still remains, and so it will remain — absolutely and thoroughly determinate. One need not be a Marxist or a communist in order to accept this obvious fact. We all live in a world, some would say a culture, that still bears, at an incalculable depth, the mark of this inheritance, whether in a directly visible fashion or not. Among the traits that characterise a certain experience that belongs to my generation, that is, an experience that will have lasted at least forty years, and which is not over, I will isolate first of all a troubling paradox. I am speaking of a troubling effect of “déjà vu”, and even of a certain “toujours déjà vu”. I recall this malaise of perception, hallucination, and time because of the theme that brings us together this evening: “wither Marxism?” For many of us the question has the same age as we do. In particular for those who, and this was also my case, opposed, to be sure, de facto “Marxism” or “communism” (the Soviet Union, the International of Communist Parties, and everything that resulted from them, which is to say so very many things), but intended at least never to do so out of conservative or reactionary motivations or even moderate right-wing or republican positions.15

9. Derrida knows that Marxism will not “wither” even as its official versions have been declared dead and buried. This is because Marxism is as “alive” as the historic struggle between dead and living labour is “alive”.16 The ghost of Marxism has returned to haunt Sorosian capitalism today where hot money 30 times the dollar value of world trade is flooding around the world speculating in exchange rates. That ghost is all that alienated, dead labour coming home to haunt the bourgeoisie as speculative capital.17

10. The growth of speculative capital represents the overproduction of capital incapable of mobilising sufficient living labour to produce more alienated surplus-value because of insufficient profits. Overproduction of capital can be in commodity form represented by gluts that cannot find a market. It is expressed also as money capital, which cannot find a profitable productive investment. So the “out of control” growth of the financial system is ultimately a symptom of the necessary overproduction of capital. Similarly the threat of fundamentalism is a consequence of the inherent crisis and anarchy of capitalist production. The real spectre is and remains the spectre of communism. It is this fear of the return of the spectre that unites Soros, Giddens and Derrida as “ideologists” of post-Marxist apologetics of the “new middle” that now seeks to replace the neo-liberal ascendancy.18

The Ghost of Dead Labour

11. Under capitalism, “dead labour” is all the accumulated value of past labour owned as capital. It is owned as the private property of the capitalist class. Dead labour is therefore the accumulation of past living labour. It is in contradiction with living labour — the working class that daily produces more value. Dead labour is in contradiction with living labour because it is used to increase production of use-values only if it realises an exchange-value and creates a profit. This contradiction means that the accumulation of alienated dead labour is at the expense of the consumption of use-values to meet the needs of living labour. Production for profits starves the consumption (and therefore reproduction) of labour-power as a use value. The contradiction can only be resolved when living labour reclaims its dead labour and frees up its capacity to produce use-values to meet the needs of all. Arising out of these social relations of production, alienation is the “human” condition of capitalism. It represents the “spectre” of past labour that comes back to haunt the bourgeoisie in the form of proletarian revolution.19

12. Alienation is the state of being separated from your self. Marx says that humans live by their labour and by consuming the fruits of their labour, or they die. Therefore to be separated from your labour and its fruits is to be separated or estranged from your self. The “self” which bourgeois intellectuals today mystify as “identity” or “lifestyle” is empty, phoney, because it is not produced through our labour. Rather our ersatz “self” is passively reconstituted when we consume our alienated labour as reified commodities.20 Instead of seeing that it is our labour that is the value in the “things”, these “things” appear to have value in themselves. Social relations of production become inverted as social relations between “things”. Marx calls this commodity fetishism. Who we are, and what we are, is therefore the product of what we consume as alienated values. Because our labour and its value is alienated so is everything else. Money is now everything. I am, as Marx says, my hip pocket. I “shop therefore I am”.21

13. At the root of what is rotten about capitalism is the separation of workers from their labour so that they do not control the fruits of their labour. This means that they have lost any control over their lives. The less control they have the more they look for alien forces as the forces which determine their fate, or in desperation they challenge fate by appealing to the irrationality of chance or good luck. Under the grip of alien forces they are incapable of recognising that they are mere projections of their own power. They fail to see that they externalise their power to fate, chance, God etc as alien and outside their control. Is it not surprising that appeals to irrational, supernatural, out-of-world experiences, mysticism, and post-modernism, become alibis for not taking control of our-selves? The alienated bourgeois subject staring into the mirror! What the bourgeois fear is what they do not see in the mirror — the ghost of dead labour that haunts them; yet it will disappear only when living labour re-expropriates its dead labour and abolishes capital in a social revolution.

14. That is why for ideological reactionaries today the spectre is still proletarian “communism”. In the language of conservative neo-Hegelians like Fukuyama, it is the totality of the working class essence (forms of which appear as “socialist”, environmentalist, religious fundamentalism, etc.) posing a threat to the unique, finite freedom of the bourgeois subject, i.e. capital. Derrida demolishes Fukuyama as an objective idealist incapable of providing a rationale to defend democracy and human rights.22 This because such a “perfect liberal democracy” is in “contradiction” with the real world of the “10 plagues”, and cannot therefore persuade anyone that the “end of history” has arrived.23 But more than this, Hegelian idealism is another totalitarian system which has to be rejected along with its cross cousin, dialectical materialism.

15. Similarly, post-modernism’s ghost is too abstract for Derrida’s purposes because it repudiates the Enlightenment project and humanism as totality. It tries to gloss over capitalism’s contradictions and to present the commodification of the world as personal redemption. This retreat into an elitist consumption culture and identify politics is too crude to contain the masses who are deprived of use-values. We shall see that the precise point at which Derrida appropriates Marxism is his rejection of the ontology of labour as a use-value. This is to eliminate labour as productive of commodities to meet the needs of wage-labour. For to allow labour as use-value to remain as a necessary condition of capitalism is to recognise the necessary contradiction between the reproduction of society (forces of production) and the demands of capital accumulation (relations of production). Such a contradiction drives the laws of motion of capital and its intensifying periodic crises. This is what makes capitalism a transient, historical mode of production, which produces the pre-requisites for the collective transformation of capitalist social relations.

16. By conjuring away the real ghost of use-value, Derrida eliminates the material basis of social determinism that can undermine and threaten the messianic performance of the bourgeois individual.24 He eliminates it as labour both in the form of living labour appropriated as commodities, and as dead labour, appropriated in the past as the accumulated material/technical wealth of the productive forces. Therefore the new challenge of capitalism in decline is for its ideologists to appropriate “Marxism” in the name of “radical” democracy ie. bourgeois individualism. There is a need for more subtlety; for an ‘indirect apologetics’ which takes capitalism’s “plagues”, and attempts to explain them as ethical sins that can be redeemed by the pure moral intentions of “responsible” intellectuals.25 There is a need for a post-Marxism that can claim to be both post- and ‘radical’ ie. true to Marx. This requires a new initiative to restore Marx to his “self”.

17. Derrida, following the “death of Marxism”, tries to marry “one spirit” of Marx to deconstruction by repudiating Marx’s ontology of living and dead labour as the social forces shaping the lives of alienated bourgeois individuals. As I hope to show, this ‘take’ on the humanist “spirit” of young Marx, attempts to recoup the subjective idealism of Max Stirner as that of the young Marx also. To help make this point I will critique a number of critics of Derrida’s recent “turn” to Marxism to show that they all fail to recognise the deeply reactionary project lying at the heart of Derrida’s “spirit” of Marx.26

Derrida’s Critics

18. It is interesting to see how Derrida’s critics interpret his (re)turn to Marx. Eagleton makes some caustic comments on Derrida’s “opportunism”, his “academicist fantasy that he has somehow mistaken for an enlightened anti-Stalinism”. He makes fun of Derrida: “It is the ultimate post-structuralist fantasy: an opposition without anything as distastefully systemic or drably ‘orthodox’ as an opposition, a dissent beyond all formulable discourse, a promise which would betray itself in the act of fulfilment, a perpetual excited openness to the Messiah who had better not let us down by doing anything as determinate as coming”.27 Yet Eagleton does not pursue Derrida’s political purpose in re-fashioning the de-totalised Young Marx.

19. Spivak, the “Marxist” most sympathetic to Derrida has tried for 10 years or more to marry Derrida to a deconstructed Marx.28 Her purpose is to rid Marx of what she sees as the idealist hangover of an undercover humanist universalism. But in the process she turns Marx into a Feuerbach who sees some abstract Enlightenment social essence (the unity of “nature” and “reason”) which can only be realised in the intellect.29 Spivak picks up on several shortcomings in Derrida’s treatment of Marx. He denies the dual nature of the commodity and counter-poses use-value as the future release from exchange-value. Socially necessary labour time is not the measure of value. He universalises money as capital so his brand of utopian socialism is to remove money — exchange-value — and replace it with use-values. (Remember the attack on Proudhon in the opening passages of the Grundrisse.) To extend Spivak’s critique further, Derrida’s discourse on the ‘new world disorder’ reduces to a critique of unequal exchange — not of labour values but of money “values” or prices as determined by the market.30 This means that insofar as “exploitation” exists it results from individuals buying commodities cheap and selling them dear. Equitable consumption then becomes a matter of caveat emptor. This reduces ideologically to performativity as “market choice” similar to that of Hayek or the “negative freedom” of Berlin.

20. Spivak’s blind spot on Marx is her view that the contradiction between use-value and exchange-value is not a real contradiction that motivates the class struggle. She thinks that Marx sets up the goalposts of a socialist “society” at which we take aim by intellectually overcoming of the shortfall of reason with doses of political dogma. This is the familiar post-structuralist critique of totalising Marxism as yet another Enlightenment teleology that has to fail.31 Marx, however, argued against idealist conceptions of revolution. The contradiction between use-value and exchange-value was, and is, a real contradiction. It is class struggle at the point of production and not in the academy that motivates capitalism’s crisis-ridden development. The limits to capitalism’s development will be decided by the practical struggle of the proletariat, and not by philosophers. While Spivak picks up on some of Derrida’s obvious “mistakes” she misses the main one — that the purpose of Marxism is not merely to interpret the world but to change it.32

21. Thus Spivak’s blind spot obscures the real source of Derrida’s weakness in his fixation on Stirner. She attempts to “correct” Derrida conceptually, but cannot understand why he “mistakes” Marx. This is because these are not “mistakes”, but the result of deliberately “excluding” the spirits of labour, class, the “party”, etc., i.e. the “totalitarian Marx”. Because Derrida is obsessed by these evil spirits, he cannot follow Marx into the Grundrisse or Capital to demonstrate the material laws of motion that elaborate and pose the practical resolution of the real contradiction between use-value and exchange-value as social revolution. Derrida purposely excludes these unwanted spirits so that he can recover the pure spirit of rebellion against “evil” in the acts of faith of individuals taking “responsibility” (weak messianic force).

22. Jameson, too, is sympathetic. While driven to explain post-modernism as a cultural expression of late capitalism (or more recently finance capital) Jameson has no brief to unite Derrida and Marx. Yet he finds Derrida’s fixation on the young Marx refreshing. He seems to endorse Derrida’s position on “messianism” shorn of the “apocalyptic” ontological certainties of Marxism. He accepts that Derrida’s appeal to the “messianic” is akin to that of Benjamin’s “weak messianic power”.33 Here he is referring to Benjamin’s conception of revolution as the “unexpected” as opposed to the Stalinist and Social Democratic “rhetoric of historic inevitability”. Jameson sees in Derrida’s return to the young Marx a way of conceiving of

post-modern virtuality, a daily spectrality that undermines the present and the real without any longer attracting attention at all; it marks the originality of our social situation, but no-one (before Derrida) has re-identified it as a very old thing in quite this dramatic way — it is the emergence, at the very end of Derrida’s book, of spectrality, of the messianic, as “the differantial deployment of the tekhne, of techno science of tele-technology”. Perhaps we need something similar here: Marx’s purloined letter: a whole new programme in itself surely, a wandering signifier capable of keeping any number of conspiratorial futures alive.34

23. This limp solidarity with Derrida’s radical indeterminacy fits with Ebert’s assessment that for Jameson consumption is the “basis for capital accumulation in postmodernism”. “Jameson offers a model of the mode of production that erases the appropriation of surplus labour just as thoroughly as does Baudrillard’s hyperreal semiotic system”.35 Ebert does not expand on Jameson’s preference for the consumption moment over the production moment. I think it can be found in his adoption of Mandel’s theory of Late Capitalism.36 Because Mandel makes crisis contingent on many causes including underconsumption he opens the door for Jameson to develop his consumptionist explanation of post-modernism.37

24. More recently Jameson has moved further away from Marx by adopting Arrighi’s model of capitalist development which separates and isolates the overproduction of MC as “finance capital” as a definite stage in the cycle of capitalist development.38 The effect is to shift the cause of the post-modern cultural turn from the drive to consume to the drive to speculate which becomes further separated from the production moment and production relations. The ills of capitalism in its current historical context are seen to be the result of the decline of US hegemony caused by the rise of financial speculation. There is no Marxist conception of the fundamental causes the financial speculation itself, or how this will “determine” a crisis of capitalist production relations and the re-emergence of the enlightenment project as socialist revolution. It is not surprising then that Jameson cannot account for much that is going on in the world and finds Derrida’s appeal to the “virtuality” of the “always-now” attractive.39

25. Fletcher gets closer to Derrida/Stirner’s extreme individualism. Fletcher argues that Derrida is reclaiming the Young Hegelian Marx but with a Stirner twist. Derrida collapses modernity into the abstract “past-present-future”. The abandonment of any historicity of social relations for an ahistorical metaphysics of time allows him to set up a surreptitious “transcendental hauntology” against ontology — which he sees as metaphysics ie. the attempt to exorcise hauntology.40 Yet obviously Derrida is privileging a meta-ontology which says that egos are shapeless and empty of substance or presence unless formed by a succession of irreducible acts (differance).

26. So hauntology is a subversive meta-narrative which says that in history there is no objective or material reality such as the necessity of social relations, only a reality which is the projection of the indeterminate (free will) ego. Any ontology that specifies “being” in relation to social essences, including social relations, is pre-empted by a bogus anti-essential ghosts-in-general/hauntology. In other words there is no “essence” beyond the individual who can perceive and understand social relations only as a sequence of indeterminate acts of “free will”, i.e. market choice. Any attempt to give this indeterminate chaos substance as a collective, universal essence is to engage in metaphysics — i.e., ghosts. Derrida writes:

What is a ghost? What is the effectivity or the presence of a specter, that is, for what seems to remain as ineffective, virtual, insubstantial as a simulacrum? . . . Let us call it a hauntology. This logic of haunting would not be merely larger and more powerful than an ontology or a thinking of Being. It would harbour within itself, but like circumscribed places or particular effects, eschatology and teleology themselves.41

27. By coining a term “hauntology” to exorcise the ghosts of Enlightenment determinism, Derrida must pre-empt the ontological (and epistemological) assumptions of “being” (rationality) by counter-posing a radical “essence” of “nothingness” (irrationality). Here he borrows from Heidegger.42

28. Derrida draws on Heidegger in particular in his reference to the notion that the “time is out of joint”. It is an attempt to explain how the “present” is formed out of the actions of individuals not ’caused’ by past or future, but for whom the present is shaped by indeterminate “traces”, i.e. before society, before psychology, etc. Derrida refers to Hamlet and his predicament (” time is out of joint”) to suggest that the “disjointure” of past present and future can only be “rejoined” in acts of pure justice. Heidegger calls this irreducible act a “gift” meaning it has no market or exchange value. Of this Derrida says:

There is first of all a gift without restitution, without calculation, without accountability. Heidegger thus removes such gift from any horizon of culpability, of debt, of right, and even, perhaps of duty. . . . Beyond right, and still more beyond juridicism, beyond morality, and still more beyond moralism, does not justice as relation to the other suppose on the contrary the irreducible excess of a disjointure or an anachrony, some Un-Fuge, some “out of joint” dislocation in Being and in time itself, a disjointure that, in always risking the evil, expropriation, and injustice against which there is no calculable insurance, would alone be able to do justice or to render justice. . . . Otherwise justice risks being reduced once again to juridical-moral rules, norms or representations, within an inevitably totalising horizon (movement for adequate restitution, expiation, or reappropriation).43

29. Derrida then goes on to explain how such pure acts can realise social justice.44 The “Messianic: the coming of the other, the absolute and unpredictable singularity of the arrivant as justice”. This is the “ineffaceable mark” of “Marx’s legacy”. Following Blanchard’s “Marx’s Three Voices”, Derrida says that Marx asks us:

Not to maintain together the disparate, but to put ourselves there where the disparate itself holds together, without wounding the dis-jointure, the dispersion, or the difference, without effacing the heterogeneity of the other. We are asked (enjoined perhaps) to turn ourselves over to the future, to join ourselves in this we, there where the disparate is turned over to this singular joining, without conception or certainty of determination, without knowledge, without or before the synthetic junction of the conjunction and the disjunction. The Alliance of a rejoining without conjoined mate, without organisation, without party, without nation, without state, without property (the “communism” that we will later nickname the new International)”.45

30. This attempt to use Heidegger to read Marx backwards as a deconstructionist also explains what he finds useful in the extreme egoism of Max Stirner.46 Derrida fixes on Stirner because Stirner learned to live with, and like, his “spooks”, i.e. the “spirit” of his unique ego — the pre-social, pre-religious, pre-everything act of self-determination.47 In Stirner’s mind these acts are the irreducible effects/spectres of his own egoistic being, messianic eschatology and teleology even. The absolute ideal becomes the “unique” ego. These “spooks” are not “totalities” coming back to haunt the ruling class because there is no class and no rule, in fact no society even. All there is is the uniquely posited pre-social individual and his (sic) “own” property.48

31. Fletcher suggests that Derrida gets into retro mode at a point when Marx made the decisive break with the Young Hegelians who had yet to expunge religion (alienation) from their cult of humanity. But more than this, I argue that Derrida recuperates a pre-Marxist Stirnerian anarchism and projects it forwards not only as an antidote to totalitarian Marxism in the present (which is largely defunct) but more importantly to any revival of revolutionary Marxism in the future. By selecting a voluntarist “spirit” of the young Marx, Derrida regresses into the pre-history of Western Marxism and defaults into a form of liberal anarchism.

Why Stirner?

32. Stirner is usually seen as an anarchist who in rejecting Hegel takes subjective idealism to its extreme.49 In so doing, Stirner exposes some of the weakness of the Left Hegelians and forces Marx to make a complete break with idealism.50 That is why it is Stirner and not Feuerbach or Bauer, who becomes the main target of Marx’s ferocious critique in The German Ideology.51 Marx’s critique of Stirner is motivated by the appeal that Stirner’s brand of radical egoism has against his own materialist method and politics. This seductive idealism had to be pulled out at the roots. Marx goes for the throat of Saint Max Stirner.

We spoke above of the German philosophical conception of history. Here, in Saint Max we find a brilliant example of it. The speculative idea, the abstract conception, is made the driving force of history, and history is thereby turned into the mere history of philosophy. But even the latter is not conceived as, according to existing sources, it actually took place — not to mention how it evolved under the influence of real historical relations — but as it was understood and described by recent German philosophers, in particular Hegel and Feuerbach. And from these descriptions again only that was selected which could be adapted to the given end, and which came into the hands of our saint by tradition. Thus, history becomes a mere history of illusory ideas, a history of spirits and ghosts, while the real, empirical history that forms the basis of this ghostly history is only utilised to provide bodies for these ghosts; from it are borrowed the names required to clothe these ghosts with the appearance of reality. In making this experiment our saint frequently forgets his role and writes an undisguised ghost-story.52

33. Stirner’s peculiar brand of ghost story in which realism and idealism are historically unified as “egoism” is just another “dishing up” of a “tedious” and “boring” speculative history, says Marx. “Moreover, the strong competition among the German speculative philosophers makes it the duty of each new competitor to offer an ear-splitting historical advertisement for his commodity”.53 Having noted that even in 1845 philosophers were commodifying their speculations, an insight that applies even more to recent French philosophy, Marx proceeds to take apart the use-value of Stirner’s commodity phrase by phrase.

34. Stirner’s egoism is an idealist fiction, itself as much an “essence” as the religious conventions he assails. “How little it occurs to him to make each “unique” the measure of his own uniqueness, how much he uses his own uniqueness as a measure, a moral norm to be applied to other individuals, like a true moralist, forcing them into his Procrustean bed”.54 His notion of the “individual” is shorn of social relations and so reproduces an “association of egoists” as an “ideal copy of capitalist society, of Hegel’s civil society”. Marx jokes that Stirner, “would be allocated a place in the capitalist division of labour”, of which he is totally ignorant.55 In destroying Stirner’s notion of “freedom of labour” as “free competition of workers among themselves”, Marx develops his concept of abstract labour.56 In his demolition of Stirner’s “rebellion” and rejection of “communism”, Marx offers a dialectical and historical conception of the individual whose self-activity and self-realisation is achieved by the transformation of social relations in practice.57 “Modern universal intercourse can be controlled by individuals . . . only when controlled by all. . . . Only at this stage, does self-self activity coincide with material life, which corresponds to the development of individuals into complete individuals. . . . The transformation of labour into self-activity corresponds to the transformation of the earlier limited intercourse into the intercourse of individuals as such”.58

35. For Derrida, however, Marx’s critique (his ontological response to Stirner’s mystification of labour) entailed the “totalising horizon” of an essential “communism”, conceived by Marx in the German Ideology, but realised as the actually existing communism of the 20th century. For Derrida, this vindicates Stirner’s objection to “communism” as doing “violence to the individual’s freedom”, against Marx’s fundamental critique of Stirner’s egoism, which takes as its starting point the “unfreedom” of labour under capitalism.59 Thus for Derrida, Marx fear of the ghost/void of the “unique” ego lead him to posit “unfree labour” as a totalitarian essence. To follow Stirner, Marx should have responded not by “filling in a void” but by “increasingly emptying it out”.60 Here the “void” is the indeterminacy of society represented by “spectrality” and exercise of “hauntology” against all totalising operations in ghost-busting. But Marx’s critique of Stirner/Derrida is precisely to “fill in the void” with the knowledge of the social relations which determine the “being” in front of its “consciousness” so that the real specter of “dead labour” can be brought back to life.

36. So it seems that Derrida has put his finger on what was a decisive turning point in Marx’s shift from post-Hegelian idealism to historical materialism. Marx was determined to overcome alienation by recognising its material other — “unfree labour” — rooted in the social relations of production. Derrida senses that this is the crucial point at which Marx defeats subjective idealism. So he wants to undermine the adoption of the philosophical method of dialectical materialism in its embryonic form. He wants to get in at the beginnings of Marxism so as to abort any rebirth of historical materialism out of the ashes of Stalinism and Menshevik Western Marxism. He must do this by inserting a subjective idealism that is congenial to the post-modern petty bourgeois’ desire for personal salvation in the age of the new world disorder.

37. Callinicos and Eagleton suggest that something of this sort is Derrida’s purpose but don’t pursue the argument further. Callinicos is correct to point to the absence of any link between Derrida’s “messianic eschatology” and “any theoretical understanding of the dynamics of historical transformation”.61 “Marx thus relies, according to Derrida, on “an ontology of presence as actual reality and as objectivity relative to which spectres and other forms of representation of the absent can be ‘conjured away’ by being reduced to their material conditions, the world of labour, production, and exchange”.62

38. So how is it that Derrida can make such a belated reconciliation with “one-spirit” of Marx? What was he doing when others such as Althusser attempted to rescue Marxism from Stalinism? Derrida, after all, is proud to state that he opposed “everything” to do with Marxism for twenty years.63 He supported the cause of Chris Hani in South Africa, but who to the left of Kissinger did’nt? Callinicos cannot come up with any real explanation for Derrida’s renewed interest in Marxism. Callinicos own stalinophobic politics is a blind spot, which obscures the reason Derrida could not take up an active anti-Stalinist stand such as that of Trotsky’s “Fourth International”. Like Derrida, Callinicos was taken by surprise at the collapse of Stalinism. Neither had a theoretical basis on which to predict the outcomes in the Stalinist states; how could there be a counter-revolution in the counter-revolution? Hence the unexpected counter-revolutions of 1989.64

39. In my opinion, this is a telling point against Callinicos’ own Marxism. On the one hand, Derrida is a subjective idealist. He wants to free the authentic act of the ego from any social determination. Ultimately this freedom is a religious experience — in which Stirner’s free ego is the pure expression of messianic salvation.65 On the other hand, Callinicos’ rejection of Marx’s analysis of the determinate effects of commodity fetishism on consciousness traps him in an equally idealist position of the spontaneously class conscious proletariat.66 For me this explains why Callinicos can only take his critique of Derrida so far. To take it any further would require an overcoming of the idealist baggage that both Derrida and Callinicos, in their own way, bring from Western Marxism.67

40. Eagleton criticises Jameson’s “summary treatment” of Derrida’s politics in defending Derrida’s brand of “left” deconstruction opposing “post-Marxism” and attacks on Althusser. Yet, he says, “Derrida’s ‘left’ deconstruction seems no more than a ‘left liberalism’, well meaning, flexible, participatory if somewhat theoretically diffuse political programmes of the traditional New Left. Is there to be a Deconstructive Party alongside the Democrats, or is the encounter between Marxism and deconstruction not that kind of thing at all?”68 “. . . Derrida has turned to Marxism just when it has become marginal, and so, in his post-structuralist reckoning, rather more alluring. (He has in fact no materialist or historical analysis of Stalinism whatsoever as opposed to an ethical rejection of it)”.69

41. Eagleton recognises that it is no coincidence that Derrida rediscovers the early Marx just as the “late” Marx of the Second International, and the Stalinist Third International, has been certified dead and buried. He can see that Derrida wants to reclaim that part of Marx that retrospectively makes deconstruction the genuine Marxism. Yet Eagleton fails completely to see what is at stake here. Derrida’s is not merely an intellectual exercise in which deconstruction becomes the ‘new’ new left fashion any more than Stirner’s unique was the fashion in young Hegelian circles. It may be that Stalinism and Second International menshevism have suffered an historic defeat, but that is not to say that the idealist method (the totalised Marx) which underpins Western Marxism is dead.

42. More important, the re-emergence of capitalist crisis tendencies carries the threat of a renewal of revolutionary Marxism. So it seems to me that in anticipation of this contest, Derrida, like other post-Marxist ideologues, is insinuating himself into the lineage of Western Marxism at the point of its inception to claim the franchise on genuine Marxism. Therefore the appropriation of Stirnerian “rebellion” as a deconstruction of materialist ontology is a conscious attempt to install an anti-materialist subjective idealist “spirit” of Marxism against the time and place of the revival of revolutionary Marxism.

From Pre- to Post-Marx via Benjamin?

43. The attempts by Laclau and Critchely to recruit Derrida to a self-conscious post-Marxism support this view. Their shift towards indeterminacy and contingency is on a convergence course with Derrida’s rejection of “totalitarian” Marxism.70 Laclau is optimistic that “deconstruction can present itself both as a moment of its inscription in the Marxist tradition as well as a point of turning/deepening/supersession of the latter”. For Laclau, the true Marxist tradition is the “Sorelian-Gramscian” line within Western Marxism where “material forces” become “loose and indeterminate”, and where the “distinction between the ethical and political becomes blurred”.71 Negri’s position is similar. He chides Derrida for his nostalgia, but commends him for producing a “new theory of spectrality, which corresponds with common experience: an experience of the everyday, and/or the masses, the experience of a mobile, flexible, computerized, immaterialized and spectral labour”.72 In other words there is a shift from objective idealism: fate, the proletarian mission, etc to subjective idealism. After all, if “material forces” become contingent, and indeed Marxism becomes one of many “emancipations”, who or what is the revolutionary subject?

44. Lukacs makes the point about bourgeois apologetics at the beginning of the imperialist epoch that it is an elite philosophy of the ‘parasitic intelligentsia’ who in response to the crises of war and revolution set out to “philosophically demolish dialetictics and historical materialism” by “incorporating its ’serviceable’ and suitably ‘purified’ elements”.73 Similarly, in the currrent period of late imperialist crisis the role of ‘revolutionary subject’ falls by default to the counter-hegemonic intellectual/priest who infiltrates the camp of the class enemy, and articulates indeterminacy as a “weak messianic power”. This is a direct reference to Derrida’s supposed affinity with Benjamin in an attempt to incorporate his “seviceable” and “purified” elements to bolster Derrida’s post-”Marxist” credentials.

45. While Jameson takes Derrida’s appeal to Benjamin seriously Callinicos is not taken in. He argues that Derrida’s attraction for Stirner fits with the latter’s “proto-Nietzschean tone”. He comments: “One might say that the poststructuralist discovery of Stirner was bound to happen sooner or later”. By comparison, Benjamin’s “tortuous, ambiguous, but ultimately decisive moment towards revolutionary socialism and historical materialism — showed that the reverse is true, that ‘messianic extremity’ requires a materialist anchorage”.74 Yet Callinicos does not speculate about why it is necessary for Derrida, as opposed to poststructuralism in general, to rediscover Stirner as “proto Nietzschean” and still make a gesture towards Benjamin the genuine Marxist.75 Either Benjamin is not a real Marxist or Derrida is.

46. But Derrida’s gesture towards Benjamin is rhetorical, since his conception of the “messianic” is very different from that of Benjamin, who takes as read Marx’s critique of Stirner’s “rebellion”.76 In his recent response to his interlocuters, Derrida clarifies what he means by ‘messianic’. This is a “messianicity without messianism” — i.e. messianicity without a messiah, without utopia.

Nothing could be further from Utopia and Utopianism, even in its “subterranean” form, than the messianicity and spectrality which are at the heart of Specters of Marx. While Benjamin still has traces of Jewish and Marxist “messianism” . . . messianicity (which I regard as a universal structure of experience, and which cannot be reduced to religious messianism of any stripe) is anything but Utopian: it refers, in every here-now, to the coming of an eminently real, concrete event, that is, to the most irreducibly heterogenous otherness. Nothing is more “realistic” or “immediate” than this messianic apprehension, straining forward toward the event of him who/that which is coming . . . messianicity mandates that we interrupt the ordinary course of things, time and history here-now: it is inseparable from an affirmation of otherness and justice. As this unconditional messianicity must therefore negotiate its conditions in one or other singular, practical situation, we have to do here with the locus of an analysis and evaluation, and therefore of a responsibility.77

47. There is clearly a massively subjective idealist project here. The “unconditional messianicity” as the “universal structure of experience” is devoid of social relations (and is therefore a void/specter) and is wholly self-driven like the sovereign consumer of bourgeois ideology. The “affirmations” of “otherness”, “justice” (meaning the gift without obligation) is the substance of social responsibility. No wonder Derrida thinks that Benjamin’s messianism has some way to go before it arrives at “messianicity”. Meanwhile Derrida merely suggests a “possible convergence” between himself and Benjamin. He wonders:

If Benjamin does not link the privileged moments of this “weak messianic power” to determinate historico-political phases, or, indeed crises. . . . Thus there would be, for Benjamin critical moments (pre-revolutionary or post-revolutionary). moments of hope or disappointment, in short, dead ends during which a simalcrum of messianism serves as an alibi. Whence the strange adjective “weak”. I am not sure I would define the messianicity I speak of as power (it is, no less, a vulnerability or a kind of absolute powerlessness); but even if I did define it as power, as the movement of desire, as the attraction, invincible elan or affirmation of an unpredictable future-to-come (or even as the past to come again), the experience of the non-present, of the non-living present in the living present (of the spectral . . . . I would never say, in speaking of this “power”, that it is strong or weak . . . . For in my view, the universal, quasi-transcendental structure that I call messianicity without messianism is not bound up with any particular moment of (political or general) history or culture (Abrahamic or any other); and it does not serve any sort of messianism as an alibi, does not mime or reiterate any sort of messianism, does not confirm or undermine any sort of messianism.78

48. Yet Benjamin’s messianism was not an alibi in the sense that Derrida means it — as a capitulation to the specter of (Abrahamic or Marxist or both) determinism. Quite the opposite. Benjamin’s own messianism fell short of Marx’s sense of “vocation”, or “destiny” of the communist individual for whom self-determination is a collective social act.79 Benjamin rejected the party as playing into the hands of bourgeois culture, while he sought to explode the contradictions from inside bourgeois culture.80 He was a dedicated communist committed to class struggle as the means of transcending the reified bourgeois subject. There is nothing in Benjamin’s role as communist intellectual to suggest any “messianic power”, however weak. He did not act as a Stirnerian ego deluded about his “freedom”. This would have reproduced in Benjamin the melancholy he found in all theological (spirit-ridden) transcendence, as against the materialist transcendence which occurs when knowledge of the “fully concrete” (i.e. void filled in) and mediated “moment” destroys bourgeois culture and its economic underpinnings.81

49. The manner of Benjamin’s death raises important questions that cannot be answered here about the role of the detached communist intellectual compared to the party cadre.82 Derrida implies in Benjamin’s rejection of the “Communist Party” a tendency towards a “hauntology” of the ghosts of determinism making his rebellion possible. Benjamin’s suicide may have had the appearance of an authentic undetermined act. But it was the “overdetermined” action of physically isolated, power-less and “defeated” communist individual.83 Derrida identifies only with a surface resonance of Benjamin’s “rebellion” and misses the historical and material conditions that determined his life and death. Derrida would have been a mortal enemy in Benjamin’s project to rid the world of capitalism and its reified (alienated) subjects.

50. Nevertheless, in flirting with Benjamin, Derrida is trying to re-appropriate a “spirit” of Marxism, which is much more than David Harvey claims:

Derrida’s resort to something akin to the Leibnezian conceit in his discussion of self-other relations as he examines how the “European subject” (an entity that Leibniz was also crucially concerned with) constitutes itself on the inside through the construction of the “other” — the colonial subject. Spivak (1988:294) approvingly cites Derrida’s strategy as follows: “To render thought or the thinking subject transparent or invisible seems to hide the relentless recognition of the Other by assimilation. It is in the interest of such cautions that Derrida does not invoke ‘letting the other(s) speak for himself’ but rather invokes an ‘appeal’ to, or ‘call’ to the ‘quite-other’ . . . of ‘rendering delirious that interior voice that is the voice of the other in us’. The dangers of such a gesture are obvious. If the only way in which the ‘other’ can be represented is through ‘rendering delirious’ the voices that I have internalised in the process of discovering myself, then very soon the identities of ‘l’autre c’est moi’ become as surely planted as did the thesis of ‘l’estate c’est moi’”.84

51. This passage echoes Marx’s critique of Stirner forcing the “other” into his “Procrustean bed”. But the point is surely that, for Marx, Leibniz’s philosophy had already been transcended by Hegel who had overcome the false Kantian dualism and united objective and subjective realities. The young Hegelians then turned Hegel “right side up” but retained the mystical kernel in the ahistorical abstraction of humanity. So it is not Leibniz who becomes the reference point for Derrida, but rather Stirner who took the ideal of humanity to the extreme of the “unique” individual. His subjective idealism rejected all social norms and conventions as limits on the free ego. For Derrida this represents the lost “spirit” of the early Marx who made the mistake of not rejecting his own “haunting”, i.e. his own self “reduced” to social relations of production. Derrida is not interested in the Leibniz pre-capitalist monad, but the young-Hegelian “self” which Marx “denied”. It is Derrida’s insistence that Marx “denied” his true spirit, which Derrida wants to conjure up and restore to life that gives Derrida’s intervention its political point.

52. I want to suggest that Derrida’s intervention in Specters is not a frontal attack on Western Marxism a la post-modernism in general as Harvey would suggest. Post-modernism rejects the Enlightenment frame in which Marxism is also caught. Derrida accepts that the “humanist” project is what is at stake. He does not turn his back on the Enlightenment, but picks up on its critique of Hegel’s objective idealism by the Young Hegelians. He wants to restore the “humanist project” to the free will of the undetermined ego by denying the alienated bourgeois subject with its roots in the ontology of labour.

53. Derrida locates the ‘free spirit’ of Marx in Stirners’ defence of private property, in civil society as an “association of egoists”, and in Stirner’s rejection of revolutionary violence as a totalitarian threat to individual freedom.85 He also hopes to enlist Benjamin in his reconstruction project. However, as I have argued, there is nothing in Benjamin that allows him to be reduced to the idealist “autonomous ego”. Moreover, his “idealist residue” is a powerful stimulus to the rebuilding of a dialectical Marxism, against Derrida’s deconstruction project.86 Thus Stirner’s anarchist idealism is a much more suitable go-between than Benjamin’s “weak messianic power” in the marriage of Marxism and deconstruction.

54. So far his critics can go. Beyond this point, Derrida wants to dehistoricise the origins of Marxism via deconstruction as a contemporary “indirect apologetics” for capitalism. His is a pre-emptive strike to render Western Marxism even more harmless than it is, and provide an antidote to any revival of revolutionary Marxism. Those critics who are part of Western Marxism, and whose method reflects the idealist split between objective and subjective reality, leave the proletariat exposed to Derrida’s political purpose. Their critiques remain one-sided critiques of ideology unless they are capable of uniting the theory and practice in a revolutionary party.87

55. It is striking that in his reply to his critics in “Marx and Sons” Derrida makes use of the failure of his Marxist critics to demolish his surreptitious religion. By this I mean Derrida’s celebration of alienation as performativity, and of deconstruction as “emptying the void” (i.e. ghost worship). He turns on his critics, accusing them (Spivak, Eagleton and Ahmad) of defending “Marx the father’s property” as their inheritance.88 “To whom is Marxism supposed to belong?” he asks. This is the sort of question that can only be asked by one intellectual of another. No doubt Derrida’s answer is that Marxism belongs to those who can “transform” Marxism according to the “spirit” of Marx. His criticism is that the “proprietal Marxists” should leave the patriarchal household. My answer is: Marxism does not “belong” to anyone, but it is the “ineffaceable mark” of the proletariat for which it is the promissory note of an historic emancipation. To prove that this is not some rival messianism with Marx as the patriarch, it will be necessary to return to the Marx’s method in the German Ideology and to the work of Lukacs and Lenin to counter Derrida’s misappropriation of Marx.

Indirect Apologetics

56. If it is true that Derrida’s “turn to Marx” is to subvert a genuine Marxism, how must he try to do this? In a word he has to render alienation natural (i.e. universal, ahistorical, nothingness). Because alienation is the fundamental condition of living labour dominated by dead labour under capitalist social relations, real-world Marxism seeks to end alienation through revolutionary practice. Derrida must abstract from capitalist social relations and naturalise the ego as an historically indeterminate actor capable of realising its “self” through its authentic pure actions. To do so he has to engage in some idealist ghost-busting. The real “specter” of alienated labour separates society from nature. This is expressed as a split between labour and its value, between labour-power as use-value and exchange-value. Thus Derrida must reject the “ghosts” of “labour”, “value” and “class”.

57. By rejecting the ontology of living labour as the source of determinate social life Derrida removes at one stroke any objective being as presence. Next the capital-labour relation is obliterated as “metaphysics”. The historical unity of production and consumption is broken, and restored only in an alienated ie. supernatural or idealist form, as the irreducible, pre-social act. This break in the unity of production and consumption can take many forms, deceptively different. In one sense the whole of Western Marxism can be understood as the result of “freezing” the moments in this unity.89 But there is common metaphysic — that of the alienated labouring social self. The subject is dominated in thought by an alien absence (the determinate “other” of dead labour) which is impossible to recover — as fetishised labour, love, or power — except in an alienated form.

58. In response to his critics Derrida’s attempt to claim adherence to the notion of class is pathetic. “I believe that an interest in what the concept of class struggle aimed at, an interest in analysing conflicts in social forces, is still absolutely indispensable…But I’m not sure that the concept of class, as its been inherited is the best instrument for those activities, unless it is considerably differentiated“.90 This is a banal Weberian, social democratic, liberal “Third way” even, lipservice to class shorn of “inheritance”, i.e. social relations, contradictions, etc.

59. But Derrida is not free indulge in mysticism as a purely ideological exercise or publicity stunt. He senses that Marxism is not quite “post”. The contradictions of capitalism manifest themselves in mounting political, social and cultural crises. In its attempts to overcome the contradiction between use-value and exchange-value, the market tries to commodify everything, including its own ideological legitimation, thereby transposing the crisis directly from the infrastructure to the superstructure with less and less mediation. As the crisis invades the “lifeworld”, i.e. culture, the ideological expressions become more and more extreme — e.g. hyperreality — echoing Marx’s prophetic words about “idealising phrases, conscious illusion, deliberate hypocrisy”.91

60. This is not just any old anarchy. The impending crisis appears to Derrida as the return of Marx’s ghost. Derrida re-reads the Communist Manifesto and realises he has to lay the ghost.92 The specter of communism is still haunting the world. The specter must be conjured away.93 The academic factory scavenges the corpus of Marx after the death of “defacto Marxism”. To certify the death. “Marx is dead, communism is dead, very dead, and along with it its hopes, its discourse, its theories, and its practices. It says: long live capitalism, long live the market, here’s to the survival of economic and political liberalism!”94 The incantations are necessary to keep the 10 plagues of the new world disorder at bay.95 But they will not work because they cannot identify the ghost. The real ghost has to be faced and a “new international” or “association of egos” created to conjure away the ghost.

61. Consider Derrida’s interesting excursion on the academic neutralisation (cushioning operation) of Marx.

Why insist on imminence, on urgency and injunction, on all that which in them does not wait? In order to try to remove what we are going to say from what risks happening, if we judge by the many signs, to Marx’s work today, which is to say also to his injunction. What risks happening is that one will try to play Marx off against Marxism so as to neutralise, or at any rate muffle the political imperative in the untroubled exegesis of a classified work. One can sense a coming fashion or stylishness in this regard in the culture and more precisely in the university. And what is there to worry about here? Why fear what may also become a cushioning operation? This recent stereotype would be destined, whether one wishes it or not, to depoliticise profoundly the Marxist reference, to do its best, by putting on a tolerant face, to neutralise a potential force, first of all by enervating a corpus, by silencing in it the revolt [the return is acceptable provided that the revolt, which initially inspired uprising, indignation, insurrection, revolutionary momentum, does not come back]. People would be ready to accept the return of Marx or the return to Marx, on the condition that a silence is maintained about Marx’s injunction not just to decipher but to act and to make the deciphering [the interpretation] into a transformation that “changes the world”. In the name of an old concept of reading, such an ongoing neutralisation would attempt to conjure away danger: now that Marx is dead, and especially now that Marxism seems to be in rapid decomposition, some people seem to say, we are going to be able to concern ourselves with Marx without being bothered — by the Marxists and, why not, by Marx himself, that is, by a ghost that goes on speaking. We’ll treat him calmly, objectively, without bias: according to the academic rules, in the University, in the library, in colloquia! We’ll do it systematically, by respecting the norms of hermeneutical, philological, philosophical exegesis. If one listens closely, one already hears whispered: “Marx, you see, was despite everything a philosopher like any other; what is more [and one can say this now that so many Marxists have fallen silent], he was a great philosopher who deserves to figure on the list of those works we assign for study and from which he has been banned for too long. He doesn’t belong to the communists, to the Marxists, to the parties; he ought to figure within our great canon of Western political philosophy. Return to Marx, let’s finally read him as a great philosopher.” We have heard this and we will hear it again.

It is something altogether other that I wish to attempt here as I turn or return to Marx. It is “something other” to the point that I will have occasion instead, and this will not be only for lack of time and space, to insist even more on what commands us today, without delay, to do everything we can so as to avoid the neutralising anaesthesia of a new theoreticism, and to prevent a philosophico-philological return to Marx from prevailing. Let us spell things out, let us insist: to do everything we can so that it does not prevail, but not to avoid its taking place, because it remains just as necessary. This will cause me, for the moment to give priority to the political gesture I am making here, at the opening of a colloquium, and to leave more or less in the state of a program and of schematic indications the work of philosophical exegesis, and all the “scholarship” that this “position-taking” today, still requires.96

62. Derrida doesn’t want to leave Marx as merely an academic commodity. He knows that is no way to bu(r)y Marx (how many proletarian militants will pass through the academies of the new millennium?). Rather he wants to embrace a re-born Marx as a mass commodity. He wants to honour one spirit out of a number of Marx’s spirits for deconstruction. It is the spirit of rebellion, of the moral injunction, of individuals to aspire to the pure act of salvation. Derrida sees that capitalism cannot be contained inside discourse. Capitalism’s contradictions cannot be ignored, so its apologetics have to be indirect. He needs transcendental signifiers for mass ecological destruction, genocide, poverty, disease etc. So Derrida buys Marx cheap, i.e. after his death and burial.97 He then excavates only the spirit he wants. He “disappears” those spirits he doesn’t want — the totalising method, the “dogmatics”, the party, the old-fashioned workers international. Then sells Marx dear as a emancipatory/religious icon by diminishing Marxism to a utopian anarcho/socialism, and then packaging it as the “promised land”. Derrida’s reduction of the “spirit of Marx” to a “messianic eschatology” and the “spirit of Marxist critique” is repacked as the commodity of “radical deconstruction”.98 This becomes clear in the section written in response to the cynics who justifiably ask, “You picked a good time to Salute Marx”.

Which Marxist Spirit, then? It is easy to imagine why we will not please the Marxists, and still less all the others, by insisting in this way on the spirit of Marxism, especially if we let it be understood that we intend to understand spirits in the plural and in the sense of specters, of untimely specters that one must not chase away but sort out, critique, keep close by, and allow to come back. And of course, we must never hide from the fact that the principle of selectivity which will have to guide and hierarchise among the “spirits” will fatally exclude in its turn. It will even annihilate, by watching (over) its ancestors rather than (over) certain others. . .

. . . To continue to take inspiration from Marxism would be to keep faith with what has always made of Marxism in principle and first of all a radical critique, namely a procedure ready to undertake self-critique. This critique wants itself to be in principle and explicitly open to its own transformation, re-evaluation, self-reinterpretation. Such a critical “wanting-itself” necessarily takes root, it is involved in a ground that is not yet critical, even if it is not, not yet, pre-critical. This latter spirit is more than a style, even though it is also a style. It is the heir to a spirit of the Enlightenment, which must not be renounced. We would distinguish this spirit from other spirits of Marxism, those that rivet it to the body of Marxist doctrine, to its supposed systemic, metaphysical, or ontological totality (notably to its “dialectical method” or to “dialectical materialism”), to its fundamental concepts of labor, mode of production, social class, and consequently to the whole history of its apparatuses (projected or real: the Internationals of the labour movement, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the single party, the State, and finally the totalitarian monstrosity). . . .99

63. That spirit of Marxism that is radical and able to critique itself, is the spirit that Derrida wants to recover and use today as a radical deconstruction of the other “spirits of “Marxism” that are not radical in this sense. To be radical thus means a constant re-styling of the commodity-Marxism. The “fundamental concepts” of labour (and labour value?) must go. No doubt they are spirits that have too much proletarian resonance today in the world of “plagues”. Mode of production is too metaphysical. It betrays the “spirit” of “dialectical method”.100 Social class and the state as an instrument of class rule? How can a class rule?! No! says the radical apologist of plague-ridden capitalism — no class can rule because class is a ghost, which cohabits with other ghosts such as labour and value. Such “spirits” must be “fatally excluded”.

To critique, to call for interminable self-critique is still to distinguish between everything or almost everything. Now there is a spirit of Marxism, which I will never be ready to renounce, it is not only a critical idea or the questioning stance (a consistent deconstruction must insist on them even as it also learns that this is not the last or first word). It is even more a certain emancipatory and messianic affirmation, a certain experience of the promise that one can try to liberate from any dogmatics and even from any metaphysico-religious determination, from any messianism. . . .

64. But more than self-criticism (i.e. deconstruction) is the “emancipatory” promise to liberate one from these ghosts of “determinism”, from a “messianic affirmation” that one can be saved by knowledge and rational action. Instead there is nothing but “interminable self-critique” and an irrational messianicity of individual salvation. Here, Derrida expresses his debt to the earlier philosophers of self-emancipation from Nietzsche to Heidegger.101 The problem now however, is to reclaim Marx, the most damning critic of irrationalism and of its most bizarre disciple Stirner, as an indirect apologist for irrationalism.

. . . Now, this gesture of fidelity to a certain spirit of Marxism is a responsibility incumbent in principle, to be sure, on anyone. Barely deserving the name community, the new International belongs only to anonymity. But this responsibility appears today, at least within the limits of an intellectual and academic field, to return more imperatively and, let us say so as not to exclude anyone, by priority, in urgency to those who, during the last decades, managed to resist a certain hegemony of the Marxist dogma, indeed of its metaphysics, in its political or theoretical forms. And still more particularly to those who have insisted on conceiving and on practicing this resistance without showing any leniency towards reactionary, conservative, or neo-conservative, anti-scientific or obscurantist temptations, to those who, on the contrary have ceaselessly proceeded in a hyper-critical fashion, I will dare to say in a deconstructive fashion, in the name of a new Enlightenment for the century to come. And without renouncing an ideal of democracy and emancipation, but rather by trying to think it and to put it to work otherwise. . . .102

65. Derrida thinks his own political credentials for “putting to work” the “ideal of democracy and emancipation”, in a “deconstructive fashion” are good. He claims that the “end of communist Marxism did not await the recent collapse of the USSR . . . all that started at the beginning of the ’50s . . . the eschatological themes of the ‘end of history’, of the ‘end of Marxism’, of the ‘end of philosophy’, of the ‘ends of man’, of the ‘last man’ and so forth were, in the ’50’s, that is forty years ago, our daily bread”. Deconstruction, he says, was born out of this “totalitarian terror” of Stalinism and neo-Stalinism. So deconstruction of the totalising “philosophical responses” includes Marxism in the name of “differance”. “The originary performativity that does not conform to pre-existing conventions . . . In the incoercible differance the here-now unfurls. No differance without alterity, no alterity without singularity, no singularity without the here-now”.103

66. Here Derrida is reproducing the core of Stirner’s “unique”, the “freedom” to act in the absence of coercive, totalising, social relations. Derrida does not see that the individual uncoerced act is not “against” totalitarianism. Rather it is the expression of the “unfreedom” of the alienated bourgeois subject. It is the ghost in the mirror, the ghost on the rampart, the absence separated from presence. Deconstructed, performativity is the “practice” of the alienated capitalist individual. It is “rebellion” as “sentimentality and bragging”. Here we have the “cushioning exercise” which poses the rebel spirit of Marx as his true spirit, to render the socially determinate as the irreducible “here-now”. He “sells” the revolution in the name of the rebellion of the “association of egoists”.104

67. Marx anticipates Derrida’s “here/now” performativity in his critique of Stirner’s “unique”:

Individuals have always and in all circumstances “proceeded from themselves“, but since they were not unique in the sense of not needing any connections with one another, and since their needs, consequently their nature, and the method of satisfying their needs, connected them with one another (relations between the sexes, exchange division of labour), they had to enter into relations with one another. Moreover, since they entered into intercourse with one another not as pure egos, but as individuals at a definite stage of development of their productive forces and requirements, and since this intercourse, in its turn, determined production and needs, it was therefore, precisely the personal, individual behaviour of individuals, their behaviour to one another as individuals, that created the existing relations and daily reproduces them anew.105

The New International

68. What is the meaning of Derrida’s “new International” as his answer to globalisation and its 10 plagues? Derrida invokes, as a counter-conjuration, a worldwide social movement with no organising features to reform international law! As an idealist fix, this is no more than a hollow call for social justice which joins with Soros and Giddens et al. in appeals to a spontaneous “millenarian” power of bourgeois citizens to fight “responsibly” for a democratic capitalism against the totalitarian spectres of speculative capital, fundamentalist ideas and totalising dogma.

But without necessarily subscribing to the whole Marxist discourse (which moreover, is complex, evolving, heterogeneous) on the State and its appropriation by a dominant class, on the distinction between State power and State apparatus, on the end of the political, on “the end of politics”, or on the withering away of the State, and, on the other hand without suspecting the juridical ideas in itself, one may still find inspiration in the Marxist “spirit” to criticise the presumed autonomy of the juridical and to denounce endlessly the de facto take-over of international authorities by powerful National-states, by concentrations of techno-scientific capital, symbolic capital, and financial capital, of State capital and private capital. A “new international” is being sought through these crises of international law; it already denounces the limits of a discourse on human rights that will remain inadequate, sometimes hypocritical, and in any case formalistic and inconsistent with itself as long as the law of the market, the “foreign debt”, the inequality of techno-scientific, military, and economic development maintain an effective inequality as monstrous as that which prevails today, to a greater extent than ever in the history of humanity. For it must be cried out, at a time when some have the audacity to neo-evangelise in the name of the ideal of a liberal democracy that has finally realised itself as the ideal of human history: never have violence, inequality, exclusion, famine, and thus economic oppression affected as many human beings in the history of the earth and of humanity. Instead of singing the advent of the ideal of liberal democracy and of the capitalist market in the euphoria of the end of history, instead of celebrating the “end of ideologies” and the end of the great emancipatory discourses, let us never neglect this obvious macroscopic fact, made up of innumerable singular sites of suffering: no degree of progress allows one to ignore that never before, in absolute figures, never have so many men, women, and children been subjugated, starved, or exterminated on the earth. . . .

69. The concerns of the “new International” are those of liberal democracy — poverty, ecological destruction, crimes against humanity — and so on — which are caused by the “de facto takeover of international authorities” by nation states and capital. Thus the authority of the law which is being ‘taken over’ is that which represents bourgeois right as freedom and equality ie. bourgeois citizenship rights and civil society. While Soros can talk of the aberration of finance capital, and Giddens of fundamentalism against citizenship, Derrida provides the political philosophy of the hyper-decadent bourgeois ego. Like Stirner in his day Derrida conjures up a philosophical apology for private property and the “freedom of labour”. And as with any common liberal it seems that Derrida subscribes to such norms and conventions of bourgeois society when he defends them against the challenge of “crimes” and “oppression” of capital. However, in rejecting the method and theory of Marxism as “totalitarian”, and wishing to renew Marxism as a “weak messianic power”, Derrida is advocating a “new” reformist International that subscribes to an ideology of distributional social justice posing as “natural” justice. Since this is the way the fetishised social relations of capital appear in daily life, there is no necessity for a “new International” which is organised around a revolutionary programme.

. . . The “New International” is not only that which is seeking a new international law through these crimes. It is a link of affinity, suffering, and hope, a still discreet, almost secret link, as it was around 1848, but more and more visible, we have more than one sign of it. It is an untimely link, without status, without title, and without name, barely public even if it is not clandestine, without contract, “out of joint”, without coordination, without party, without country, without national community (International before, across, and beyond any national determination), without co-citizenship, without common belonging to a class. The name of the new International is given here to what calls to the friendship of an alliance without institution among those who, even if they no longer believe or never believed in the socialist-Marxist International, in the dictatorship of the proletariat, in the messiano-eschatological role of the universal union of the spirits of Marx or Marxism (they now know that there is more than one) and in order to ally themselves, in a new, concrete, and real way, even if this alliance no longer takes the form of a party or a workers’ international, but rather of a kind of counter-conjuration, in the (theoretical and practical) critique of the state of international law, the concepts of State and nation, and so forth: in order to renew this critique, and especially to radicalise it.106

70. Derrida’s new International is nothing like a Marxist international and more like a Masonic order.107 By basing itself on the ideal to which capitalism aspires in its fetishised form of equal exchange, he seeks to render this ideal real for each individual. The spirit of Marx he has recovered is actually that of Stirner’s “free ego” who is alienated not by society-in-general, but by capitalist social relations. To express this freedom as a intellectual critique or a “radicalisation” of Marxism is a retreat to a subjective idealism in which the bourgeois subject aspiring to Stirner’s “unique” remains trapped in performativity as consumption of its alienated identity.

71. So in his misappropriation of Marx, Derrida offers the young idealists of today a brand of anarchism they can consume in the belief that their actions constitute a rebellion for “democracy” and “emancipation” against the dehumanising norms and conventions that alienate them. Just as Stirner’s “association of egoists” was a figment of his “Thought”, Derrida’s new International has the potential to divert a new generation of alienated youth into discursive acts against the symptomatic phrases rather than the materialist substance of capitalist crisis.

72. In his response to his critics who deride the idea of an “international” without class he replies:

Whenever I speak of the New International in Specters of Marx, emphasising that, in it, solidarity or alliance should not depend, fundamentally and in the final analysis, on class affiliation, this in no wise signifies, for me, the disappearance of “classes” or the attenuation of conflicts connected with “class” differences or oppositions (or, at least, differences or oppositions based on the new configurations of social forces for which I do in fact believe that we need new concepts and therefore, perhaps new names as well) . . . the disappearance of power relations, or relations of social domination . . . . At issue is, simply, another dimension of analysis and political commitment, one that cuts across social differences and oppositions of social forces (what one used to call, simplifying, “classes”). I would not say that such a dimension (for instance, the dimension of social, national, or international classes, or political struggles within nation states, problems of citizenship or nationality, or party strategies, etc.) is superior or inferior, a primary or a secondary concern, fundamental or not. All that depends, at every instant, on new assessments of what is urgent in, first and foremost, singular situations and of their structural implications. For such an assessment, there is, by definition, no pre-existing criterion or absolute calculability; analysis must begin anew every day everywhere, without ever being guaranteed by prior knowledge. It is on this condition, on the condition constituted by this injunction, that there is, if there is, action, decision and political responsibility — repoliticization.108

73. In other words, the term “international” is a mystique. It covers for a nihilistic cult. Its Marxist meaning is inverted; just as messianicity is messianism without a given messiah — because everyone is one’s own messiah. There is no prior knowledge that can guide any collective action because that pre-anything (society, religion, etc.) is spectral, is the unfilled “void”. There are only irreducible acts which individuals perform at any given moment by personally attempting to calculate, on the spot as it were, which of many “dimensions” or “forces” immediately concern them, “responsibly” and in the name of “justice” (whose gift?). If there is one name to apply to this contingent conjunction of “forces” which tries to “name” the “new” it is as I have argued above, performativity.109 Moreover, as I set out to prove, Derrida’s performativity is the idealist philosophical license for the political/social concept of reflexivity as developed by Soros and Giddens to express their abstract understanding of the ’structure-agency’ problem in the new global economy.110 Teamed-up, as performo-reflexivity, we could not get a better prescription for “demobilising” and “depoliticising” the masses in the face of the current world crisis of capitalism.

Marxist Dialectics

74. Yet as the crisis of “very late” capitalism looms larger it cannot be contained by such idealist fixes.111 Despite the hype, capitalism that is in dis-order and dis-equilibrium, and in terror of its own ghosts (this time the real ghosts of dead labour) is under threat of a materialist re-haunting. The victory of the more market messianicity is clamped in the jaws of contradiction. The neo-Hegelian infinite liberal democracy cannot paper over the cracks in the world economy. The resident contradiction between use-value and exchange-value asserts itself constantly in the form of the rejection of Says law that supply creates demand — that the market is the best/only historic mechanism to meet the needs of consumers. Needs are “out of joint” with profits. There is no “jointure” if consumers have no income with which to consume to meet their needs/justice. What pure gifts are possible when poverty cannot be commodified? So how can the Soros/Derrida/Giddens “new International” of the “new, new right” be the answer to underconsumption?

75. Underconsumption was the problem that Keynes recognised as the result of insufficient investment. There was no necessary connection between demand and supply because capitalists were governed by “animal spirits” which determined whether or not they would invest in production to supply demand. Keynes solution was for the state to take responsibility for productive investment [consumption] when the capitalists did not. What Keynes failed to recognise was that capitalists’ motivation for investment did not depend upon their atavistic ahistorical “animal spirits”, but the rate of profit.112

76. Keynes was unable to explain why Say’s law broke down. Capitalists only produce to meet demand if they can make a profit. This is not a problem of under-consumption that can be fixed by boosting consumption, but a problem of overproduction of capital that cannot be reinvested profitably. The reason for this is that consumer needs are not sovereign under capitalism, profits are. In order to produce capitalists want to make profits and they can only do this if they can expropriate sufficient surplus-value during production to be realised as profits. They will not permit their profits as private property to be socialised by fiat or by stealth. And while this is the case the messianic Hayek and Co can still argue for the inherent superiority of the market. Bourgeois social relations and their legal forms, property rights, set systemic limits to the possibility of distributional/cultural/legal reforms.

77. Hence modern capitalist society is ‘reflexive’ only to the point where it generates a spontaneous defensive reflex from the owners of the ’structure’ of private property against the ‘agency’ of the rampant oppressed. Giddens’ attempts to supplant “productivism” with a “post-scarcity order” will also come up against this limit.113 Given the need to accumulate capital, capitalists have to constantly increase the rate of exploitation (expropriation of relative surplus-value) and to do this they are driven to increase their investment in constant capital (machines etc) to increase labour productivity. This is what Marx called relative surplus value expropriation. This has the effect of super-exploiting a relatively declining proportion of workers, and throwing an ever-larger number of workers onto the industrial scrap-heap. As a result capitalism produces more and more efficiently with less and less necessary labour time in order to increase relative surplus value.

78. This creates an obvious problem. Profits begin to fall if the rate of surplus value does not rise fast enough to keep up with the rising organic composition (the Tendency for the Rate of Profit to Fall — TRPF — which Marx called the most important law of political economy). This is the real cause of capitalist instability and disequilibrium. But in addition to this, and with fatal consequences for Say’s law, proportionately less value is expended on variable capital (wages) and is available for wage-good consumption. So capitalism digs its own grave by creating a working class that becomes increasingly impoverished and unable to consume what it needs without revolutionising the relations of production.114

79. The market therefore cannot be fixed by state intervention to compensate for this falling demand because it cannot prevent the fundamental cause of overproduction in the first place. Keynesian demand management, which involves boosting state spending and working class consumption, exacerbates the problem of falling profits because taxes are a drain on profits! The fatal flaw of the market, (and of all forms of market socialism that are all attempts at state intervention to suppress the TRPF) is that it is integrated into the circuit of capital at the point of exchange. It cannot be cut loose and doctored to transform the circuit of capital, since in the last analysis the circuit of capital is determined by production and production relations.115

80. What does this mean for the ideology of more-market as the “historic best” at matching supply with demand? It makes all the rhetoric surrounding the superiority of the market over planning so much hot air. Hayek’s fundamental point that only the market can coordinate the information necessary to match supply with demand falls flat when demand falls flat.116 The demand factor is now seen to be not the result of a natural market-freedom to spend a “factor” income. Rather demand results from a socially alienated and historically conditioned residual income, the value of the wage, in the case of the vast majority of producers, or revenue plus profit as expropriated value in the case of the tiny minority or exploiters. But consumption depends upon production. The production of market mythology will continue, but its consumption will fall as demand collapses. As the masses are starved of consumption, the ghosts of alienated labour and the fetishised world-view will cease to hold them in thrall. It will no longer be possible for indirect apologetics of Derrida and Co. to keep up the lie of the (l)awful legitimacy of the market.

81. In the face of the contemporary crisis of capitalist production it becomes more difficult to maintain the false split in reality between ideal fixes and material roots. The symptoms collapse in on the cause. The discourse is exposed as dis-cause. Crisis theory formerly retracted into discourse without even the signifiers of the contradiction — use-value/exchange-value — explodes back into consciousness. And despite all his efforts to de-materialise Marx into the idealist Max Stirner, Derrida cannot suppress this fundamental contradiction of signified dead labour carried on the backs of living labour coming back to haunt him.

82. In other words there is more to “life” outside discourse than the “void”. And there is more to this “void” than fetishised appearances (including Derrida’s “speeches” to the masses).117 Derrida’s recuperation of Marx stops at exchange relations. The 10 plagues are but manifestations of capitalist ills that can be Stirnerised without totalising transformations. But the real predicate that Stirner fears — the ghostly contradiction between use-value and exchange-value — is in reality objective. It manifests itself both objectively and subjectively as a dialectical process that cannot be suppressed by idealist contemplation/interpretation. And despite their wilful attempts to reject history as dialectics, and to substitute the unique ego, both Stirner and Derrida have a place in the division of labour already set aside for them. It is as bourgeois intellectuals engaged in indirect apologetics of pre/post-Marxism.118

83. This proves, as Trotsky said, that if we don’t “recognise” dialectics, dialectics nevertheless “recognises” us: “that is, extends its sway” over us.119 In the same way that the “visor effect” blocks off the ghost’s identity yet the ghost sees right through us.120 So in the end, it is dialectics — finally the contradiction between use-value and exchange value — that is the ghost that haunts capitalism. No amount of tinkering with the system will stop the capitalist market as a historically time bound mechanism from collapse (though if the proletariat pushes it will not fall in on them). The market and the new millenarian hype cannot magic away the “specter” of Marxism. It cannot be conjured out of existence. The Dialectic is the ghost’s re-visit. The Spectre of Marx re-materialises Derrida’s hauntology.

Millenerianism or Materialism?

84. Today, after more than 200 years of capitalist expansion all over the world, we face the dawn of another century. Will it herald a conflict free age of social advancement, or an age of growing social disorder and international class conflict? By itself a new century offers no hope to the billions of workers and peasants whose lives are ruined or destroyed by the ruthless capitalist market. It will only offer hope, if they can shed all their religious and superstitious illusions about the past and the future, and destroy the social system that denies them hope in this life. The promise of the new millennium for the masses is not the re-born Marx of Derrida, but the dialectical method of the German Ideology and of Lukacs, Lenin and Trotsky. Only such a real-world Marxism shows them how to root out the causes of their poverty and misery and to overcome their alienation from themselves and others and to take the power over production and society in the name of humanity.

85. I think that Marx was already a materialist dialectician in the German Ideology.121 Not in spite of, but because of Hegel. This shows up clearly in his critique of Stirner. The contradiction of the relations and forces of production was already at the centre of Marx’s method. Unfortunately Western Marxism aping radical bourgeois ideology split and fetishised the forces or the relations into a one-sided fatalism or voluntarism. This is the trap of Western Marxism laid by the petty bourgeois intellectuals with no life in the class struggle but who want to (p)reserve an indeterminate cultural space for their own historical “com-edification”. Benjamin was a victim of this failure of dialectics, but no more than the various “communist” internationals that failed to apply materialist dialectics and thus the method of Bolshevism. Within this tradition only Lukacs powerful analysis of bourgeois irrationalism (that splits subject and object) succeeds in uniting theory and practice in the party.122

86. Lenin and Trotsky revived the dialectical method in the form of the revolutionary party. The contradictory unity of objective and subjective reality was realised in the revolutionary programme by means of revolutionary practice. Here we find bourgeois idealism subjected to the revolutionary critique of practice. The weapon of critique becomes the critique of weapons. Freedom is not posed as the fear of necessity expressed as “metaphysics” only to be ‘overcome’ by the authentic irrational acts of isolated individuals. Real freedom is the recognition of necessity. First, as the theory of the historic social relations which determine social life and which alienate bourgeois subjects from their labour and from themselves. Second, as the practice that allows necessity to be transcended by social revolution.123

87. We do not have to let capitalism destroy the planet. We can take power, expropriate the expropriators, and collectively plan to create a better, freer, and equal society called socialism. But to do this we need to mobilise and organise the working class. Not in Derrida’s “spirit of Marxism” but against it, taking stock of Marx’s method, recuperating the methods of the Bolsheviks and taking state power. This is both necessary and possible, since the contradictions of capitalism make busting the ghost of alienation and collectivising dead labour the only means of survival as well as emancipation of living labour.


Notes

1 Derrida, 1999, “Marx and Sons” in Sprinker (ed.) Ghostly Demarcations. This is an astonishing appeal to the banished universals of psychoanalysis as motivating his marxist critics.

2 Soros, 1998.

3 Most recently in Giddens, 1998.

4 New Statesman, October 31, 1997. See also the interview with Giddens which talks about his influence on Blair’s New Labour Party and his search for a term which expresses the essence of the “global, post-traditional, market society”, in The New Yorker, October 6, 1997.

5 Giddens, 1995:1.

6 The role of bourgeois intellectuals as apologists for capitalism at its various stages of development is tbe basic premise of Marx and Engels in The German Ideology, and of Lukac’s in The Destruction of Reason. I develop this theme in this paper.

7 Despite his reputation to the contrary, Derrida is a philosopher with his own “metavocabulary” (Rorty, 1991:94) and what’s more presents himself as the interpretor of a “real” world (Norris, 1997:106). The only question is: what is this reality? Here I argue that it is the fetishised reality of exchange relations. Cf Spivak (1995) on Derrida’s confusion between “commercial” and “industrial” capital. See Ahmad on Derrida’s affinity with the “Third Way”.

8 1994:63-64.

9 Ibid xix; 4.

10 Ibid 13.

11 Ibid 13. See Lewis on Derrida’s ‘metaphysical’ and “psychological” method of interpreting law, international law and nationalism.

12 For example in Sprinker (1999) both Negri and Hamacher argue for qualitative transformations in capitalism which partially endorse Derrida’s project.

13 1994: 13.

14 I agree with Ahmad (1994) that Derrida’s motives for reclaiming Marx are suspect. Why didn’t Derrida challenge the “dogmatics” with his “spirit” of Marx when it could have mattered? Why mourn the death of Marxism when he never loved it anyway? And why condemn totalitarian Marxism and keep quiet about the right-wing uses of deconstruction? But I argue that there is more to Derrida’s “recouping” of Marx than a re-branding of deconstruction to distinguish itself from the new right.

15 Op.cit. 13-14.

16 “In proposing this title, Specters of Marx, I was initially thinking of all the forms of a certain haunting obsession that seems to me to organise the dominant influence on discourse today. At a time when the new world disorder is attempting to install its neo-capitalism and neo-liberalism, no disavowal has managed to rid itself of all of Marx’s ghosts. Hegemony still organises the repression and thus the confirmation of a haunting. Haunting belongs to the structure of every hegemony”. (37)

17 But this is only a symptom — an “appearance” of “times out of joint”. Things need to be “put right” and made “lawful”. But “dead labour” (i.e., abstract labour that is embodied in the value of commodities) cannot be made “lawful”.

18 Why Derrida? His influence is wider than the academy, as a recent visit to Australia and New Zealand showed, Derrida drew between 1000 and 2000 at public lectures and got exposure in the national media. It seems that Derrida provides a “speculative philosophical” anti-foundationism which is the necessary premise of “Third Way” post-marxist and post-modernist politics. Anticipating this, Marx argues that “speculative history” requires a shift from the mysticism of the “concept” to the materialism of the person as “self-consciousness”, and to “thinkers”, “philosophers” etc. who represent the “concept” in history, the “ideologists who . . . are understood as the manufacturers of history, as the “council of guardians”, as the rulers”. ( Marx and Engels,1976:70)

19 I use “dead” labour in the sense of past “living labour” that becomes “objectified labour”, “crystallised” “congealed labour-time” etc. (see Marx, 1976:129-131) now represented as “constant capital”, combined with current “living labour” or “variable capital” to set in motion the further production of value (Marx, 1981:243-245).

20 Of course the performativity of alienated consumption appears as the opposite, as the authentic realisation (sovereignty) of the individual who is freed from necessary labour.

21 Marx, 1973:157. Also Marx, 1976:163-177. Money is the highest expression of alienated labour. On the surface it seems that Derrida understands this. However, on further inspection, the closest he comes to it is to recognise that money is the alienated form of “property” — not specifically labour value.

22 Derrida is correct to see Fukuyama as presenting a Hegelian “gospel”, which echoes Kojeve, that the US and the EU is “the embodiment of Hegel’s state of universal recognition” (1994:61).

23 Ibid p. 62-65.

24 See Derrida’ comments on use-value as ideology and ontology in “Marx and Sons” (1999). By mystifying use-values, Derrida renders the whole Hegelian/Marxism bag of tricks of dialectical contradiction non-existent (haunted).

25 Lukacs defines “indirect apologetics”: “. . . Whereas direct apologetics was at pains to fudge the contradictions in the capitalist system, to refute them with sophistry and to be rid of them, indirect apologetics proceeded from these vary contradictions, acknowledging their existence and their irrefutability as facts, while nonetheless putting an interpretation on them which helped to confirm capitalism. Wheras direct apologetics was at pains to depict capitalism as the best of all orders, as the last, outstanding peak of mankind’s evolution, indirect apologetics crudely elaborated the bad sides, the atrocities of capitalism, but explained them as attributes not of capitalism but of all human existence and existence in general. From this it necessarily follows that a struggle against these atrocities not only appears doomed from the start but signifies and absurdity, viz., a self-dissolution of the essentially human” (1980:202-3). Also: “In the ethical realm, indirect apologetics chiefly discredited social action in general, and in particular any tendency to want to change society. . . . Indirect apologetics in ethics have the task of steering intellectuals, sometimes rebellious ones, back to the path of the bourgeoisie’s reactionary development, while preserving all their intellectual and moral pretentions to a superior ease in this respect (1980:295).

26 The recent appearance of Sprinker’s (1999) “symposium” on Derrida’s Specters of Marx, is disappointing. Of those contributors who are clearly critical of Derrida, there is little that is new. Ahmad’s promise to devote a longer reply to Derrida has yet to appear. Lewis reproduces much of Callincos’ critique. Derrida’s response is much more interesting, including as it does Spivak (who does not appear in Sprinker’s book), in his petty and pathetic response in “Marx and Sons”.

27 1995:37.

28 Eagleton, 1986:117.

29 1993:108.

30 Like Max Weber, when push comes to shove, Derrida is a vulgar marginalist. On Weber see Lukacs, 1980, and Clarke, 1982.

31 1993:119.

32 Cf Ebert who accuses Spivak of “substituting discursive politics” for the transformation of social relations, 1996:291-293.

33 Derrida, 1994:55. It is clear that Jameson approves of Derrida’s concept of the “messianic” as a realm of “contingency” for the individual undetermined by social relations etc. I argue below that this is a consequence of Jameson’s adopting of Mandel’s eclectic model of Marxist economics which separates production from consumption, and more recently Arrighi (1994) who over time separates speculative capital from production. This primes Jameson to provide a “left cover” for the post-Marxist “cultural turn” (1998).

34 1994:108-109.

35 1996: 40.

36 See Jameson, 1991: 3, 35, 53 and especially 400.

37 See Paul Mattick’s (1981) critique of Late Capitalism. “Mandel adheres to two distinct theories of crisis at once: the overaccumulation theory, which is based on the relations of production, and the overproduction theory, which is based on the difficulties of realizing surplus value due to insufficient demand for consumer goods” (200). That aspect of Mandel’s theory which allows increasing consumption to partially compensate for overproduction, becomes the basis for his theory of the “Third Phase” of capitalist development, or “Late Capitalism”. Mandel’s consumption theory of crisis is that which is then used by Jameson to account for post-modernity as the commodification of culture. It is a short step from this theory to a messianic theory of cultural resistance as acts of virtuality in the face of consumer choice.

38 By this I mean that Arrighi separates out the sphere of money circulation (M-M’) from production, not merely in a real time circuit, M-C-M’, where excess money capital which cannot invested profitably results in speculation, but historically. Each hegemonic power goes through a period of productive development followed by a period of financial speculation. This is a retreat from Mandel’s position which conflates crises of overproduction and underconsumption where the circuit of capital is potentially arrested at the consumption moment, to a position in which financial speculation in the sphere of circulation (M-M’) creates a crisis that arrests the circuit of capital. See Robert Polin’s (1996) review of The Long Twentieth Century. As Polin puts it, “Arrighi never explicitly poses the most basic question about the M ­M ‘ circuit, which is, where do the profits come from if not from the production and exchange of commodities?” (115).

39 See Jameson “Culture and Finance Capital” in Jameson, 1998. Note the echo of this “overaccumulation” of money theory of capitalist crisis in Derrida”s “epidemic of overproduction”, 1994:63.

40 1996:33.

41 1994:10.

42 I see Derrida as following in the tradition of irrationalist philosophy of which Nietzsche and Heidegger are part. He is idealist in rejecting an objective reality outside consciousness. His idealism is subjective, as it is the individual consciousness rather than some external transcendental consciousness that gives meaning to being. For an excellent account of the role of Nietzsche and Heidegger as “indirect apologists” for capitalism against socialism in the irrationalist tradition, see Lukacs, 1980.

43 (1974: 25-28).

44 Derrida has no answer to the social causes of injustice. He argues that “justice” must come not from vengeance as with Hamlet, not from market exchange, but from pure gifts (presents) in a social “desert”. Here Derrida imagines that redistributive justice can proceed on the basis of an absence of social content let alone social relations; otherwise, he says, “justice risks being reduced again to juridical-moral rules, norms, or representations, within an inevitable totalizing horizon (movement of adequate restitution, expiation, or reappropriation” (28). Cf Spivak, 1995: 77.

45 Ibid 28-29. To attribute to Marx such views is quite a feat. It is the expression of a form of pious utopianism as we have seen. All the more utopian as the moral injunction to give what one does not have is not directed to those who can give some of what they have as charity. Derrida’s problem is that he cannot find a way to achieve justice in the here/now for fear of “evil, expropriation, and injustice”. But why fear what already exists in the historic social relations of capitalism? Because for Derrida the fear of the “inevitable totalising horizon” of dogmatic Marxism is much greater than the actually existing evil of capitalist expropriation and injustice. Marx did not counterpose the future ideal of the communist individual as the answer to capitalism today, but as the real outcome of the collective knowledge, party organisation, and mateship of a revolutionary alliance to expropriate and socialise the ‘dead labour’ of capitalist property.

46 Lukacs, 1980:255.

47 “I on my part start from a presupposition in presupposing myself; but my presupposition does not struggle for its perfection like ‘man struggling for his perfection’, but only serves me to enjoy it and consume it. I consume my presupposition, and nothing else, and exist only in consuming it. But that presupposition is therefore not a presupposition at all: for, as I am the unique, I know nothing of the duality of a presupposing and presupposed ego (an ‘incomplete’ and a ‘complete’ ego or man); but this, that I consume myself, means only that I am. I do not presuppose myself, because I am every moment just positing or creating myself, and am I only by being not presupposed but posited, and, again, posited only in the moment when I posit myself; that is I am the creator and creature” (Stirner, 1995:135).

48 Cf Stirner’s “self-determined” ego (Marx and Engels, 1976:308) and Derrida’s notion of the self in Derrida, 1997:16-22 and 1998:304.

49 I use the term “subjective idealism” here in the same sense as Lukacs. “The dissolution of Hegelianism, before Marx took the decisive step to the materialist overthrow of Hegelian dialectics, has the peculiarity that the attempts to break through the Hegelian barriers engendered a retrograde movement in these questions objectively. Bruno Bauer, in the effort to develop Hegelian dialectics further in a revolutionary way, lapsed into the extreme subjective idealism of a ‘philosophy of self-consciousness’. By thus caricaturing ­as the young Marx was already demonstrating at the time — the subjectivist aspects of the Phenomenology, and by reducing Hegel to Fichte, he too eliminated the social and historical motives from dialectics and made them far more abstract than they were in Hegel himself; he thus de-historicised and de-socialised dialectics. This tendency reaches its climax which tilts over into the absurdly paradoxical with Stirner” (1980: 254-5). Cf Leopold’s introduction to Stirner, 1995.

50 Paterson, 1971: 107.

51 Thomas, 1980; also Patterson, 1971 and Leopold, 1995.

52 Marx and Engels, 1976:142.

53 Ibid, 143.

54 Thomas, 155.

55 Ibid 142.

56 Ibid 147.

57 Marx clearly has a concept of historically specific social relations in The German Ideology. It arose from his break with the Feuerbach specifically in response to Stirner’s critique of Feuerbach and Marx. “The more the normal form of intercourse [social relations] and with it the conditions of the ruling class, develop their contradiction to the advanced productive forces, and the greater the consequent discord within the ruling class itself as well as between it and the class ruled by it, the more fictitious, of course, becomes the consciousness which originally corresponded to this form of intercourse (i.e., it ceases to be the consciousness corresponding to this form of intercourse), and the more to the old traditional ideas of these relations of intercourse, in which actual private interests, etc., are expressed as universal interests, descend the level of mere idealising phrases, conscious illusion, deliberate hypocrisy. But the more their falsity is exposed by life, and the less meaning they have for consciousness itself, the more resolutely are they asserted, the more hypocritical, moral and holy becomes the language of this normal society” (Marx and Engels, 1976:310). Also: “That money is a necessary product of definite relations of production and intercourse and remains a “truth” so long as these relations exist — this, of course is of no concern to a holy man like Saint Max, who raises his eyes towards heaven and turns his profane backside to the profane world” (ibid: 219). Cf Callinicos, 1985: 44-46.

58 Marx and Engels, 1976: 97.

59 Thomas, 146.

60 Derrida, 1994:30.

61 1996: 40.

62 Ibid: 38.

63 Ahmed, 1994.

64 Callincos 1991. Cf Trotsky’s position that the “degenerate workers’ states” were a contradictory unity of workers property and stalinist state power which could only be resolved by political revolution or social counter-revolution (1972). Lewis (1999) repeats Callinicos’ argument in more detail, charging Derrida with ignorance of “state capitalism”. It is beyond the scope of this paper to further develop the significant differences between these contending positions. Nevertheless because Derrida’s ignorance of Marxism is most profound on the question of method I don’t think that the state capitalist position can possibly correct it.

65 Compare Marx on Stirner’s self-determination as “absence of determination” (Marx and Engels,1976: 309) and Derrida on the messianic as “opening to the future or to the coming of the other as the advent of justice”. This is a discursive fantasy where Derrida imagines a desert preceding “all determinate community, all positive religion . . . it would link pure singularities prior to any social or political determination, prior to all intersubjectivity, prior to the opposition between the sacred and the profance”. Such a link would allow a new respect and tolerance . . . without this desert in the desert, there would be neither act of faith, nor promise, nor future, nor expectancy without expectation of death and of the other, nor relation to the singularity of the other” (1998:16-22).

66 Callinicos’ rejects commodity fetishism on philosophical and political grounds. Philosophically, he rejects any necessary link between social relations and consciousness, and specifically a link between exchange relations and bourgeois ideology. Thus the whole basis of Marx critique of fetishism which turns relations between men into relations between things as the source of ideology is rejected. Politically, Callinicos says that if fetishism is allowed then this suggests that “capitalism can reproduce itself indefinitely”. Both of these grounds are wrong. By avoiding Marx’s reified individual Callinicos apparently avoids “pessimism”. In its place he puts a groundless, fatalistic “optimism” based on an idealist notion of spontaneous class consciousness that must lead to workers remaining trapped by fetishised exchange relations (1985:131). Nor do I think that Eagleton’s warnings against “fetishism” are valid (1986:75). For an excellent discussion of the importance of Marx’s method and the theory of commodity fetishism in Marxism, see Rubin, 1973. For its application to the theory of the party see Lukacs, 1970 and 1971.

67 Briefly, the failure of materialist dialectics in Western Marxism results from the split between objective and subjective reality that can be united only in the programme of the revolutionary party. Callinicos cannot transcend this split because his stance is one of objective idealism in which the working class (rather than humanity) acts spontaneously, unmediated by the revolutionary unity of theory and practice in the party which is necessary to penetrate fetishised reality. On the other hand, Derrida is attempting to revise Marxism as a left-Hegelian subjective idealism. In both cases the self-activity of the individual is dehistoricised either by abstracting from social relations in Derrida’s case, or by abstracting from the alienated bourgeois subject in Callinicos’ case.

68 1986:87.

69 1996:87, 1995.

70 Laclau, 1995; Critchley, 1995.

71 1995:95.

72 1999:9 There are strong echoes here of Jameson’s endorsement of “weak messianism”.

73 1980:404, 411.

74 1996:40-41 n.7.

75 See Callinicos’ discussion in 1987: ch. 5.

76 See Marx on Stirner: “The unity of sentimentality and bragging is rebellion” (Marx and Engels, 1976:318) and “By rebellion we make a leap into the new, egotistical world” (ibid: 399). Compare Benjamin who sought to eliminate the “autonomous individual” of bourgeois culture and replace him/her with the critical intellectual who used dialectial materialism to destroy capitalism by means of critique which could explode the contradiction in the commodity at its point of highest tension — the dialectical image (Pensky, 1993; Lowy, 1996; Wohlfarth, 1996).

77 1999:248-9.

78 1999:253-4.

79 “For Saint Sancho however, self-determination does not even consist in will, but in indifference to any kind of determinateness…if Saint Sancho saves himself from determination by his leap into absence of determination . . . then the practical, moral content of the whole trick . . . is merely an apology for the vocation forced on every individual in the world as it has existed so far. If, for example, the workers assert in their communist propaganda that the vocation, designation, task of every person is to achieve all-round development of all his abilities, including . . . the ability to think, Saint Sancho sees in this only the vocation to something alien, the assertion of the “holy”. He seeks to free them from this by defending the individual who had been crippled by the division of labour at the expense of his abilities and relegated to a one-sided vocation against his own need to become different. . . . The all-rounded realisation of the individual will only cease to be conceived as an ideal, a vocation, etc., when the impact of the world which stimulates the real development of the abilities of the individual is under the control of the individuals themselves, as the communists desire” (Marx and Engels,1976:308-309 also 463). I would argue that this projected communist individual is the unity of theory and practice, which theoretically is foreshadowed in the party cadre of the Communist Party (Bolshevik).

80 Benjamin’s “marxism” had an idealist residue. This could be seen to result from his efforts to escape the crude (vulgar marxist) determinism of Stalinism, and his own personal isolation and intellectual standpoint. On Adorno’s and Brecht’s views on Benjamin see Broderson, 1996: 233-239.

81 Pensky, 1993:211-239.

82 Benjamin’s rejection of the “party” was probably more the effect of his isolation from the working class, than a cause of it. There is obviously no direct relationship between actual historic party membership and the incipient ‘communist’ individual Marx projects in the Germany Ideology. First, after 1924 the actually existing party was Stalinist and repressed or even murdered its dissidents. This meant that the “Left opposition” had few mass roots that could have sustained a “collective” proleterian culture. It would be interesting to compare the long-term legacy of Benjamin with his younger brother Georg who joined the party in 1923 and died in a concentration camp in 1942 (Broderson, 1996: 208).

83 See Broderson (1996:261) for an account that shows that Benjamin was but one of countless victims of fascism. His decision to kill himself in Port Bou on the French/Spanish border rather than be returned to Vichy France and to a concentration camp, followed frantic but futile phone calls to the US Consulate in Barcelona, and tragically occurred during a short period of one day when the Spanish authorities refused entry.

84 1996:70-72.

85 Thomas,1980:142.

86 Specifically Benjamin’s uncompromising attitude towards the “independence” of cultural history which for him is reduced to the history of class struggle! What about some Benjamin studies in place of “cultural studies”? (See Wohlfarth 1996.)

87 Following Marx, Lenin, Lukacs and Trotsky, my view of materialist dialectics is that it unites objective and subjective reality in the unity of theory and practice of communists. Since Lenin this formulation has been expressed as the unity of theory and practice in the organisation and programme of a democratic centralist party. Intellectual critiques of Derrida’s deconstruction do not unite theory with practice unless they are translated into a revolutionary programme and put into effect by a revolutionary party as the “proletarian scientist”. Specifically, Derrida’s politics would favour an individual contract between a worker and a boss. Since all work is “here/now” this contract should be very flexible. From a materialist dialectical standpoint, the revolutionary party would attempt to sign up individual workers to collective contracts that are enforceable by collective action such as the closed shop. In the process workers would be educated by the experience of winning more favourable conditions, exposing the “performativity” of the isolated worker as one determined by exploitative social relations rather than the “affirmation of the other”.

88 1999:231.

89 This breaking of the unity is an attempt by the petty bourgeios intelligentsia to “incorporate” the “servicable” parts of Marxism and “purify” the rest. Thus separating the exchange moment reduces exploitation to unequal exchange the province of the trade union bureaucray; freezing the distributional moment reduces exploitation to power relations and the maldistribution of wealth which can be reformed by parliament. . . . Freezing the consumption moment, reduces the notion of exploitation to individual errors of choice and hence to caveat emptor.

90 Derrida, 1999:237.

91 Marx and Engels, 1976:310.

92 Cf Ebert, 1996.

93 1994:40.

94 Ibid:52.

95 Ibid:81.

96 Ibid:31-32.

97 Just as in the 1890’s Max Weber borrowed from Marx in order to suborn him (Clarke, 1982) so in the 1990’s Derrida repays his debt to Marx by “buying him cheap and selling him dear”. Marx rejects the analysis of capitalism based on exchange-relations where profits “apparently” derive from “buying cheap and selling dear”. Similarly, I reject Derrida’s re-appropriation of Marx as similarly superficial because he “profits” from the “appearance” that Marx stands for distributional social justice rather than the revolutionary “essence” which is the socialisation of the means of production to produce use-values to meet needs.

98 Ibid: 59; 68. Rorty picks up on this when he says that Derrida “betrays his own project” by offering a view which is not totally devoid of “all dialectics, all theology, all teleology, all ontology” (1991:92-91). Rorty obviously sees Derrida as genuinely keeping alive some of the misconceived totalising spirits of Marx. He accuses Derrida of offering a “new metavocabulary which claims superior status” (1991:94).

99 1994:88-89.

100 1994:68.

101 See Lukacs, 1980. Specifically on post-1945 irrationalism (765-853).

102 1994:87-90.

103 Ibid 14, 14, 30. See also more recent statements along the sames lines in Derrida 1997 and 1998.

104 Stirner’s ego is an idealist essence because it abstracts from social relations and inserts a concept of the free ego. The “association of egos” is therefore meaningless. As Marx says of Stirners rebellion: “The difference between revolution and Stirner’s rebellion is not, as Stirner thinks, that the one is a political and social act while the other is an egoistical act, but that the former is an act while the latter is no act at all. The whole senselessness of the antithesis that Stirner puts forward is evident at once from the fact that he speaks of “the Revolution” as a juridical person, which has to fight against “what exists”, another juridical person” (ibid: 400).

105 Marx continues: “They entered into intercourse with one another as what they were, they proceeded “from themselves”, as they were, irrespective of their “outlook on life”. This “outlook on life” — even the warped one of the philosophers — could, of course, only be determined by their actual life. Hence it certainly follows that the development of an individual is determined by the development of all the others with whom [s]he is directly or indirectly associated, and that the different generations of individuals entering into relation with one another are connected with one another, that the physical existence of the later generations is determined by that of their predecessors, and that these later generations inherit the productive forces and forms of intercourse [productive relations] accumulated by their predecessors, their own mutual relations being determined thereby. In short, it is clear that development takes place and that the history of a single individual cannot possibly be separated from the history of preceding or contemporary individuals, but is determined by this history” (1976:463).

106 1994: 85-86.

107 Ahmad, 1994:103.

108 1999:241-2.

109 See Hamacher’s (1999) sympathetic interpretation of this point. It is not too difficult to see that Derrida’s notion of performativity is the (post) modern version of the existential, irrational subject. See Lukacs on the “Ash Wednesday of Parasitical Subjectivism” (1980: 489 passim).

110 See Soros, 1998: 6-27, and Giddens, 1995.

111 Crisis is understood here following Mattick, 1981.

112 Pilling, 1986.

113 Giddens, 1995:247.

114 Marx and Engels, 1962: 43-45.

115 Marx, 1973:99.

116 Hayek, 1935.

117 Despite his disclaimers and attempts to purge filiation, fraternity, paternity etc of the authority of the pre-existing everything (history), it seems to me that the logic of Derrida’s whole method is that of the priest/demagogue/saviour who speaks to the masses of the religion of pure egoism as personal salvation — his message? “faith, hope, charity”. . .

118 On this point see Deb Kelsh (1998).

119 Trotsky, 1971:62.

120 Derrida, 1994:7

121 Cf. Callinicos’ view that Marx confuses technical and social relations in The German Ideology (1985:131).

122 Here I follow Lukacs’ brilliant exposition of the Communist (i.e. Bolshevik) Party as the “conscious” vanguard of the proletariat. I cite only one passage: “The pre-eminently practical nature of the Communist Party, the fact that it is a fighting party presupposes its possession of a correct theory, for otherwise the consequences of a false theory would soon destroy it. Moreover, it is a form of organisation that produces and reproduces correct theoretical insights by consciously ensuring that the organisation has built into it ways of adapting with increase sensitivity to the effects of a theoretical posture. Thus the ability to act, the faculty of self-criticism, of self-correction and of theoretical development all co-exist in a state of constant interaction. The Communist Party does not function as a stand-in for the proletariat even in theory. If the class consciousness of the proletariat viewed as a function of the thought and action of the class as a whole is something organic and in a state of constant flux, then this must be reflected in the organised form of that class consciousness, namely in the Communist Party. . . . Thus in the theory of the party the process, the dialectic of class consciousness becomes a dialectic that is consciously deployed” (1971:327-8).

123 E.g. Lukacs, 1970, 1971; Lenin, 1976; Trotsky, 1975.


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Contents copyright © 1999 by David Bedggood.Format copyright © 1999 by Cultural Logic, ISSN 1097-3087, Volume 2, Number 2, Spring 1999.

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Antipodean Marxism meets Indigenous Peoples’ Struggles

13 02 2008

tuwhare-marxworkerposter.jpg

Hone Tuwhare and Poster of Karl Marx as Construction Worker

Introduction

Today the struggle of indigenous peoples in Australasia is becoming institutionalised in international law and the post-modern politics of multi-cultural ‘difference’. When Derrida can visit Australia and NZ and be hailed as a partisan of indigeneity (Bedggood, 1999); when Lyotard can be invoked to bring Kant to the rescue of ‘native title’ (Green, 1994); we see that the colonial missionary has been supplanted by the post-colonial emmisary. Thus the official policy has gone from forced integration, relocation, stolen children, suppressed language and customs etc, towards a liberal paternalism under the guise of ‘multiculturalism’, ‘biculturalism’ and more recently ‘post-colonialism’.

Such a move tokenises indigenous peoples’ rights conferred by the bourgeois state and celebrated by the rituals of cultural reconciliation. But the cultural turn in indigenous peoples struggles is not new. It is a time-honoured strategem for political incorporation and economic assimulation into global capital accumulation.

Today indigenous peoples remain heavily oppressed by racism on top of systemic class exploitation. What then do Australasian Marxists have to say about the prospects of indigenous peoples overcoming their historic oppression and joining forces with the international proletariat in the overthrow of capital? Do they have a future as a people or as a class? Or, what is the difference?

Materialist premises

We should begin by defining some materialist premises. In the case of Australia and New Zealand, white settler colonisation arose from the first crisis faced by the leading capitalist state in Europe, Britain. These colonies went through a process of a bourgeois revolution (as yet incomplete) in which bourgeois land, labour and capital were formed (but which remain semi-colonies of the US and Japan).

Internal to these countries however are the indigenous peoples who remain oppressed minorities without equal rights to land, labour and capital. How can these oppressed peoples’ gain their liberation? All arguments about liberation have been drawn from European sources and imported into the Antipodes. Are they therefore necessarily examples of cultural imperialism? I would say Yes, if they continue to deny the same rights to indigenous minorities that were fought for and won in Europe, or attempt to contain these rights inside the framework of the bourgeois constitution rather than the socialist commonwealth.

In this paper I want to distinguish between two sorts of Marxism. The first is a Euro-centric Marxism that imposes an imperio-centric notion of progress and self-determination upon Aborigines and Maori, and in doing so provides a radical edge to the project of assimilation. The second, is an Antipodean Marxism that fights for the right of oppressed national minorities to self-determination up to and including secession as part of the struggle for socialism. This distinction correlates roughly with Gramsci’s concept of traditional intellectuals serving capitalist hegemony and organic intellectuals servicing the counter-hegemonic rise of socialism.

In dealing with the Antipodes, like Marx I do not start with geography, but with production relations. I argue here that societies generate ideas out of social relations that reflect those relations and help reproduce them. In the formation of the Antipodes there was a clash of ideas that reflect pre-capitalist and capitalist modes of production each with its own social relations because such sets of social relations are incompatible. Maori and Aboriginal societies were non-class modes of production with social relations based on kinship. Ideas served the reproduction of kinship relations.

Capitalist ideas on the other hand are split between those that express the disguised fetishized form of social relations as equal exchange (i.e. hegemonic ideology) and those which break down this ideology by penetrating to the totality of capitalist production (counter-hegemonic critique). In that sense these different standpoints all originated from Europe because that is where capitalism began, but they become real, that is concrete and complex, only by applying these concepts to the specific social formations that are mixtures of social relations comprising nations in the global economy.

However, remembering Marx, the point is not just to interpret but also to change the world. Thus the concept of Antipodes (as European fragments) and Indigenes (as pre-capitalist formations) are not mutually antagonistic. They are part of the totality of the articulation of social relations in the concrete regional social formation I call ‘Australasia’ situated in the inclusive world capitalist social formation. But these concepts mean nothing unless they inspire and guide our thought and action to advance democratic rights and freedoms for all.

Australasia, like all settler social formations, has yet to resolve its ‘founding problem’ – the dispossession and oppression of its indigenous peoples. Even on the terms of classic bourgeois rights, until this historic blight is remedied Australasia fails to live up to its ‘civilising mission’. Bourgeois society cannot indefinitely tolerate one group of ‘subjects’ who do not have citizenship rights unless they are deliberately denied these rights for some offence against the ‘common good’. So the first step is to define the problem. Why is it that the indigenous peoples of Australia and NZ were largely excluded from equal rights during the settler colonisation of these countries? What is the basis of this exclusion and how can it be overcome?

Today it is widely recognised that indigenous peoples were historically oppressed and that these past ‘wrongs’ need to be redressed before any society can claim to be equal and humane. Both Aboriginal and Maori peoples have made advances in redressing past wrongs winning legislation that specifically establishes certain political/legal rights and land rights. In NZ the Treaty of Waitangi settlements form the political/legal basis for this process. In Australia, the process is not as advanced. Native title is now part of the law, even if as yet the barriers to claiming Native title are very high.

This is because the ‘settlement’ process is heavily contested not only between the national minorities and majorities, but also within both camps. Answers to the question of who is responsible for the historic oppression of indigenous peoples and who should pay for the reparations typically express the dominant ideological standpoints found in capitalist society; neoliberal and liberal. This standpoint is hegemonic and has framed the terms of the debate to the point of marginalising radical and revolutionary challenges. It is the purpose of this paper to critique that dominant standpoint from a classic Marxist position, and to argue that the real solution, self-determination, necessarily implies socialism.

Neoliberal conservatives

Within the hegemonic frame, the crudest position is that of the classic liberals (today’s neo-liberals or market liberals). Historically it originated with white settlement as the ‘civilising mission’. It adopts an evolutionary schema in which peoples range from savages to civilised, with gradations in between. Australian aborigines were, and are still to some extent, regarded as at the extreme savage end, sub-humans living in a ‘primitive communist’ pre-social existence. Wolfe talks of how 19th century anthropologists justified treating Aboriginals as landless on the grounds that they had not discovered patriarchy and got properly married! (1999:69).

The New Zealand Maori were regarded as ‘noble savages’ further up the evolutionary scale. The settlers understood a society that based land claims on conquest! Yet there was some doubt that even Maori could be civilised. The only way to ’scientifically’ civilise the Maori was “in his coffin”. (Sinclair, 1961:7). There are still echoes of these racist ideas today in right wing attacks on the ‘natives’ and their demands. The fear of Aboriginal and Maori as ‘primitive communism’ threatening to destroy European civilisation is evident in the extreme racist reactions to Land Rights.

The extreme right racism in Australia has been rekindled today as a fear of Communism. The original racism of the white settlers was based on the need to convert land to private (patriarchal) property. At Markus has shown the furore of the Blainey debate in 1984 was kicked off not by any obvious marked concern about an Asian invasion but about Federal and West Australian Labor Government’s plans to legislate on land rights and challenge the property rights of the mining industry (1987:21). The White Australia policy was always about the ‘primitive communism’ of Aboriginals failure to respect private property and patriarchy, and extended to other migrants later.

The concerns of Hanson et.al. today echo this primordial racism. If the policy of stealing children was justified because the deluded patronising Anthropologist Daisy Bates reported that Aboriginals ‘ate their babies’ in the 1930’s, then it is the same fear of atheistic communism that droves the anti-Asian racism of the 19th century and revived today (Hall, 1998). While much of the debate about racism in Australia today is to do with how ‘Anglo-celts’ struggle for a national identity there is no escaping that private property is at the root of racism (Hage, 1998; Stratton, 1998).

Whatever the cultural autonomy of racist nationalism, it is direct threats to capitalist property that serves to re-mobilise racist political arguments and seek popular support from petty bourgeois and workers whose fears and insecurities can be re-directed at these convenient targets.

Responding to a radical revival of Maori land rights in the 70’s and early 80’s, Geoff MacDonald claimed that Maori radicals were in league with international communists to takeover the country and suppress white settler civilisation.(1985). As a former member of the Australian Communist Party of 13 years, and a life long trade union official, McDonald claimed that Maori were not oppressed, and whites were not racist. The whole question of Maori self-determination was a communist plot to ferment discontent among Maori, and find a substitute for the working class that had proven itself incapable of making a revolution.1

Ten years later, part of a growing redneck backlash to multimillion-dollar Treaty settlements in land and fisheries, Stuart Scott expressed the new right capitalist obsession with “one law for one people” (1995). The Treaty is an anomaly because it creates privileges (Article 2 claims over land and resources not used by Maori in 1840) as well as bourgeois rights as subjects. Scott says that Article 2 privileges should be junked and the Treaty limited to Article 3 rights. This is the redneck Article 3 solution where Maori are supposed to be equal subjects and citizens; one law for one people! 2 It reflects the ideology of the market where individuals are supposedly equal as citizens and can own private property and respect family values. Any failure to do so results from personal failing, tribal culture, stone-age economics or deficient genes. Richard Prebble and ACT have picked up and run with these ideas. Prebble’s recent call for a ‘time cap’ on Treaty settlements is the most politically explosive current expression of this position (1999).

Professor Kenneth Minogue’s 1995 book Waitangi: Morality and Reality, presents the New Right’s big gun pseudo-philosophical arguments.3 He stakes out the classic liberal assumptions about European civil society, the rule of law, and the separation of powers in the British and US Constitutions, and then rejects all deviations from these. He blames Marxism, legal relativism, and legal activism for subjecting the law to political pressures such as the “Treaty Process”. This, he argues, will make Maori dependent upon the state as a collective victim or a new rentier class, rather than free them to become equal citizens under one law for all. What is obscured in his assumptions is the fact that the bourgeois law and state are already politically loaded agents of the bourgeoisie in defence of its private property rights etc. and that the Treaty is doing no more than retrospectively correcting for the illegal transfer of property under that “one law”.

Minogue objects not so much to the interference of politics in the law, but rather the attempts by social liberals to treat Maori differently with a separate law. Why? Because this would expose the historic fact that bourgeois law is not universal but is politically loaded in defence of bourgeois property rights from which Maori have been largely excluded. This exposure threatens the legitimacy of the state and may lead to situation where the rule of law and democracy are threatened by ‘particularistic separatist’ movements that put ‘New Zealand in danger’ of collapsing into ‘anarchy’ and ‘civil strife’.(1998: 89,90). Here then, is a philosophical smokescreen to deter anyone undermining the real political function of bourgeois law i.e. the defence of private property; specifically, opposition to Treaty claims being made on private property, and opposition to Treaty claims being used to stop the privatisation of state assets, and the re-nationalisation or Maori incorporation of privatised assets!

Gareth Morgan, Infometrics head honcho, in his NZ Herald column amplified Minogue’s alarm about the Treaty posing a threat to social (meaning the capitalist ‘market’) order.4 He had another go at the Treaty when he tried to claim that the “return of stone-age economics” in New Zealand was linked to Hanson’s neo-fascist politics in Australia.5

A more sophisticated Maori-bashing can be found in Donna Awatere’s recent books. Awatere is an interesting case of a Maori who has made the transition from left to right on the Maori question. In her book, My Journey, she even claims that the transition took place while she was reading Das Kapital. After being wooed by the Communist Party for some years, Awatere explains how visits to Cuba, Albania and Russia made her question ‘official’ communism.6 Ironically, this is almost the same position taken by Geoff McDonald some ten years earlier in attacking Awatere’s Maori Sovereignty, 7 testifying to her complete break with her radical past and advocacy of an extreme right neo-liberal ideology. 8

Liberal Humanists

The more politically correct liberal position is that of the humanists. Historicallly the crude ‘natural selection’ approach was weakly contested by the then politically correct ‘humanitarianism’. Outright annihilation and assimilation was frowned upon and replaced with ‘native protection’. Civilisation would transform indigenous cultures with the aid of humanitarian reforms – from the missionaries to social workers- the civilising mission would do its work (Bedggood, 1978).

However, because such ‘progressive’ liberals did not believe in natural selection but rather humane intervention, indigenous peoples were granted ‘protection’ and bourgeois rights to land, citizenship – in theory if not in practice. The history of liberal race relations in the Antipodes has been to peacefully amalgamate the two races into a harmonious unity. Treaty recognition, settlements, apologies and “pardons” etc are the attempts to realise this ideal. Failure is blamed on ill will, institutionalised racism, Euro-centrism etc. Liberal reforms, post-colonial critiques, and internal decolonisation will correct this situation. Today the liberals want to turn historical Treaty rights into Constitutional reforms and International law that protects and allows the development of indigenous peoples rights. Indigenous rights are regarded as natural rights. More about this later.9

Yet this liberal approach to natural rights is seriously misguided. No rights exist without the might to back them up. Entrenching indigenous right must mean empowering indigenous might. This could only happen by a transfer of power by force or cession.10 In Australia the multicultural project is to say sorry but not to empower Aboriginals to reclaim their land and culture. Notwithstanding the Mabo and Wik decisions that formally recognised some grounds for claiming land rights, these are so limited as to be largely tokenism in the face of mining and farming property rights (Alford, 1999).

As Hage (1998) and others point out, ‘multiculturalism’ is on the terms of the dominant Euro culture. This is because people can become equal culturally only if they are equal economically and politically. For this to happen there would need to be a fundamental reform of the capitalist social relations that consigns Aboriginals to a largely landless rural reserve army where they could not subsist adequately without engaging in low paid often seasonal and insecure wage labour.

In NZ the bicultural project requires that Maori power-share in the bourgeois state. This of course is the standpoint of classic social democracy where social justice can be won by reforming the state. But while in NZ the ideology of ‘statism’ is powerful because of the central role played by the state historically, there are no grounds for believing that Maori can harness the state to their purposes in the manner of the bourgeoisie.

This is because, despite the new right revision of statism in NZ (Bassett,1998), at each historic point when major state intervention occurred it was to create and reproduce the conditions for capital accumulation. When white settler colonisation required the dispossession of the indigenous people and their induction into the reserve army of labour, how can decolonisation reverse this process? As we shall see illusions about indigenous rights are based on the belief that decolonisation works. But the model of decolonisation applied to indigenous peoples is inherently flawed since it fails to register the ongoing process of economic subordination that is the fate of decolonised i.e. neo-colonised nations.

In the middle of the 19th century Karl Marx gave an account of the causes of white settler colonisation that laid bare the hypocrisy of the ‘mission’ of one people to civilise another. Far from being a peaceful process of civilisation, the colonies exposed the real history of the rise of capitalism in Europe – one of “primitive accumulation” (i.e. the bloody conquest, plunder and sometimes destruction of pre-capitalist society). The purpose was to expropriate the indigenous population from the land to convert it into private property and the population into a reserve army of labour. This had been the history of the rise of capitalism in Europe, and it was now the purpose of the ‘new theory of colonisation’ of Wakefield and Co. to kill “two birds with one stone etc”. 11 The crude experience of colonisation – the destruction of the pre-capitalist society and its “articulation” into the dominant capitalist society – rapidly exposed bourgeois conservative and liberal ideology as a pack of lies.

So contrary to the claims of the missionaries and ‘humanitarian’ colonial politicians who wanted to “protect the native”, the real purpose of colonisation was that of a land grab and the mustering of the indigenous people as a reserve army of labour. Land, labour and capital had to be created and assembled as the notorious “factors of production”. This created the opposition and resistance to European colonisation from its first bloody conquest right up to the post-modern assimilation today. However, instead of seeing the real motive behind colonisation as one of establishing a new class society, radical ideology presents the conflict only in terms of its more immediate aspect of racial or national domination/oppression.

Radical nationalists

The earliest forms of radical ideology were based on the defence of a kinship lineage society against its destruction. The first radical nationalists in Australasia were the Aboriginal people who resisted the destruction of their society. Considered pre-social, of no ‘economic value’ unless required as a cheap labour source, and without identifiable ‘territory’, Aboriginal resistance was written off as no more than the sporadic and irrational acts of outlaws who rejected the benefits of their protection as ‘native subjects’ (Rowley, 1972:5). In reality however, this resistance was a determined socially organised response to the use of force to take Aboriginal land and to genocide (Reynolds, 1981, 1987). It was equally as rational as the settler society that seized good land to produce fine wool for the rapidly expanding British market.

The radical re-interpretation of the frontier recognises clearly the contradiction between two antagonistic social systems. Simple hunting and gathering came up against the pastoral production of commodities. We have seen how the Euro-centric anthropology of the 19th century and much of the 20th reproduced the dominant evolutionary conception of Aboriginal society as the earliest form of society on the evolutionary scale.

More recently radical and neo-Marxist anthropologists and historians have partly corrected this bias. Aboriginals were not sub-human, or pre-social without knowledge of paternity and land rights. While a relatively simple lineage mode of production, this society was complex in its social organisation and division of labour including warfare. Thus today there is a wider acceptance of the existing rights of indigenous peoples to their land and resources, and acknowledgement of the destruction wrought by colonisation at the hands of a more powerful capitalist social system largely as the result of a history of radical resistance to dispossession and oppression (Reynolds, 1996).

In NZ, the Treaty of Waitangi was signed by Maori on the strength of the assurance that it granted Maori self-determination as equal British subjects (Article 3); with ‘tinorangitiratanga’, i.e. control over their own lands and fisheries etc (Article 2); subject only to the limits of overall British rule “kawanatanga” (Article 1). Many Maori chiefs refused to sign the Treaty of Waitangi seeing clearly that they had already lost their land. 12 Hone Heke, according to Sahlins the first to sign the Treaty,13 then cut down the British flag pole at Kororareka four times because in Maori mythology it signified that the British were in reality breaking Article 2 and claiming the land and the real mana (authority) of the chiefs.14

When these rights were dishonoured, the Treaty was seen as dishonoured, a “fraud”. Maori attempts to protect their land and assert their independence were radical demands because they rejected the process of ‘primitive accumulation’. Their military defeat (Waikato, Taranaki, Hauhau etc) 15 led to civil disobedience (Parihaka), and then later to nationalist demands that Maori collectively be recognised as (Article 3) bourgeois subjects (Kotahitanga, King Movement, Pomare, Separate Maori seats, etc). 16 This begins with the assertion of equal bourgeois democratic rights (Article 3) for Maori as a people, but not as isolated bourgeois individuals, and a restoration of land and other resources under Article 2. These demands were for restoration rather than for political secession.

Similarly, in Australia, after the first waves of resistance had been defeated, Aboriginals continued to stake their claims to land and to equal rights, though these had not been agreed to in any past Treaty. Middleton (1977) documents the resurgence of struggle for equal pay and land rights after WW2. The Pilbara strike of station hands in 1946 won Aboriginal workers equal pay. A campaign for citizenship was won in 1967. The Gurindji struggle for the return of their land at Wattie Creek began in 1966 and and sparked off twenty years of land rights struggles that culminated in the Mabo and Wik decisions (O’Lincoln, 1993). Mabo removed the myth of terra nullius, and Wik recognised the right to ownership of traditional land based on continuous occupancy. But just like the Gurindji and other claims, successive governments have refused to restore full land rights or have tried to convert them into private property rights without ownership of mineral wealth.

The failure of Aboriginal and Maori national struggles to result in national liberation results from the politics of the radical leadership. Most of these struggles became taken over by middle class blacks claiming a share of Antipodean capitalism. New movements for self-determination emerged in both countries but the ’self’ that was determined was not that of a whole people, but an emergent ‘middle class’ of black bureaucrats and black bourgeoisie (Poata-Smith, 1998).

Their model was the US civil rights movement. Radicals like Donna Awatere in New Zealand and Bobbi Sykes in Australia were heavily influenced by Black Power in the 1970’s. Black Power drew its support from the oppressed African-American minority in the US and demanded access to power and wealth for blacks (Burgmann, 1993:34). Instead of joining forces with white workers to overturn a racist exploitative capitalism, the politics of Black Power sought to achieve racial equality by advancing blacks out of the working class into the petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie. The result was that in Australasia, Governments began to foment a white backlash to Black Power as a separatist racist threat to the unity of the white nation. The radical intelligentsia had no interest in trying to unite black and white workers against this backlash, but tried to guilt trip the white middle class to turn against white workers and blame them as accomplices in the oppression of Aboriginal and Maori.

In NZ following a decade of renaissance of Maori land rights protest, Awatere’s 1984 book Maori Sovereignty marked the revival of a radical critique of Maori inequality and oppression.What was striking about the resurgence of Maori radicalism in the late 1970s and early 1980s was its ambivalence towards Marxism and the selective use of popularised and Euro-centric ‘Marxist’ concepts to promote the struggle of indigenous peoples rather than the class struggle. This reflected not only the experience of Maori as primarily members of the working class, but also the rise of a Maori labour bureaucracy that identified with various currents of Western Marxism, Soviet or Chinese ‘communism’ and Third world liberation movements. European capitalism was seen as aggressive, acquisitive and expansionist, colonising and exploiting indigenous peoples and the model of national liberation struggles was adapted to the decolonisation of Aotearoa.17
In broad terms this neo-Ricardian ‘Marxist’ theory posits the expropriation of value from producing classes by the capitalist class. But in the hands of under-development theorists, class is displaced by nation as the relation of domination. It is argued that the dominant European nations at the ‘centre’ exploit the dependent, subordinate, ‘periphery’ of colonies, semi-colonies or client states. This makes the working class in the dominant states accomplices with ‘their’ employers in the exploitation of workers and indigenous peoples in the subordinate states. Thus a Euro-centric neo-Marxism becomes the basis for a left-wing post-colonial inversion of the ‘civilising mission’ in which white settler workers and their descendants become complicit in colonial oppression, and must today become the allies of indigenous peoples to win their national liberation (Windshuttle, 1996; Maka and Fleras, 1998;Walker, 1999).

Donna Awatere’s radical critique borrows from such theories in order to portray all the European colonists regardless of their class, as motivated by their ‘white hatred’ to oppress all Maori. Such racism certainly served to justify the land grab. But here Awatere does not advance much beyond Keith Sinclair’s ‘acquisitive’ Europeans (Sinclair, 1961:21). The land grab is motivated by settler racism and greed that are culturally given, and not explained as the historically specific effect of the crisis of British capitalism and class struggle. As the cause is not related to class, Awatere’s solution isn’t either. She borrows from Gramsci to put the Maori people at the head of an alliance of progressive forces that can reclaim the stolen land. Hence a borrowed pseudo-Marxism becomes a bureaucratic tool to empower Maori as an oppressed people over Europeans as an oppressor people.

Rob Steven criticised Awatere’s argument because it was ‘idealist’ . That is, it did not explain the historical and material causes ‘white hatred’ (1984, 1989). He argues that racism and the desire for land are not sufficient to explain colonisation. He traces colonisation back to the crisis of rising prices in Britain that caused a surplus of labour and capital. Colonisation was an answer to both as it established new lands on which relocated labour and capital produced commodities that cut the price of raw materials in Britain.

Once explained, it could be shown that in the nineteenth century all Pakeha did benefit from the rent from stolen Maori land. But today this no longer applied. So while Awatere threw down the challenge to Pakeha to get in behind the Maori struggle, Steven attempted to prove that today there was no longer any material benefit to be gained for the proletariat from Pakaha racism. A socialist alliance could be built based upon the most oppressed workers, Maori, Pacific Island and Pakeha.

However, Steven’s explanation is a neo-Ricardian one. Exploitation is based on the extraction of surplus-labour during exchange (deducted from wages). Therefore crisis is caused solely by rising prices (including wages) and not by the failure to increase exploitation sufficiently to maintain profits. While the colonists comprised different classes, they all benefited from the rent (surplus) extracted from stolen Maori land and differential rent stolen from British workers. So NZ workers exploited British workers because high wages in NZ were deducted from differential rent deducted from the profits of British capitalists and therefore from the wages of British workers.

By invoking “Marxism’ to account for the cross-class white racist oppression of Maori in NZ, Steven thought he had found a materialist explanation to improve on Awatere’s idealist explanation of Maori nationalism as a progressive force. However, on both counts he adapts to petty bourgeois nationalism and falsifies Antipodean Marxism. First, he ignores the fact that the oppression of Maori as a people had been the subject of debates among Marxists in NZ long before the resurgence of Maori nationalism in the 1970’s. And the significance of this debate cannot be simply caricatured as a crude Euro-centric denial of racial oppression by the subordination of Maori to the white working class. Second, there already existed an orthodox Marxist analysis of the Maori national question that had developed to explain the historic racist complicity of Pakeha workers in the exploitation of Maori as a effect of capitalist class relations of production rather than of national relations of exchange (Macrae and Bedggood,1979).

In Australia, longtime Black activist Roberta Sykes writing in 1989 echoed Awatere’s black power position. “The early colonisers arrived in Australia with a history of racism firmly embedded in their psyche. They sprang from the loins of, and were nurtured by, forebears who played a central role in the kidnapping and abduction of Black Africans. Because of their race and the colour of their skin, the English regarded the lives of Africans as of no consequence.” She makes the same conclusions as Awatere that ALL whites regardless of class conspired to oppress blacks.

“Basically, the whites who landed in Australia in 1788 consisted of two groups, convicts and their keepers. The power relationship between the two groups was obvious, keepers on top, convicts on the bottom. The presence of a third group, Black and indigenous, added another dimension. The convicts and keepers obviously had more in common than they had differences, as they were able to successfully contrive together to dispossess the Blacks of their land and livelihood.” (1989:5).

Sykes explains her approach to understanding racism. “I understand racism as not merely a black/white phenomenon. Rather, this society has established a hierarchy of respectability, acceptability and power. I visualize this hierarchy as a ladder, with Blacks on the very bottom step. But who is at the top? And on which rungs do all the other groups stand?” (ibid:14) Not all whites are at the top of the ladder. At the top is an elite of white men with “fair hair, blue eyes, six feet plus in height, heterosexual (or apparently so) and not encumbered by physical handicaps”. A female white elite is “slightly lower to the side”. Whites below them on the ladder are, in the majority, also oppressed. ”Glued to the bottom” are Blacks because new migrant groups start ahead of them and never fall below. (ibid:19) Blacks are divided by their oppressors into a gender and caste hierarchy and have negative racist stereotypes labelled on them by the dominant culture. (ibid:36)

Sykes does not borrow ‘Marxist’ ideas to project Aborigines into the vanguard of the class struggle. She argues that racism is constructed historically by a white power elite to justify its theft of wealth. Racism can therefore be deconstructed by Black Power. The Black struggle for equal rights, land rights and sovereignty has to overturn the oppressive power structure through radical political action. As I have argued, the radical objective of legal/political equality presumes that economic equality is possible by abolishing unequal exchange.

It is the land rights of indigenous peoples that make their claims radical. It overturns the claims to capitalist private property with demands for restoration of collective ownership. The demand for land rights has the potential to challenge the limits of the idea of unequal exchange (theft) as the cause of national oppression. Yes the land was stolen but in order to create capitalist private property. The radical concept of unequal exchange is then seen as necessary for the ‘primitive accumulation’ of capital i.e. theft of collective property to create modern landed property (private property) as the capitalist means of production.18

‘Primitive accumulation’ is the basis for creating a capitalist monopoly ownership of the means of production that allows it to exploit wage labour separated from its means of production. But it is not the basis of the ongoing exploitation of capitalism, This is based upon exploiting wage labour to create surplus value in order to ‘accumulate’ capital If this is the case then Aboriginal and Maori must sooner or later come to realise that decolonisation, and even worse cultural reconciliation, is a reactionary utopia unless it is premised on the collective ownership and control of the means of production.

If the Marxist critique of the radical theory of unequal exchange is correct, then class-consciousness cannot arise spontaneously. If exploitation and oppression is based on relations of production, not exchange, then consciousness of this can only occur if the experience of indigenous oppression joins forces with a materialist critique of the causes of that oppression.

Let us look briefly at the prehistory of Antipodean Marxism facing up to the national question in Australia and New Zealand as the first attempt to engage a materialist critique with the national rights of indigenous peoples.

Lenin on the national question

The national question is about the democratic right of nations to self-determination (Lenin, 1964, 1970). Self-determination includes the right to equality up to and including separation (secession) if necessary. This right is a bourgeois democratic right that has its origins in the development of capitalist society emerging out of feudal society in Europe. In the epoch of imperialism, capitalist exploitation requires the oppression of some nations by others. This is because the only way for imperialist states to try to prevent their profits falling is to extract super-profits from colonies and semi-colonies. Imperialist exploitation is therefore in conflict with democratic rights in the colonies and semi-colonies. This means that a national democratic struggle for independence from imperialism cannot succeed in winning democracy without also overthrowing imperialism. And to do that it has also to overthrow imperialism’s agents the national or comprador bourgeoisie. The national revolution must therefore continue as a permanent revolution for socialism to win even bourgeois democratic rights.

So the national question is also the social question. Oppressed peoples have the right to self-determination. This right must be defended by the international working class as an integral part of the world socialist revolution. If the demand for self-determination is raised by a majority of oppressed people, then workers everywhere should not only recognise, but also demand, that right. This is the only way to demonstrate to workers who are oppressed nationally that workers who are part of the oppressor nation(s) do not support their oppression. By doing so, oppressed workers can be won from an alliance with their national bourgeoisie who remain the agents of imperialism to an international working class struggle for socialism.(Lenin, 1970:408).

In the light of this conception of the national revolution the question to be answered is this: do Aboriginals and Maori represent oppressed peoples? If so, under what conditions should workers support a call for self-determination? In answer to the first question, it is clear that historically indigenous peoples colonised by white settlers were and remain oppressed peoples. As peoples who occupied the land, they had their land and resources stripped and were consigned to a reserve army of labour. But this experience alone would not distinguish them from all wage workers who have been dispossessed of their means of production and means of subsistence. What distinguished ‘indigenous peoples’ from wage labour as such was the historic survival of pre-capitalist society as a ‘reserve’ for a reserve army of ‘unfree’ labour still retaining some means of subsistence.

The question as to whether this national oppression has been removed is an open one. It depends upon the ability of Australasian capitalism to overcome national oppression by completely dispossessing Aboriginals and Maori of their means of subsistence thereby forcing them to become fully ‘free’ wage labour. I would argue that this historic oppression has become less, but that today despite various ‘Treaties’, biculturalism, multiculturalism, reconciliation etc. Australasian capitalism continues to reproduce national ‘oppression’ by its reconstitution of the policy of land and labour reserves under the guise of ‘economic autonomy’. Therefore the national question is still on the agenda and needs to be taken up by the working class as a whole.

The history of white settler support of indigenous rights is a dismal one. As Marx pointed out in his critique of Wakefield, those who came to Australasia, voluntarily or involuntarily, did so to escape the condition of ‘free’ labour. They wanted land, and took it, fought for it, and justified these actions by the prevailing rationale of ‘new lands’. Settlers were for the most part brutal in their treatment of ‘natives’ who resisted. Not until the late 19th century did an immigrant class of wage labourers become a potential ally of the indigenous peoples, but to protect their jobs and wages they usually adopted the racist attitudes towards both indigenous peoples and non-European immigrants who formed the reserve army. The early trades unions and Labo(u)r parties of the late 19th and early 20th centuries were forceful advocates of a ‘white Australasia’ inside their own ranks.

Anglo-Celtic and Pakeha workers did not in the main challenge this racist division in the working class until the post-WW2 period when Aboriginal workers fought for equal pay, and Maori entered the manufacturing sector in large numbers. There was no common class unity, despite many struggles in which this demand has been raised and some notable exceptions. In both countries indigenous peoples did not have equal political and legal rights. Maori had separate parliamentary seats. Aboriginals did not count as citizens until the Referendum of 1967.

The fact of indigenous oppression was recognised early on by Marxists. Lenin wrote about white settler colonisation as “a union of the privileged, or participants in monopoly, in Australia – the monopoly owners of vast territory – jointly plundering the ‘yellows’ and ‘blacks’.”(1968:522). In reviewing Siegfried’s book on NZ, Lenin comments “A country of inveterate, backwoods, thick-headed, egotistic philistines, who have brought their ‘civilisation’ with them from England and keep it to themselves like a dog in the manger. (Exterminated the natives – the Maoris – by fire and sword; a series of wars.)…Creation of a small landownership; large estates (stolen, etc., in the basest fashion from the Maori etc).” (ibid, 532-3).19

Inside the the Stalinist Communist Parties. Marxists usually took one of two positions. Either Aboriginals and Maori were nations, in which case Lenin’s method applied, or they were not.

In Australia, the CP produced a statement on the Aboriginal question in 1938, New Deal for Aborigines. This pamphlet did not challenge the then prevailing paternalistic view that Aboriginals should live on their own land as a rural reserve army of cheap labour. Instead it offered suggestions only on how their living conditions could be improved. Middleton excuses this lapse by noting that few CP members had any contact with Aboriginals.(1977:131) Of course there was more to it than this. In 1935 Stalin began the popular front period by opening up alliances with imperialists powers to defend the Soviet Union. This meant that the USSR was willing to back any capitalist power, including Fascist Germany, against those countries that posed a threat to its existence. C.P.s around the world in countries allied to the USSR were instructed to adopt a conciliatory line with their ruling classes and limit their politics to a Keynesian labourism (Kuhn, 1989).

The post-war period brought big changes and Aboriginal struggles for equality. Middleton (1977) documents the support by white unionists of the black labour struggles at Pilbara in 1947 and Darwin in the early 1950’s. This support came partly from the fear that underpaid Aboriginal workers would undercut organised labour’s wages and conditions. From 1963 the ACTU took a more positive attitude and began to give full support to equal rights and qualified support to land rights (ibid:110) By the 1950’s the CPA had formed a ‘Minorities Committee’ and published an article “A New Stage in the Development of Aboriginal People” in which it recognised that Aborigines as well as being an oppressed minority were taking their place in the working class.

In 1967 the CPA adopted a policy statement ‘Full Human Rights for Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders’ (ibid:132). From the late 1960’s and the Sino-Soviet split the CPA dropped the line that blacks were basically minorities within the working class for the radical Black Nationalist separatist line. Middleton notes that the 1974 CPA Congress adopted a resolution that Aboriginals were a nationality. “Communists fully respect the independence of the Black Movement and offer it unconditional support and aid” but made little reference to then as workers (ibid:133).

Meanwhile the Socialist Party of Australia which took the Soviet Union side in the Sino-Soviet split, came up with its own resolution in 1972: “The Aboriginal people are an oppressed national minority within the Australian nation [with] the right … to control their own affairs as members of a distinct national minority within the Australian nation; inalienable possession of remaining tribal lands now set aside as government or mission settlements or better land where these are unsuitable; ownership of mineral and other natural wealth located on their lands; full citizenship rights within the Australian community with special stress on equal wages and working conditions; the right to work and training for work; special benefits to counter the effects of more than a century of oppression to enable the people to assume rapidly their rightful place, equipped with general education, trade and professional training, health, housing and other facilities necessary to make equal rights a reality.” (Middleton, 1977:133). Aboriginals were considered to be “above all” members of the working class, but they had the right to choose whether to live autonomously in their own communities or as part of the “general community”.

So once more we have the Stalinist flimflam of the CPA ‘nation’ versus the SPA ‘class’ positions which resulted from cutting the Leninist position on national self-determination in half. While the CPA had capitulated to the Black Nationalist line, the SPA’s position did not pursue the ‘revolutionary’ aspect of land rights. There was no call for the return of Aboriginal land stolen to create capitalism in Australia. There is no real self-determination in the demand to retain existing lands (even with collective ownership and full mineral rights) since the vast bulk of the land has already been stolen and the mineral rights exploited. Only when stolen land is demanded back does the class ’settlement’ of Australian nationalism between white bosses and white workers get challenged. The Leninist test for Australian workers who see Aborigines as part of the working class is to support Aboriginal self-determination (i.e. land occupations) unconditionally. Not until Aborigines see that, will they be convinced that black and white unity in the working class is the only way to regain their land rights, and in the process build the movement able to go on to fight for socialism.

The failure of the Australian left to arrive at a Leninist position resulted from two factors. First, there was the relatively small size and still mainly rural base of Aboriginal workers. Second, partly as a result of this, and partly due to the dominance of Stalinist migrant recruits who continued the assimilationist white Australia policy in the labour movement, there was no development of a fully developed Antipodean Marxism to explain the impact of settler capitalism on Aboriginal society. By contrast in NZ both of these factors developed side by side. First, Maori were a much larger proportion of the population, and underwent a massive migration to the cities to industrial jobs. Second, this fact stimulated the development of a Marxist analysis that tried to account for the racist divisions in the working class by embarking on a fundamental analysis of NZ settler capitalism.

In NZ when the post-war boom pulled Maori from their tiny rural reserves into industrial jobs in the cities it looked like the question of “Maori as a ‘people’ or as ‘workers’” would be settled by their growing participation in the industrial working class. After some strong arguments for an against, the CPNZ rejected the concept of Maori as an oppressed people and adopted the position that Maori were not a nation but were becoming part of the working class, though there was a vague acceptance that Maori should have the right to decide whether or not they want ‘self-government.’ 20 However, debate on this question re-surfaced with the end of the post-war boom which proved that Maori were still locked into the reserve army of labour to be drawn upon in boom times and laid off in slumps.

In NZ the first document to address this question seriously in Marxist terms was the Spartacist League Programme of 1970. Of course it called on Pakeha workers to unite with Maori workers in the struggle for socialism. But more than that, it argued that this unity could only be won if first Pakeha workers recognised Maori as an oppressed nation. For the first time on the Marxist left a correct Leninist position was taken on the Maori Question. Maori had a right to self-determination, and if this was expressed popularly (i.e. by the majority of Maori workers, not a few petty-bourgeois so-called leaders) it had to be supported by non-Maori workers to prove to their Maori brothers and sisters that they were not accomplices in racist oppression. In this way, by fighting the root cause of racism, national oppression, Pakeha workers would win the confidence of Maori workers, and the often invoked but seldom implemented, racial unity of the working class forged.

With the end of the post war boom in the 1970’s the liberal dream of racial assimilation ended. The demands for Maori nationalism increased. The Communist Party, with many Maori members in industry, backed land occupations such as Bastion Point tactically but always as a tactic to unite workers in struggle against capitalism. Maori nationalism was considered necessarily a petty bourgeois deviation. Only the ‘Trotskyists’ (ie. Spartacists and Socialist Action League, though for different reasons) saw the Leninist demand for self-determination (separatism) as a correct and supportable demand. But the SAL stand derived from its Euro-centric programme where the working class was subordinated to petty bourgeois vanguards or ‘social movements’, and Maori fitted that bill well. By contrast the Spartacist’s position came from an attempt to develop a genuine Antipodean Marxism; that is, an application of European derived Marxist method to the concrete historical conditions of NZ as a specific white-settler social formation.

The Development of Capitalism in Australasia

In the early 1970’s when the Maori struggle was reactivated there was as yet no developed Marxist account of NZ’s colonial origin and development. In 1979 John Macrae and David Bedggood published an article on the Development of Capitalism in NZ (Macrae and Bedggood, 1979). In Australia Kelvin Rowley (1972) and Philip McMichael (1984) embarked on similar analyses of the founding of Australia as colonies for the export of surplus British labour and capital. The crisis of overproduction in Britain was not only caused by high costs of raw materials (due to feudal rents) but the inability of capital to increase productivity fast enough to stay ahead of these price rises. This crisis could be overcome only by expanding capitalist agriculture at home and abroad. It was much easier to expand into the ‘new lands’ and combine surplus labour and capital with virtually free land.

This required capitalist colonisation. Capitalism had to be re-invented. That is, the land was appropriated and turned into capitalist property (modern landed property). The indigenous peoples were dispossessed to gain access to the land, and then forced into a rural reserve army of cheap labour. Capital could now ensure that primarily immigrant wage labour could be exploited in capitalist agriculture to cheapen commodities as wage goods and raw materials in the British economy. As a result a capitalist society in which a bourgeoisie, petty bourgeoisie (small farmers) and proletariat was created.

We have already seen how Marx critiqued the Wakefield scheme as exposing the truth about the original ‘primitive accumulation’ in Britain. In the colonies it was necessary for capitalism to be created anew by the agency of the British state that established penal colonies in Australia and defeated Aboriginal and Maori resistance allow land, labour and capital to come together. The best part of Marx’s critique is his proof that without free labour (workers dispossessed of land) no profits can be made. This is because workers will not work for a boss when they can work for themselves. Capitalist production is therefore shown to require at its birth, the expropriation of the means of production and dispossession of wage-labour.

Unfortunately, Rowley and McMichael do not go beyond a descriptive account of this process. They concentrate on the analysis of differential rent that allows Australia to become an efficient primary product producer to establish the material base of the place of Australia in the world economy. Macrae and Bedggood also showed that NZ was an efficient primary producer undercutting European agriculture and gaining a differential rent. Because NZ costs were lower, more then cancelling distance, the difference between costs of production allowed NZ producers to earn a surplus rent over and above the profit received by the worst land in Europe. However, while this differential rent was redistributed from less efficient capitalists in Europe, it was not at the expense of British workers, nor was it shared by NZ workers. Contrary to Steven’s claim, there is not evidence that NZ workers received part of this differential rent in the form of higher wages.

Rowley’s essay on ‘Pastoral Capitalism’ was intended to “open up the systematic analysis of Australian history from a scientific, Marxist standpoint, not to complete it”. Unfortunately he, and those who followed never got beyond a neo-Ricardian standpoint based in exchange relations. And most ignored the significance of stolen land for the Aboriginal struggle other than to note it in passing. Australia was one of the ‘lands of white settlement’ where the:

“indigenous population was engaged in a good-gathering (hunting and fishing) rather than settled agriculture, and was enslaved and exterminated by the invading power… These areas also grew in response to European demand for raw materials and primary products, but developed along different lines to those areas with an already existing established agricultural economy. Because they were unhampered by a pre-existing system of agriculture they quick assimilated capitalist techniques and arrangements, supported a growing population, absorbed European immigrants, and developed staple exports that allowed them to prosper in the same world economy that doomed less fortunate primary-producing countries to backwardness, underdevelopment and mass-starvation.” (1972:12).

Rowley does not mention the importance of land and its dispossession apart from to reproduce a version of terra nullus, the absence of a “pre-existing system of agriculture”. The failure to ‘use’ the land was of course one of the arguments deployed by the settlers to justify the dispossession of the Aborigines. Rowley assumes the elimination pre-capitalist social relations. Australia’s good fortune then was agricultural rent gained from of the dispossession of Aboriginal land, a fact noted by Marx in his critique of Wakefield, but the Aborigines never shared in that good prosperity. Unlike NZ where Maori did have a settled form of agriculture, and where they did seek to benefit from rent from their common land, Australian settlers simply took the land and were able to gain from differential rent once they had converted the land to capitalist private property.

McMichael’s Settlers and the Agrarian Question, appeared in 1984. Like Rowley, his focus was on the origins and development of capitalist agriculture in Australia, and the class distribution of differential rent. Yet there is hardly a word on where the land came from, apart from the fact the expanding British economy required ‘new and fertile lands’ to lower the costs of agricultural commodities. What is missed in this approach is that the point made by Marx against Wakefield. Surplus capital and labour cannot be put to use on land unless that land is modern landed property i.e. capitalist private property.

Of course McMichael recognises that land was necessary to create a class of free labourers and to establish capitalist agriculture. But the point is that the founding of Australia required the dispossession of the Aborigines before even squatting could occur. True, the limits of semi-feudal squatting could only be transcended by the creation of capitalist property at which point the squatters disappeared into history. But the original dispossession of the Aborigines is not just passing history. The original dispossession of the Aborigines and the subordination of the remnants to their mode of production nevertheless preserved their pre-capitalist social relations as well as consigning them into the capitalist reserve army of labour.

In the first attempt to apply the theory of articulation of modes of production to Australia, Hartwig makes this point. “Hence the process of dissolution is by no means necessarilly complete when the ‘economy’ has been destroyed, or its land-base appropriated, although in the long run the eradication of the economic base creates the preconditions for dissolution of the non-capitalist mode. If the ideological and political instances survive, albeit in modified form, if the partly dissolved mode of production is still exploitatively articulated with the capitalist mode we still have a case for internal colonisation.” (1978:132). Hartwig goes on to argue that Aboriginals land was expropriated as the basis of pastoral production, but that this was also necessary to dissolve the Aboriginal mode and to ’socialise’ Aboriginals in the discipline of wage-labour.

This was justified by means of basic bourgeois ideology on the need to civilise savages and turn them into equal bourgeois subjects. “…traditional rights of Aborigines had been superseded; they were British subjects and as such should become ‘useful’ members of society, as labourers, or course, or at most petty commodity producers.” (ibid:133) When in the mid 19th century Aboriginals failed to adapt to wage-labour in large numbers, the dominant ideological discourse shifted to one of ‘race’ in which Aboriginals were regarded as a doomed race. The survival of the ‘race’ was then attributed to the degree of racial intermixing and a policy of assimilation begun in the mid 20th century. Whether efforts were made to ‘destroy or conserve’ the pre-capitalist mode, and whether the ideology of ‘racism’ was deployed, therefore depended upon the willingness of Aborigines to become part of a capitalist reserve army of labour where the old mode provided means of subsistence that allowed employers to buy labour power ‘below its value’ (ibid:135).

Hartwig’s Marxist analysis provides the basis for understanding the survival of the Aboriginal mode of production and its social relations, and its revival in the post-World War Two period. This is beyond the capacity of liberal or radical theory. Hartwig’s critique of the liberal theory ‘internal colonisation’ is that it locates the causes of colonisation/decolonisation in pluralist politics of bourgeois democracy. Aborigines can become ‘civilised’, win human rights and then become equals in the neo-classical conception of the labour market.

This is a position that fits with contemporary ‘post-colonial’ readings of Aboriginal rights to be discussed later. The radical version of ‘internal colonisation’ counterposes a ‘natural’ struggle for survival against the ‘unequal exchange’ of the frontier that is overcome by the victory of Black Power. As I hope to show, neither ‘becoming civilised’ nor the victory of ‘black power’ can explain why Aboriginal society as a distinct mode of production with its own developed social organisation survived such widespread destruction of its ‘economic base’ and revived the demand for land rights to restore that economic base today.

Miles (1987:116) takes this analysis a step further and shows that the failure to dissolve the Aboriginal mode of production into the capitalist mode was the result of the forced consignment of Aboriginals into the reserve army of labour as ‘formally’ subordinated to capitalism as ‘unfree labour’. This meant that demand for cheap non-wage labour could only be met by allowing a residual Aboriginal economic base to survive to provide some of the means of subsistence for a labour reserve. The creation of ‘reserves’ provided a ‘holding tank’ of labour living at bare subsistence, as well as holding down the cost of labour to the pastoral industry. Casual work in exchange for food was replaced by a contract system in 1886 which required employers to provide, food, clothing and health care in exchange for labour power. In 1905 the state required Aborigines who were not ‘lawfully employed’ to live on reserves (ibid:109). By introducing Aboriginals into the capitalist mode as ‘unfree’ labour, the struggle began to achieve equality as ‘free’ wage-labour as a condition for citizenship. However, rather than leading to the complete dissolution of the Aboriginal mode, the status of Aboriginals as still largely trapped in the reserve army of labour has fuelled their renewed struggle for full political rights, and for land rights as means of subsistence and means of production.

For Macrae and Bedggood, looking at NZ, the central place of differential rent reflected the new production relations imposed upon Maori. Despite the rapid adaptation of capitalist techniques to production for the market, Maori retained their own collectivist social relations of production based on commonly owned land. This meant that Maori were primed to capture differential rent from capitalists and did so by selling wheat and other commodities to the Australian market. So long as Maori retained ownership of land they retained the rent. The capitalist mode came into full conflict with the Maori mode of production and the inevitable clash could only result in the conquest of Maori and their subordination as a sub-mode of production to the capitalist mode. Capitalist landowners now appropriated the rent. Maori became poor ‘peasants’ existing on remnants of their tribal land that subsidised their low wages as members of the reserve army of labour, holding down all wages. They were then, fundamentally part of the working class. Pakeha workers worked alongside Maori but usually in the better-paid and more secure jobs.

This division in the working class meant that pakehas got higher wages on average, not as the result of rent being gained from Maori land, but because they had been fully separated from the land and were ‘free labour’, usually had craft skills and were organised into unions, while Maori were not separated fully from their traditional social relations, and functioned as a reserve army of labour in the capitalist mode.

According to Macrae and Bedggood, this was the material basis of the racism and discrimination directed at Maori. It was a rationalisation of their dispossession and of their permanent position in a reserve army of labour. If Pakeha workers did not fight to overcome racism and discrimination and include Maori as equals in the proletariat then Maori would always look back to the causes of their oppression as a people and seek a solution in the form of sovereignty or self-determination. The post-WW2 boom and its end reinforced the truth of this analysis.

Despite progress towards ‘free’ labour, it could not overcome the major setback to unity in the working class of the deregulation of the protected economy. Maori were mainly employed in domestic substitution manufacturing, transport, agriculture and the meat industry. Most Maori now had no tribal land to subsidise their wages and were fully ‘free’ members of the reserve army of labour. But the mass unemployment that set in by the late 1970s and 1980s as restructuring hit hard forced many to go back to their tribal lands to survive. The demands for equal rights in industry and social welfare now became joined to the demand for the return of land and for the honouring of the Treaty. It was as a result of the end of the post-war boom and the onset of structural crisis that setback the struggle for equality and saw the revival of Maori Sovereignty or self-determination.

“Maori Sovereignty” challenges Marxism

During the 1970’s a younger generation of Maori radicals began to demand social, political and land rights. Some were openly influenced by Marxism. Donna Awatere’s Black nationalist book Maori Sovereignty was in part the product of this early debate over Marxism. Awatere, Ripeka Evans, Sharon Hawke and others had been part of a Capital reading group in 1978 and mixed with a wide range of the Pakeha Marxist left. However, her prime motivation was that shared by many other young educated Maori whose high expectations of progress in education and employment came up against the racist barriers that still existed in employment with the onset of structural crisis. This is why she could claim with some credibility that Maori were an oppressed people at the bottom of the heap, and challenge all Pakeha to forget their class and gender and side with Maori to transform the system.

With the revival of Maori Nationalism most of the petty bourgeois left were guilt stricken and conceded that race rather than class or gender was the main issue in NZ/Aotearoa. The journal, RACE, GENDER, CLASS that was published from 1984 to 1994 reflected this emphasis. It was in this journal that Rob Steven published his sophisticated neo-Marxist attempt to arrive at the same conclusion without resorting to reverse racist labelling. Pakeha workers had to become conscious that their racist history was not inherent in their ‘human nature’, but served to justify their material privileges in living off the ill gotten gains of stolen Maori land. By acknowledging this history of complicity in oppressing Maori, Steven hoped to unite Maori and Pakeha workers in a Socialist Alliance (1985).

Also typical of this response was that of Bruce Jesson, who edited and wrote for The Republican magazine. For them the Maori left was the only left worth talking about. The Pakeha working class was too weak and passive to do anything. By joining Awatere in pinning their hopes on Maori radicalism, the petty bourgeois Pakeha left adapted a number of strands of European Marxism to the Maori cause. The Socialist Action League (SAL) had already gone through the liquidation of post-war Trotskyism. That is, it had abandoned the working class as the vanguard of revolution for various petty bourgeois youth, black or guerrilla vanguards. It did not take much for them to latch onto the Maori vanguard as the NZ substitute for the proletariat. Peter Lee in a series of articles in The Republican placed Awatere in the tradition of the Frankfurt school in producing a profound critique of capitalist society. Steven Webster adapted his western Marxist genealogy to a Maori whakapapa. More on this later.

Unmoved by the challenge, the SUP, CPNZ and WCL reiterated the familiar Stalinist line in which the Maori Question was to remain dead and buried in the class question. Either way, the standard response of the Pakeha left to Awatere’s attempt to borrow neo-Marxist ideas and apply them to Maori nationalism was reduced on one side to a ‘new left’, and on the other, a Stalinist right, opportunism.

This paralleled the split in the ‘left’ in Australia between the ‘radical left’, which included the left Laborites, the former ‘Trotskyist’ Democratic Socialist Party and the CPA, who tailed the ‘land rights’ movement more or less uncritically, and the hard line Stalinist class-reductionist position of the Socialist Party of Australia (which opposed the 1972 Aboriginal Embassy) and the ’soft’ class line of the International Socialists (who endorsed the Embassy). But in Australia there was no standout ‘Black Marxism’ which tried to adapt Marxist ideas to the Black movement. So there was no serious challenge to either ‘left’ or ‘right’ opportunism requiring a serious defence of Marxism. As I have suggested above this can be explained I think first the relatively low priority given to the Aboriginal Question compared with national struggles outside Australia by the “left’, and second, the extent to which White Australian racism still pervaded the ‘left’.

Even in NZ where the Maori Question was much more central to the labour movement, the only serious Marxist response to the challenge laid down by Awatere in her Broadsheet articles came from the Spartacist League/Communist Left. Owen Gager in Towards a Socialist Polynesia, published in September 1982, wrote the most definitive Marxist analysis of the Maori Question produced in NZ (Gager, 1982). In it he took both the petty bourgeois Maori nationalists to task as well as the twin camps of Pakeha left opportunism. In raising the red flag of Leninist-Trotskyism on the National Question, Gager set the benchmark for what was to follow.

Towards a Socialist Polynesia

Towards a Socialist Polynesia (TSP) appeared in mid 1982. It was the NZ Spartacist League’s response to the events of the previous decade culminating in the Anti-Springbok tour movement, and the publication of Awatere’s Maori Sovereignty. It re-affirmed the Leninist position on national self-determination and the historic oppression of the Maori people. But it argued that no such national oppression currently existed or was expressed by a majority of Maori calling for self-determination. The call for Maori Sovereignty was a demand by petty bourgeois Maori for their entry into the bourgeoisie. Against the petty bourgeois nationalism of both Maori and Pakeha, TSP tried to present a materialist analysis of the real history of race relations in NZ’s white-settler colonisation and ongoing semi-colonial development. It agued strongly against petty bourgeois nationalists who came out against British imperialism and its NZ ‘imperialist’ pretensions and identified with Maori opposition to imperialism because this struggle was posed in nationalist/racist and not class terms.

Gager’s pamphlet shot through this nationalist front with a Marxist broadside. NZ was a capitalist colony. Capitalism was not imported into the South Pacific completely knocked down and ready for assembly. It had to be imposed by a process of bloody conquest and ‘primitive accumulation’. That meant dispossessing Maori by force if necessary. The object was not to destroy Maori society for its own sake but to destroy their primitive communist resistance to class society i.e. capitalism. The Treaty was a fraud. It was a ‘trick’ admitted at the time, to pacify the savages while the settler ruling class was able to muster the imperial troops to take the land. All of this rotten history had one purpose; to convert tribal land into capitalist property, and to convert Maori into landless labourers so that they would be forced to work as wage workers and be exploited by capitalism.

TSP proved that this was the case by demonstrating that the history of Maori resistance to their expropriation and super-exploitation as waged workers was anti-capitalist. This process was part of the ongoing capitalist expansion into the South Pacific in the 19th century and it set the pattern for NZ’s semi-colonial development in the 20th century. The post-war boom accelerated this process by propelling Maori from the rural reserves into the urban ghettos. But the end of the boom brought with it a massive shock as the new jobs, incomes and expectations were suddenly dashed. Awatere and the new generation of rebels expressed outrage at this betrayal of the dream of assimilation by economic progress. In its place they raised the demand “Aotearoa is Maori Land!”

What TSP did was to point out clearly that it was a sham for a few petty bourgeois Maori to stage a national revolution when the majority of Maori were already detribalised and in the working class. Awatere was merely putting out the claim for a middle class Maori ‘fair share’ in kiwi capitalism. The sovereignty gambit was an opening shot designed to guilt-trip the petty bourgeois Pakeha anti-racists behind the movement and to up the ante in the Treaty settlement process. TSP rejected this petty bourgeois nationalism as anti-migrant when Ripeka Evans, Donna Awatere’s collaborator, called for Pacific Island migrants to “fuck off” home. Their “Black Unity” did not extend to their Polynesian cousins. But most Pakeha anti-racists joined forces with petty bourgeois Maori nationalism at the expense of other migrants. To make it worse so did most of the so-called Left when they found reasons to call Awatere some kind of ‘Marxist revolutionary’.

The Republican left

TSP rubbished the so-called Marxists fawning on Awatere. For example, Peter Lee claimed that Awatere was some kind of antipodean Walter Benjamin.21 Bruce Jesson took Awatere’s reference to Gramsci at face value to mean that the Maori people could recover their “treasures” and lead the struggle of New Zealand’s independence. He failed to notice that Awatere’s ‘counter-hegemonic bloc’ fundamentally misrepresented Gramsci. Her bloc was not Gramsci’s class bloc where other classes were led by the working class. Rather it was an alliance where the working class was led by the Maori people!

The Republican Marxist left of Jesson and Co took this to mean that the Maori Question could only be resolved by a national independence struggle in which the working class remained subordinated to the Maori as a people.22 The Maori People were a liberating force who in alliance with Pakeha radicals had a common interest in a “Republic of Aotearoa”. 23 According to Jesson the Maori as part of the proletariat and as a force for socialism was non-existent. Since Maori People were a figment of petty bourgeois Maori nationalists, this was his way of putting the petty bourgeois in front of the working class in the national revolution.

Gager anticipated Lee’s argument by showing that the European Marxist Walter Benjamin had long ago warned that appeals to tradition were not a basis for as progressive national movement but rather a reactionary ploy to divide and rule the working class: “Walter Benjamin, in Illuminations, saw fascism’s role as “rendering politics aesthetic, while communism responds by politicising art”. His understanding of the reactionary implications of making politics “cultural” still expressed the perspective of Leninism. “Cultural treasures” writes Benjamin “are the spoils of war between ruling classes which owe their origin not only to the efforts of the great minds and talents who have created them, but also to the anonymous toil of their contemporaries”. In Maori society, all those who could not claim to be ariki or rangatira.”

Gager continued: “Maori culture, as it is now, consists of the spoils of war which the white ruling class has plundered. Historical materialism, on the contrary, wishes to retain that image of the Polynesian past which unexpectedly appears to the Polynesian worker in crisis, singled out by history at the moment of danger. That danger affects both the content of Polynesian tradition and its receivers. The same threat hangs over both: that of becoming the tool of the ruling classes. In every area that attempt must be made anew to wrest Polynesian tradition away from a conformism that is about to overpower it. Only that militant will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the Polynesian past who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And that enemy has not ceased to be victorious”. (ibid:22)

Stalinist Left

Even worse than the Republican left was the Stalinist left. Stalinist political groups such as the Workers Communist League (now defunct), the Stalinist SUP-dominated trades unions and the ex- ‘Trotskyist’ Socialist Action League (and their Young Socialists) flocked to the cause of Maori Sovereignty. TSP exposed them as common liberals who limited their support for Maori struggles to that of becoming equal under capitalism. But where the Republican left wanted Maori in the vanguard, most Stalinists wanted them in the rearguard. So when Maori workers overstepped their subordinate role in the labour movement they got dumped just as The Polynesian Resource Centre “Te Moana” was evicted from the Trade Union Centre in 1981 when Ripeka Evans criticised the white trade union leadership. “By ‘allowing’ Maori people to lead the ‘anti-racist’ struggle, but in limiting their demands to ‘full equality’ and ‘minority rights’, WCL actively suppresses the revolutionary potential of the Maori proletariat in order to maintain its ‘leadership’ of the white working class.” (ibid: 9).

The reason for this was the rotten legacy of colonial racism embedded in the Pakeha “labour-aristocracy” and “labour-bureaucracy”, which were the class fractions the Stalinists were based on. This was amply demonstrated by the WCL: “The Stalinist Workers Communist League claims it has a “class” analysis of racist and colonial oppression in New Zealand. But their programme itself is clearly racist. For them, the history of New Zealand’s movement towards independence is a Pakeha history, to which the Maori people are an appendage…For them the achievement of white settler power based on denial of Maori suffrage in New Zealand is an “advance”. The failure to see that white “independence”, achieved at the expense of Maori independence, assumed a reactionary and imperialist character leads logically to a recognition of Polynesian workers as a class with no revolutionary potential, and which must limit itself to a “minimum programme” of democratic rights, forgetting; ‘independence’ and ‘socialism’.” (ibid:9)

In Australia the SPA position is similar. Middleton’s (1977) talk of the revolutionary potential of ‘taking the land back’ does not translate into the SPA position. In her discussion of strategy and tactics she sees the Aboriginal struggle as part of the world-wide national liberation movement. Yet this struggle is not to get the land back, but merely to land rights for some remaining land. “At the same time it must also be recognised that Aboriginals are not only workers, they are black workers. They are more than members of the working class for they are also members of an oppressed national minority. Failure to recognise this and to fight for their national rights only strengthens imperialism in Australia. The fundamental condition for the recognition of their special position and for the fulfillment of their national aspirations is rights to communal land in perpetuity”. (ibid:176) In other words, the SPA puts a condition on self-determination, No to taking land back! This appeases the racism white workers who do not have to face up to the loss of the material base of their relative privileges, stolen Aboriginal land.

Permanent Revolution

Against the petty bourgeois ‘Marxists’ TSP argued that Maori were historically an oppressed people. It supported Maori self-determination up to and including secession if the majority of Maori demanded it. Support for self-determination by Pakeha workers would then be necessary to win Maori workers to the struggle for socialism. It foresaw the possibility that self-determination would come back on the agenda. This was because Maori were trapped in the reserve army of labour and could not win equal rights under capitalism. Nor could the Treaty settlement process honour a fraudulent treaty. It could only fake this by creating local versions of Bantustans like the independent Pacific Islands whose ‘cultural treasures’ were returned in exchange for the wealth that was spirited away. The whole process would have the effect of encouraging and reinforcing class divisions in Maoridom – an effect that capitalism could not possibly avoid – but in the name of sovereignty (now tinorangatiratanga).

This would devolve the responsibility for poverty onto Maori themselves and away from the oppressive racist state that has ruled over them for nearly two centuries. The national question remained alive but Maori could only win their democratic rights by means of a ‘permanent revolution’ i.e. socialist revolution. TSP labelled Awatere and Co petty bourgeois nationalists. They were not the voice of the majority of Maori workers. They rapidly turned to “honouring” the Treaty.

TSP predicted the role that petty bourgeois nationalists would play in getting “10% Kiwi capitalism” in the name of a re-invented cultural tradition. Events have proven Gager correct. The Treaty is still a fraud. The whole Treaty process has seen Maori co-opted by class further into capitalism. A few have become bosses or bureaucrats, but the vast the majority stayed workers with a widening gap between them. It can be nothing else when the land, resources and labour-power expropriated for 150 years are now accumulated as capitalist private property. The token settlements that have been trickled back are little more than capitalised benefits advanced as seeding capital to spawn mini-corporations who will swim as sprats among the MNC sharks. The Treaty Settlements work like a local version of the World Bank/IMF. The local NZ state hands out seeding capital but locks everyone into the local economy, just as the IMF/World Bank locks it into the global economy on the terms of the imperialists.

In Australia, Gager’s arguments in TSP were applied to the land rights question by the Communist Left of Australia. In a recent RED, the CLA position is clearly stated:

“Revolutionary communists support the right of self-determination for the Black people. For Leninists this means the right to one or more separate nations. Communist Left considers that the material bases for a nation exists. Whether or not they take up the fight should be determined by Black proletarians. Our message in offering this right respects their nationality as equals. Not every Black person will want to or be able to join this separate nation (or nations). Other demands must be raised for Black people who choose to live in the cities.”

“But the key question is the right to an economy. The decision of the Supreme Court Common Law Division did not allow the Wik people the right to an economy let alone control of the economy. Revolutionary communists therefore reject the Supreme Court as any focus for Black land rights…Communist Left believes it is not just the right but the duty of Black proletarians to take on an expropriate multinational property owners. In 1967 a massive struggle by the Gurrindji people took on the might of British multinational Vesties, owners of the Wave Hill station which was the size of Belgium. They took over the land which they claimed as their own and established their own cattle station. The Gurrindji people worked as stockmen. They were backed by the Trade Union movement, most notably the Darwin Branch of the Waterside Workers Federation which is now part of the Martime Union of Australia.”

“Of course any localised struggle can only be a limited victory unless it is generalised. The Gurrindji people did not have the programme to fight the system consistently (despite their exemplary militancy). They were linked to Stalinists like Frank Hardy, who despite some serious work in gaining support had faith in the system through their “minimum programme”. But the point is not to reject direct action, but to see that it is linked to a revolutionary programme. The Gurringji struggle points the way forward – not the Supreme Court lobbying for common law rights.” (1997).

Neo-Marxist analysis

What other left analyses have followed in the 1980’s and 1990’s? And did they add or subtract from the Communist Left’s Leninist/Trotskyist analysis? I will look as several recent attempts to develop an Antipodean Marxism on the indigenous peoples rights question before passing judgement on their strengths and weaknesses. They all tend to reduce ethnicity to class and fail to see that the national oppression lies behind ‘racism’ in the working class and is not just a concoction of petty bourgeois nationalists. This is an adaptation to white racist workers fears of indigenous people taking their jobs and scrounging on their taxes. I will concentrate on the International Socialists and Socialist Alternative as the main examples.

In 1994, in response to the Mabo decision, the Socialist Worker in Australia (ISO) published a pamphlet called The Fight for Black Rights by Diane Fields. Its basic message was that Aboriginals are oppressed because they lack equal rights. However, Blacks are considered part of the working class that has on many occasions united to fight for Black rights. The way forward is in the future is to unite around black rights and build ‘the socialist alternative’. The problem with this analysis is that is sees ‘racism’ as just an ‘idea’ that can “break down when workers are involved in common struggle”(1994:38). But racism is more than an idea. It is an ideology with a material basis – the dispossession of the indigenous people. Racism historically justified the dispossession of Aboriginals and white workers complicity in this.

Because of the key nature of this demand, the ‘common struggle’ for land rights is the only way that racism will be overcome. White workers have to unconditionally support land occupations to restore land rights, collective ownership and control and mineral rights as well. But more than this ’socialists’ have to recognise that the struggle for land rights is not separated from the right to self-determination. Not until white workers take on this fight as their own will it be possible to unite the working class to build the ‘socialist alternative’.

In NZ, Evan Poata Smith’s work is similar to the IS standpoint. The strengths of his work are that it is based on an analysis of New Zealand as a capitalist country. Therefore Maori inequality/oppression is not the result of the primitiveness of Maori or the inherent racism of Pakeha. The Pakeha (and more recently the ‘brown table’) capitalist class is the problem. Poata-Smith recognises that what he calls “cultural nationalism” is not a strategy for liberation. It is similar to the concept of petty-bourgeois nationalism raised in TSP since it is middle class or petty bourgeois Maori who benefit from it at the expense the majority of working class Maori. Poata Smith recognises that “[r]eal liberation for Maori will not occur without a fundamental transformation of capitalist society” (1996:116 ).

What weaknesses? These are first, a failure to explain clearly how Maori fit into a class system where two sets of social relations are articulated. For example, the emerging Maori bourgeoisie is very much a ‘lumpen’ bourgeoisie in terms of its limited ability to accumulate capital. Second, he does not demonstrate that ‘tribal capitalism’ has generated a Maori bourgeoisie. Therefore he cannot show how the exploitation of Maori workers by Maori capitalists will generate a break from the trap of a ‘cultural nationalism’. Third, while his solution to the Maori question is class unity and socialism, Poata-Smith does not put forward a concrete analysis or programme to make it happen.

This failure is also evident in Andrew Geddes’ pamphlet The Way Forward to Tino Rangitiratanga which draws heavily upon Poata-Smith. Published by the Socialist Workers Organisation in 1997, apart from general statements about Maori liberation happening only in a ‘socialist society’, there is not much indication in this pamphlet on how to get there. Geddes uses the examples of fighting for democratic rights such as the funding of Maori language broadcasting, and the return of stolen land and taonga (cultural treasures) as part of the struggle for socialism. These are necessary democratic demands that must be part of a transitional programme. But there are two problems with this.

First, the SWO does not define self-determination to include the right to secede. In others words, sovereignty is divisible only because it isn’t real sovereignty – merely ‘autonomy’. This is a fundamental break from the Leninist concept of self-determination and a major concession to bourgeois ideology.

Applying Lenins’ conception, TSP stated that if the majority of Maori responded to their worsening economic oppression with a call for secession (independence), then Pakeha workers must support them in order to win them to socialism. How this can happen today needs to be clearly spelled out. Specifically, Pakeha workers need to give critical support to the demands of urban incorporations for inclusion in the Treaty settlements, and for the return of stolen land, fisheries and other resources. However, despite the hysteria of the ‘Pakeha backlash’, such an inclusion would clearly fail to meet the needs of Maori, and if the majority of Maori workers called for political independence, then that should be strongly endorsed by non-Maori workers as a democratic demand.

Second, the SWO does not integrate immediate, and democratic demands (including the right to secede) with transitional demands that include many other demands to unite Maori and non-Maori workers in class struggle all the way to “workers power”. Therefore there is a split between the immediate demands and the goal of socialism that becomes, like the petty bourgeois Marxists, a split between a minimum and maximum programme, in which Maori have minimum (democratic) rights, but Marxists have the maximum (socialist) solution. Ironically for a group that stresses the ‘self-activity’ of workers, the petty bourgeois ‘Marxist’ notion of stages is slipped into its politics in a disguised form of support for Maori liberation.

Revolutionaries must fight to combine the struggle from democratic demands to those of transitional demands for jobs, workers control, etc to prepare the ground for the socialisation of all capitalist property as the expropriated labour of generations of Maori and Pakeha workers. Concretely, then, this means supporting the return of Maori land, fisheries, compensation etc. up to and including the demand for independence (should it be demanded by a majority), as part of a programme that, at the same time, calls for the nationalisation of the land and fisheries under workers’ control (with Maori guaranteed traditional rights of use), the re-nationalisation of state assets without compensation, the expropriation of capitalist property, a workers state able to plan the economy, and a workers’ militia to defend the state from the international bourgeoisie.

Going beyond the IS position requires concrete analysis to be fused with revolutionary practice. There is a need to develop Antipodean Marxism in theory and practice so as to relate the indigenous peoples and class questions in a programme of action all the way to the seizure of power. First, the inability of capitalism to deliver to indigenous people has to be demonstrated to win them way from reformist illusions in the law to revolutionary politics. Why would capitalists who stole the land in the first place, now return enough of it to allow indigenous peoples to reproduce themselves independently of capitalism?

Decolonisation allows the pretence of political independence, accompanied by continued economic super-exploitation and oppression. Small scale tribal enterprises or royalties from fishing, mining or agriculture may allow a small class of bureaucrats or lumpen-bourgeoisie to expand, but will not provide the means of subsistence let alone means of production based on collective property. Thus the polarisation of classes and divisions within the indigenous populations will intensify and further impoverish workers and small farmers as well as squeeze the petty bourgeois and small capitalists down into the proletariat.

Pink-Greens/green left

The pink-greens are today’s radicals and take indigenous peoples struggles seriously. This is because they are closer to nature and value conservation. Their anti-capitalism sees the struggles of the Zapatistas against the IMF, WB, WTO etc to replace these oppressive institutions with a decentralised, popular and democratic capitalism as the model of a ‘peoples’ capitalism. The oppression of indigenous peoples is caused by a white, racist, largely male neo-liberal elite that can be defeated in parliament. What of the latter day Maori radicals like Tama Iti etc? Where have all their protests gone? Gone to parliament under MMP, which is the latest fraud to be perpetrated on the workers and oppressed. From Mat Rata to Mason Durie, the Maori intelligentsia envisages Mana Motuhake as sharing power in the bourgeois state. Maori will have their own economic base and governance. All that is required is for Maori to mobilise as people(s) and assert their right to share power under a new constitution. Even the centrifugal forces of globalisation can be offset by counter-hegemonic indigenous rights movements backed by international law.

The premise of this liberal post-colonialism is that ’sovereignty is divisible’. By this is meant that minority nations can gain political autonomy within a larger federation. The Nunavut nation of the Inuit has the autonomy of a Canadian province or an Australian state, with control over not only education and health, but over business and economic resources (??:1999). Quebecois autonomy is another example. Such examples are feasible when large minorities still occupy tracts of land and control economic resources. In the case of indigenous peoples who have been largely dispossessed, political autonomy is little more than a ‘treaty’ required to establish ‘tribal’ land and resource ownership that provides a ‘capital’ fund for a capitalist incorporation. Political autonomy therefore depends upon survival in business.

In Australia the main ‘green left’ advocate of this position is the Democratic Socialist Party. This party has been outspoken in the cause of land rights for decades. Its position has moved from one of ‘permanent revolution’ to that of ‘divided sovereignty’. The DSP recently stated its position on land rights:

“Aboriginal people have been developing political solutions since the European invasion. For instance, to end the Tasmanian resistance war, Aboriginal leaders sent a petition to the Queen of England arghuing for a political solution. For its time this wasn’t a bad solution, especially given that a number of Aboriginal warriors had learned the invaders’ language and studied their customs in order to relate to the wage battle with them.”

“Today demands include community self-government and self-policing by expanding democratically elected community organisations and councils with funds allocated directly to these councils for the delivery of health, housing, education, employment and legal services.”

“Land rights is the basis for self-government. Without the restoration of land to communities and adequate compensation for dispossession, community leaders agree that adequate provision of services will not be possible.” 24

The DSP calls on the whole working class to rally in solidarity with the land rights movement. However, rather than seeing this as part of a necessary first step towards socialism, the DSP promotes a reformist position that claims that land rights can produce Aboriginal self-government and sufficient economic and social services to meet Aborigines needs. Underpinning its reformist politics is an an exchange based analysis of racism that claims that racism can be eliminated without revolutionising capitalist social relations of production.

In NZ such an exchange-based analysis is spelled out by Elizabeth Rata who applies ‘Regulation Theory’ to the Treaty settement process. She sees the current ‘settlements’ as no more than creating a form of ‘tribal capitalism’ as a post-Fordist mode of regulation. That is, she recognises that Maori have been co-opted into state-defined tribal entities to produce a settlement that is in the interests of international capital (1997).

The problem is that Regulation theory is neo-Ricardian rather than Marxist. It explains that the exploitation of Maori requires a political conspiracy on the part of the white ruling class to contain Maori demands for autonomy and sovereignty within the structures of the capitalist market. This is similar to Kelsey’s view of ‘passive revolution’. A section of the ruling class has imposed a neo-liberal mode(l) of regulation (capitalist conspiracy) to contain the threat of revolution from below. This being so, then it must be possible for democratic forces to counter-mobilise to remove that oppressive mode(l) and open up a process of radical social democratic, evolutionary socialism (1994).

The pink-greens still regard the issue as about land or capital i.e. an economic base of sorts, which becomes the material base for ‘autonomy’ short of self-determination. Yet even such a limited struggle for land rights has the potential to challenge the system and can be transformed into a struggle against capitalism. For Post-modernists however, the issue is about indigenous rights and nothing else. They think that the struggle for equal political rights is an end in itself since it makes possible equal participation of Aborigines alongside all other minorities in the marketplace. The means become the dead end.

The ‘promised land’: pomo meets Indigenism

Now that most of the Maori compradors have been bought off and the Pakeha liberal left have bought into the honouring of the Treaty the debate is now about how much? First the fiscal cap on the amount of settlements was imposed by Government but rejected by Maori. Then a sped-up process of direct settlements with iwi rather than hapuu was rammed through. Even so, the petty bourgeois nationalists are satisfied that the Maori nation can now take its place alongside the Pakeha nation in a multinational commonwealth of difference. Ranginui Walker expresses this sentiment in terms of “…the postmodern world of multiple discourses, negating the grand narrative of the Pakeha. …the Maori desire for self-government will not dissipate. It has grown stronger along with the cultural renaissance and the new-found confidence of Maori in the multiple discourses of the post-modern era”. 25

All that is required is ‘cultural therapy’, a hell of a lot of talk, some attitudinal change and cheap goodwill. Steven Turner writing about the legacy of colonialism in NZ employs a ‘non-Enlightenment’ frame to respect Maori cultural difference to overturn 160 years of ‘Enlightenment history’ (1999). 26 So we see the post-modern turn as Maori are transformed into fully blown ’subjects with attitude’ in the marketplace, with the past ‘pardoned’. Donna Awatere personifies the excess play of post-modernism with the market in the ACT Parties Maori programme of ‘self-reliance’. The Treaty will be turned into the base document of a new Constitution in which token partnership status is accorded to the tangatawhenua but where a ‘once and for all’ settlement removes past wrongs and creates an equal ‘playing field’. This goes under the fashionable term ‘post-colonialism’ meaning essentially a ‘divisible sovereignty’ in which all are at last equal bourgeois subjects of difference within the sovereign market. A recent book dedicated to this enlightened project of cultural politics ends with the prospect: “Towards a multiculturalism within a bi-national framework” (Fleras and Spoonley, 1999).

In Australia a revised Constitution with a suitable preamble will acknowledge Aboriginals as the ‘first inhabitants’ while at the same time under the Liberal Government’s Native Title Amendment Act of 1998 land rights are bitterly contested all the way through the courts for those who were pushed off their land 200 or 100 years ago. The legal catch-22 is that Aboriginals who were forcibly removed from their land and whose links to the land have been “washed away by the tide of history” cannot meet the test that they are still the occupiers! (Alford, 1999:78).

What the new right and the postmodernists all agree on, is that the market creates the conditions for freedom and these can now be realised. Not in terms of land titles but the commodification of indigenous cultural artifacts and practices separated from the land. Every ethnic group and nationality can take their place in international society with their ‘identity’ i.e ‘difference’ recognised and respected.

Recognising this, Steve Mickler asks the question of the ‘Left’ which failed to rally to the support of the Aboriginal struggle for the site of the Old Swan Brewery in Perth in 1989. He concludes that the ‘left’ is preoccupied with international examples of decolonisation because it is in denial of the Aboriginal struggle.

” ‘Our Aborigines’ may have a ‘plight’, we might deplore their ‘condition’, but we don’t think of ourselves as having an unresolved colonial problem in the international sense…The resistance at the Waugal ground is an epic act of counter-colonialism waged by Aborigines…”

“Traditional supporters of Aborigines have to come to terms with the problem that cosmopolitan rhetorics of ‘the public’ are disguised rhetorics of imperialism and colonialism. They project a socialistic-sounding, multinational, multiracial one-worldness, while effacing actual relations of production and distribution which impoverish and ghettoize cultural minorities. It is the self-flattery of the imperialist subject, a pleasant illusion, that the City in itself transcends class, national and racial contradictions that structure it…When did the City of Perth, for Aborigines, cease to be a city of colonizers? What processes of decolonization have taken place, what recompense provided, tracts of land returned, cultural rights conferred?” (1989:87).

Post-colonials believe that once the ‘whites’ have unmasked the power base of their ‘whiteness’ they to can be proud of their Ango-Celtic or pakeha identity (McKay, 1999). The Treaty Industry becomes part of the ‘culture industry’ looking to protect indigenous ‘cultures’ as commodities that can fund their ethnic “difference”. Green applies Lyotard’s concept of the ‘differend’ in recognising the ‘incommensurability’ of white settler and Aboriginal law. According to Lyotard, “A case of differend between two parties takes place where the ‘regulation’ of the conflict that opposes them is done in the idiom of one of the parties while the wrong suffered by the other is not signified in that idiom.” (1994:158). In the case of the Mabo decision a judgement ‘without precedent’ went some way to recognising native title. “The decision threatens Capital’s ability to reproduce itself” (ibid:166). However, this decision will not be a mortal threat unless the logic of Aboriginal social relations is liberated and expressed as the dominant law. The necessary ”incommensurability’ of the law reflects the essential contradiction of the modes of production. Might is Mother Right!

Meanwhile, ‘the differend’ becomes trivialised as ethnic ‘difference’. Cultural becomes the irreducible, undetermined act of consumption i.e. a difference that the sovereign consumer notes when s/he buys a commodity as it appears in TV or ‘performances’ such as the opening and closing ceremonies of the Sydney Olympic Games. Maori too have been have only been re-landed so as to be re-branded.27 Tama Iti, once the firebrand radical who spat at the Governor General, is now an entrepreneur who sells his ‘native art’. The ‘promised land’ of liberation becomes the freedom to buy and sell commodities in the market. But as I have argued Australasian capitalism will deny that freedom to most Aborigines and Maori so long as they/we do not revolutionise the relations of production.

Proletarian politics

As TSP predicted, and Antipodean Marxism has explained, most Maori ‘honoured’ as a reserve army of labour find themselves still trapped in the proletariat with the obvious consequences. There are few Maori bosses. Not because of ’stone age’ economics like neo-liberal mouthpiece Gareth Morgan thinks, but because if you didn’t have individual title you could not raise capital. Talk about the new right blaming the victim. Today the corporatisation of iwi opens up the capitalist road, but too little too late to get anywhere. Maori as a people are stalled on the road to nowhere.

In Australia, the Mabo and Wik decisions which opened the way for recognition of land titles have been reversed to protect land as the private property of the runholders and giant mining companies. Reconciliation is class reconciliation or not at all. Australasian capitalism is in the hands of the MNC’s. They won’t sacrifice their profits for the sake of any proposed Treaty or land rights. We have “the GAP” instead. Profits continue to accumulate while Aboriginals and Maori get the leftover crumbs. Today Maori own no more than about $10 Billion in assets. The majority earn well below the average wage. Maori youth unemployment is over 20%. The new Maori bosses’ economic prospects are as sprats among the sharks, not good. Many self-employed have been dispossessed. Small farmers and fishers swamped by globalisation. Which class will benefit and what will the masses do?

Aboriginals and Maori remain part of the reserve army of labour. Land rights settlements and special welfare policies that are ‘race based’ perpetuate this reserve army by perpetuating ‘reserves’. In NZ land settlements which create iwi incorporations still act as reserves because they boost the material subsistence of tribes in the form of ’settlement shares’ at the same time locking them into wage labour. The difference today is that the modern reserves are administered by a Maori bureaucracy and petty bouregoisie.

Are urban iwi incorporations the answer? No. To reconstitute iwi in the cities is to actively promote urban reserves. But as multi-ethnic working class organisations they have potential. This potential is not to set up a separate backward economy for an urban peasant existence, or try to compete in the corporate rat race, or with a vote to a second chamber, but to mobilise Maori along with all workers through the unions to expropriate the national wealth as their historic stake in socialism.

So the answer is to find a way to transform the national question into the class question. But how to do this? First the national question has to be addressed as real. It will not go away because Australasian capitalism cannot eliminate its ‘racialized’ reserve army of labour. This is why oppression of the landless indigenous people continues today. Opposing it means rejecting the policy of reserves, of trying to survive in ‘bantustans’ like the Pacific Island neo-colonies, Aboriginal tribal reservations or iwi incorporations. Instead we must fight for the return of stolen land and fisheries including mining rights under collective ownership. White workers must make that commitment before any other. Then the common cause against the common class enemy becomes a possibility.

Why stop at reclaiming bits of land on the bourgeoisies’ Treaty terms? That’s still fraud. Maori and Aboriginals as proletarians helped make theses countries. Surplus labour accumulated over generations is congealed as the wealth of these nations and of the major imperialists. But before they were proletarians they were landowners. But in order to create a reserve army of labourers, the colonists created the native ‘reserves’. The land rights struggle is to turn all stolen land into ‘native land title’! Not until white workers unconditionally demand indigenous land rights, will Aboriginal and Maori open up to the struggle for socialism.

The land rights struggle fulfils two conditions. First it proves that the working class can unite and fight. Second it proves that land rights under capitalism cannot realise the self-determination of indigenous peoples. To escape the barbaric fate of a destructive, inhumane capitalism, the working class as a whole needs a revolutionary programme to unite the masses in the struggle for socialism.

To ensure that nature’s resources are protected to provide for the needs of the masses, it will be necessary to nationalise the land, rivers and seas under workers democratic control, with indigenous peoples’ rights to their use guaranteed. To ensure that people have access to essential resources, energy supplies and services vital for their existence, it will be necessary to re-nationalise privatised state assets without compensation and put them under democratiic workers control. To prevent the wholesale destruction of past labour by footloose Multinationals it will be necessary to expropriate the assets of the capitalist corporates.

All of this will be possible only if the working class and its allies mobilise to fight for a workers’ and working farmers’ government based on workers councils and militia. Then it will be possible to build Socialist Republics of Australasia as part of a Federation of Asian/Pacific Socialist Republics.

——————–

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Notes

1 McDonald proved that his Stalinist training could be put to good use as a neo-fascist of the League of Rights. His grasp of Marxism was superficial as we would expect in one recruited into the Eureka Youth League of the Comunist Party of Australia.

2 The articles of the English version of the Treaty referred to are: “Article the first: The Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New Zealand and the separate and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over their respective Territories as the sole sovereigns thereof. Article the second: Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantees to the Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full and exclusive and undisturbed possession of their Land and Estates Forests Fisheries and other properties which they may collectively or individually possess so long as it is their wish and desire to retain the same in their possession: but the Chiefs of the United Tribes and the individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of Preemption over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate at such prices as may be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her Majesty to treat with them in that behalf. Article the third: In consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of British Subjects. (Source. Orange, 1987:258)

3 Minogue is well known as a right wing academic with several books promoting market economics, Thatcherism etc. See Harris and Twiname, 1998:51

4 In his NZ Herald column on April 15. My reply was submitted unsuccessfully to the NZ Herald op ed page, April 15 1998.
“What sheer hypocrisy! The demands Maori are making today are pitifully small compared with the almost total destruction of their society and its bastardisation by colonialism. If any forces pose a threat to social order today, they are those which the new right represent; the rapacious mulitinationals who are the descendants of the imperialist troops who conquered the Maori. Today those same forces seek to dominate and oppress NZ in the name of their super-profits. Such is their greed, that even a token settlement of a few billion dollars, a miniscule part of the wealth ripped off the Maori over the generations, is resented. When that is bantustan-like welfare statelets for their people, suddenly the ‘tribal elites’ become cronies, no doubt ripe for corruption. Anything less than a total ‘transparency’ on the global playing field is presented by the new right as a form of primitive communism or state socialism akin to Asian cronyism which handicaps the market god. A few billion to keep Maori out of jail becomes ‘barbaric’ compared to the ‘civilised’ behaviour of Ameritech and Bell Atlantic grabbing $7 billion in profits from Telecom since 1990.
The new right is frank in admitting that conquest leads to civilisation. Yet they take no blame for creating the current situation in which Maori have yet to achieve equality as citizens. The idea that Treaty claims reverses the oppression of Maori is ludicrous. The reason that these claims have been recognised in legislation is because they are made in terms of the bourgeois right to property introduced by the colonists but blatantly flouted in the case of the Maori land grab. The notion that Apartheid exists today in New Zealand is laughable. Apartheid in South Africa was the creation of the ruling class/caste. Its purpose was to provide state legitimacy for a form of forced labour. The current situation in New Zealand has nothing in common with this. The chaos feared by Morgan and Minogue is the creation of decolonisation, and the undoing of some of the damage of conquest. The real threat posed to ‘civilisation’ is not some pre-capitalist, non-democratic tribal hangover from the past. It is the anarchic, destructive nature of the glorified market and the uncontrollable forces of rapacious finance capital roaming the world for the biggest buck. It is this destructive process which forced Maori to mobilise behind Treaty claims when their jobs and wages started dissappearing. The vaunted Morgan/Minogue market could not even deliver jobs and a living wage let alone equal citizenship, so Maori had no option but to invoke bourgeois rights to reclaim part of the conquest just to survive. This is nothing to do with ‘re-inventing’ the past, but making use of the documented colonialist abuse of bourgeois rights in the past to secure their future. What Minogue and Morgan fear more than anything, is not only further Maori demands to realise equality, but worse, the joining together of Maori and Pakeha workers as a class bent on overthrowing their market god. That’s why Maori bashing is an unscrupulous racist attempt to rewrite history and blame Treaty settlements for the plight of pakeha workers today. That’s what makes the apologists of the new right take every opportunity to voice their alarmist fears. They want to ‘re-invent’ the past to cling onto their class privileges in the face of growing criticism of the gap between rich and poor of every race and nation.”

5 Here is my reply also submitted unsuccessfully to the NZ Herald op ed page on June 17 1998 in response to Morgan’s column.
“Gareth Morgan shows that the core of Pauline Hanson’s ideas are quite consistent with his New Right thinking. New Right thinking blames market failure on traditional barriers to the market such as tribalism, collectivism, and dependence on the state which saps individual will. Of course Morgan is more consistent than Hanson and opposes all forms of economic protectionism. But they both agree that if Aborigines and Maori are to compete in the marketplace they must abandon their traditional tribal, collectivist practices. Hanson wants Aboriginal land rights removed and welfare payments stopped so Aboriginals are forced to learn some civilisation. She justified the ’stolen children’ on the basis that it was good for them. Morgan similarly fears that Treaty settlements are reproducing “Stone Age” economies that cannot succeed in the market environment. In both cases it is the historic racism of the white-settlers towards their own indigenous peoples, which sets the terms of the debate. These terms need to be exploded. In the first place, how realistic is the fear that Aboriginal and Maori land rights will undermine the market economy? In the case of Australia, this is not a credible argument. Hanson has rekindled the deeply rooted white racism towards Aborigines held by the colonisers. Aborigines were considered to be animals, or children at best. They became citizens as recently as 1967. The recent Mabo (1992) and Wik (1996) land right decisions recognised for the first time that Australia wasn’t empty when the white settlers arrived, and that Aboriginals had historic land rights. These rights could be claimed if Aboriginals could prove a ‘continuous historic connection’ to the land. This is difficult to prove except for small areas, but nevertheless these decisions have provoked a racist backlash against Aborigines by small farmers and large mining companies. John Howard’s current 10-point plan is designed to make it even more difficult to claim a ‘historic connection’ to the land. Yet such is the furore that Hanson has been able to appeal to farmers and mining companies’ fears of an Aboriginal land grab at the expense of individual private property rights. That’s why she wants the Wik decision reversed, and welfare payments to Aborigines on their land stopped, to force then to follow the path of the ’stolen children’ and be force fed some civilisation.
That this racist backlash is totally out of proportion to the amount of land in question (little more than 1% even in Queensland) and the numbers of Aboriginal’s living on this land (a few thousand at most) proves that it is not the Aboriginals getting a tiny part of their land back who are responsible for the fears of farmers. The rural downturn is easily explained by the long-term decline of small farming, falling prices, and droughts. By extension, Hanson’s claim that migrants are taking Australian’s jobs defies reason. Almost all jobs in Australia are held by migrants or the decendents of migrants. It is crazy to say that long-term or cyclical unemployment is caused by migrants. The labour market responds to trends in economic expansion or contraction. Australia has always had a policy of giving preference to white settlers, and maintaining a reserve of Aboriginal and Pacific Island labour which could be turned off and on like a tap as boom turns to bust. So in turning off the ‘Asian inflow’ Hanson is doing no more than reviving an Australian racist tradition. It is even more crazy to claim that the Treaty settlements in NZ work against the market. Morgan cites the case of Tainui iwi operating in a way that “subjugates the rights of the individual for the benefit of the collective”. Whatever we might think of the way Tainui are using the small part of their land and financial loss compensated for by the state, they are at least investing most of their capital in jobs and education. This is a thousand times more productive, in market terms, than say the speculative ‘hedge funds’ that are run by prominent capitalist entreprenuers like George Soros, and who causes runs on national currencies including our own. What of all the other Treaty settlements, such as fisheries and forestry, being turned to productive investment? Far from a revival of tribalism, the Treaty settlements have actively promoted a breakdown of tribalism as tribal leaders take on the role of entrepreneurs and the majority of beneficiaries become mere shareholders. Even more, urban Maori so far left out of most settlements, are now little more than detribalised workers. So where is the evidence that the so-called “tribal model” ascribes a “low value” to education and conventional workforce participation? It is a racist figment conjured up to fuel a reactionary panic.
Therefore, by comparison with the large Western banks which are bringing the Asian tigers, and quite probably Australian and NZ economies to their knees, it is a sick joke to blame Aboriginal and Maori land rights settlements for the failure of the market to perform. Yet both Hanson and the New Right in NZ are beating the drum of racism and fomenting a redneck backlash against Treaty and land rights. The question is why? There can only be one answer. Racism, and its logical extension, fascism, diverts attention away from the real causes of economic crisis towards the most convenient scapegoat – the racially impure alien whether indigenous or foreign. It is not a revival of indigenous tribalism that is the real threat as Morgan claims, but a racist nationalism that can easily develop into fascism. This is clearly evident in the revival of the racist right in Europe where up to 20% of the population support neo-fascist parties and movements. “

6 “The party officials enjoyed the elegance and power you associate with kings. The party officials ran everything. Theirs were the only views that counted. That doesn’t appeal to Maori because that’s not how it works on a marae. My suspicions had been aroused and I wanted to get to the bottom of them. Marx had many interpreters in NZ. Factions and sects told us their version about the struggle of the proletariat to seize the means of production. It was naturally very confusing. So I suggested to a few colleagues that we should read the book ourselves rather than listen to their interpretations.
We started a study group in an upper Queen St. office to read Das Kapital.This was quite an undertaking for Sunday mornings. Most of us had extreme, almost experimental, hangovers. The study group consided of university students doing law, medicine and so on. We took a chapter a week, read it, and applied the thinking to modern Maori life.
I have been told now by an economist friend that the book is based on a mistake, that Karl Marx found this out towards the end of writing it, and put the book in his bottom drawer without ever publishing it. After he died, years later, his collaborator Engels tidied it up and published it. I’m not going into an analysis of Marx’s thinking here, but his mistake it is based on his theory of price. No-one in the 19th century knew why things cost what they did. There were many theories, and Marx had one that was still followed in NZ in the 1970’s. He thought, as we did, that it was a cost-plus deal; a banana custard, for instance, cost a dollar because a dollar’s worth of labour had gone into making it. The value of labour, in a capitalist system, was simply what it cost to kekep workers alive and breeding. When Marx finished Volume One of his book, an economist came up with the law of supply and demand and that was the end of that. Banana custards cost a dollar because that’s how much people were prepared to pay for them. There was no ‘iron law’ of wages, and that was why workers’ wages under capitalism are ever-increasing. Half-way through the book we all moved from potential communists to capitalist sympathisers.7 The more we understood what he was saying the less we agreed with his analysis. His argument that people sell their labour to capitalists to produce a good and the capitalist keeps the profit instead of giving it to his workers didn’t square with my experience. I had a shop where I’d hire part-time workers to help my mother. I’d pay them and use the profits to buy more stock. When we had made enough and saved enough we bought another shop. These activities made more jobs for part-time workers. And in the question where did the jobs come from we agreed that profit was the incentive that drove people on in economic lifeWhen Marx was writing it was much harder for ordinary people to acquire capital. But in modern life it is not such a problem. I was thirty, and from a standing start I owned a house, a shop, a couple of cars. I’d started a business. Today, capital is far more readily available. My uncle had started with nothing and now owned the largest tackle and game shop in Rotorua; other uncles owned a fleet of plumbing trucks, another uncle gook tourists out on Lake Taupo fishing. So the lesson I took from it was that if you don’t want capitalists to make a profit from your work then don’t work for them: do it yourself.”

7 Writing about the ‘pioneers’ who settled NZ to improve themselves and “achieve a better life” he says: “There is nothing wrong with that. To work hard for economic improvement is not a sin. There would be no jobs and wealth to be distributed to other if it was not for those who were ambitious. The person who is contented with being a worker for an employer has no need to feel less dignity than the employer, nor any feeling of envy.”

8 See Awatere (1998) in which she puts forward ACT’s views on eductation for Maori as “self help” views very close to those of Minogue and other BRT or Centre for Independent Studies sponsored tracts on privatising education.

9 Wilson, 1995; Mason Durie, 1998; P.G. McHugh, 1999; Augie Fleras, 1999; Ken Coates, 1998; Alan Ward and Janine Hayward, 1999.

10 This is precisely the point that Minogue makes because he sees the “Treaty process” as a limit put upon the bourgeois constitution by “primitive communism”. He links the empowerment of Maori to the international moves for the UN and international jurisprudence to recognise “indigenous rights’ as part of world-wide marxist conspiracy to take power by stealth. Andrew Sharp makes a classic liberal rebuttal (1997:317) . There can be no threat by Maori as a pan-Maori collective, as the constitution has adapted to demands by iwi and hapu under pressure of neo-liberal policies it has incorporated, but no co-opted, them as legitimate actors. No doubt Kelsey would see this process as the continuation of the ‘passive revolution’.

11 See Marx, 1976 Chapter 33 “The Modern Theory of Colonisation.” The “two birds” are dispossessing the indigenous population to create modern landed property, and creating a free labour force obliged to work for wages.

12 See the report of the speeches in Caselberg, 1975. See also Sorrenson, 1999.

13 Sahlins, (1987: 61) says ” Beyond all Western ideas of property or sovereignty, the land is ‘the inorganic body of the class community’ (to adopt Marx’s phrase). It is the objectified mana of the kinship group. Maori and Western concepts on this score are incommensurable. Still Firth must be right when he says that ‘the concept of mana is connection with land is…most nearly akin to the idea of sovereignty’ (1959:392). For when Heke determined that the Treaty of Waitangi was proposing some new sacred arrangements of property, he concluded that it must mean for Maori the loss of mana; as occurs in conquest, dispossession, and enslavement. The British were putting up their own tuahu.” (70) While Sahlin’s interpretation is a materialist reading of mythology, its more likely that Heke had up to then seen the loss of land as outweighed by the benefits of British “protection”. When these benefits failed to materialise, Heke acted against the symbol of the rival British authority.

14 See Windshuttle’s (1996) critique of Sahlins post-modern account.

15 Despite a stalemate in the North these conflicts lead to the conquest of Maori society and its subjugation as a Sub-Mode to the Capitalist Mode of production. See Macrae and Bedggood, 1989 and Bedggood, 1980.

16 Walker (1990, 1999) affirms the history of struggle. Webster (1996) sees Hapuu as changing organisations of resistance though bending to the stornger power of capitalism. Ballara (1998) sees Hapuu as adapting to demands put upon them, while Rata (1997) argues that ‘tribes’ have been reinvented as a mode of regulation (domination) of Maori by post-fordist capitalism. I argue below that the power of resistance in the transformed hapuu draws not only on surviving elements of ‘primitive communism’ but also from Maori memhership of the working class so that hapuu and unions are the two roots of Maori anti-capitalist resistance.

17 In the 1970’s and 1980’s most Eurocentric currents of ’socialism’ saw third world liberation movements, even ‘fourth world’ indigenous peoples’ struggles, as the in the vanguard of the world revolution. The US ‘new left’ and ‘black power’ movements projected minority social movements such as women and blacks as the leading progressive forces inside the imperialist states.

18 Middleton (1977:25) makes the point that Aboriginal land rights contain a revolutionary challenge to re-appropriate the means of production. A similar challenge exists in NZ with among those who reject the liberal belief that land rights can be realised by honouring the Treaty. The Treaty is still a fraud, because the land and tino rangatiratanga that was taken has not been returned, and Maori separatism is still a means of winning for Maori the bourgeois right to self-determination. Separatism however, does not yet mean secession, since there is still hope that self-determination short of secession will win Maori sufficient access to an “economic base” to ensure their survival.

19 See also Sid Scott’s “Lenin On New Zealand” in NZ Labour Review, Vol 8 (1 &2), Feb & March. 1953.

20 This is not ‘self-determination’ in the Leninist sense. See Sid Scott, NZ Labour Review, Vol 8 (4) May 1952. However, in ‘NZ’s Road to Socialism – Draft Programme’ NZ Labour Review, Vol 7 (7) August 1952, we find a more Leninist formulation. “In certain areas of NZ where the Maori people predominate, they must have the right of determining the course of their own economic and cultural development and their relationship to the nation as a whole.” What this proves to mean however, is ‘equality of opportunity’ in a socialist NZ.

21 The Republican, #43 December 1982

22 Bruce Jesson, “Reviewing the Maori Sovereignty Debate” The Republican, #48 December 1983; #49 February 1984.

23 The Republican, August 1984 “The Latest Contribution to the Maori Sovereignty Discussion”.

24 “Land Rights and Solidarity needed to defeat racist attacks Green Left” 1996. Available on the Green Left website http://jinx.sistm.unsw.edu.au/greenlft/1996/236/236p14.htm

25 Walker, 1999

26 Steven Webster has argued forcefully against post-modern attempts to ‘sublimate’ Maori culture from a critical theory perspective (1993). Unfortunately, while Webster locates the sublimated culture firmly in land rights and hapuu “as a way of struggle” (1997) he does not explain that ‘struggle’ as resistance to antagonistic social relations of production and the need to revolutionise those oppressive relations.

27 Wilson, 1995, (cf Yeatman,1995) explores the redefinition of the subject that will be necessary in a new constitution in which ‘justice, identity and difference’ can be ‘reconciled’ (210). All of this occurs in the realm of discourse of course. For a recent account which attempts to re-situate identity politics in a material base of capital accumulation see Poata-Smith, 1996.

[This article is unpublished. It went through several drafts in the 1990s and this draft dates from 2000. Ive put it up as a backgrounder to the current Australian Labor Party attempt at 'reconciliation' after the Howard years of open racism and military intervention in the NT. 'Sorry' is a start...but towards what?]





Lost in the Crowd? Hardt and Negri’s Empire and Multitude in Argentina

31 01 2008

Negri on his favorite subject

Introduction

In their book Empire Hardt and Negri argue that today world capitalism has entered a new stage of development. ‘Empire’ is different from imperialism and is bigger than any particular country including the US. ‘Empire’ is opposed by the ‘multitude’ that is different from, and yet has greater potential for resistance, than pre-existing conceptions of class organisation.[1]

I welcome the challenge posed by Hardt and Negri.[2] But it is necessary to test this theory against the more standard neo-liberal, social democratic and Marxist approaches. Negri has himself claimed that his theory can explain recent events in Argentina. After the World Social Forum of January 2002, he stated that the Multitude is “walking on two legs”; the ‘movements of movements’ represented by Genoa, and the Argentinazo of December 2001. So here we have the opportunity to put Negri’s theory under scrutiny as a ‘new communist manifesto’ and as a political action program. ‘Empire’s’ initial appeal was its ‘fit’ with the eclectic notions of multi-class ‘networks’ or ‘movement of movements’ that is to be found in the World Social Forum of Porto Alegre (Hardt, 2002b; WSF, 2003). This now reverberates back with Negri and Cocco citing the WSF of 2002 as mounting the worldwide struggle of the Multitude against Empire (2002).

When the Argentinazo bursts on the scene in December 1991 it becomes the first clear expression of the Multitude against Empire. Negri and Cocco seize on it to demonstrate the fruitfulness of their concepts. The multitude came out on the streets on December 19 and 20 uniting the middle class and unemployed across class lines as an opposition to Empire (Negri and Cocco, 2002).[3] So the case of Argentina should allow us to see how far Hardt and Negri’s basic theory fits with the reality of a semi-peripheral or ‘developing’ country undergoing an economic, social and political upheaval.

Empire vs imperialism?

Empire puts forward the proposition that Empire is not located in any one imperialist country, especially the US. The US is not about to be replaced by Europe or China. Rather Empire transcends any nation state and is a global power with a legal/political repressive framework. For Negri this is a progressive shift from imperialism to empire created by the Multitude that now has the capacity to end the constituted power of Empire. Any reversion by the major powers back from the historic advance of Empire to ‘oil wars’ is regressive because it reactivates old populisms, fundamentalisms and even fascism, and hinders the formation of the Multitude (Negri and Cocco, 2002).

The strongest argument in Empire is that Empire and Multitude are now facing off directly without mediating institutions. This is posed as the stark opposition of the constituent power of the Multitude confronting the constituted power of Empire (Hardt and Negri, 2000:184-185). The question arises how do we identify the power protagonists on both sides? A problem here is that if Empire has no official nation-state backing what role is left to the various states at the centre and the periphery? Do we ignore the US sponsored invasions of Iraq, Bosnia (Gowan at al, 2001) or Afghanistan (Zizek, 2002b) or are they a manifestation of the regression of US imperialism from the global challenges of Empire? The latter it seems. Hardt and Negri attribute the US war drive to a regression from Empire back to US Imperialism (Hardt, 2002c; Negri, 2002b, 2002e; Negri and Cocco, 2002).

However, if Empire is legal/political framework that succeeds imperialism in the extraction of surplus value for the purpose of capital accumulation, surely it has to have a territorial base i.e. states. Negri talks of the ‘global aristocracies of multinational capitalism’. The closest he comes to defining this is to talk of the leaders of powerful states, such France and Germany, opposed to Bush’s ‘imperialist’ reaction (2002g). Hardt counsels these ‘elites’ to resist the US war drive in the name of the ‘Empire’ (2002). Here we have a clear statement of the inchoate, progressive Empire against the backward and outmoded imperialism.[4]

It seems that it is ‘international institutions’ such as the IMF/World Bank, and the UN Security Council as well as the ‘global aristocracies’ who own the multinational firms and banks that constitute the power of Empire.[5] On the face of it this is a new ‘ultra-imperialism’ where it is supposedly rational for capital to unite and dissolve national antagonisms. However, like the earlier theory of ultra-imperialism, these propositions seriously misunderstand the inbuilt nature of the rivalry between the major powers for a zero-sum repartition of the world.[6] In the post September 11 2001 world, it seems that these epochal rivalries have re-asserted themselves over fundamental questions of which imperialism should control the world. The question is, which set of social relations, imperialist, or of the Empire, manifests itself in Argentina?

Multitude vs proletariat

Second, who or what is the Multitude and how does it resist Empire on the ground? What has happened to the concept of class? Where have the old sites of class struggle gone? Hardt and Negri argue that the proletariat has been reconstituted as the Multitude in which ’communication workers’ who produce immaterial labour are the core.[7] The relationship of the urban middle class to the unemployed worker is rewritten. Both become included in the overarching concept of biopower that says that all whose bodies cooperate in production part of the Multitude.[8] It seems that a class alliance between the unemployed and the ruined middle class is no longer necessary because they are two elements of the same ‘class’ united in the common production of immaterial labour. Does this mean the Empire extracts most of its surplus from immaterial labour? The theoretical status of immaterial labour has been unclear because it lacked application (Blunden, 2001). Now that it has been apparently concretised in Argentina we have the opportunity to put this concept to a reality test. (Negri, 2002; Negri and Cocco 2002)

Let’s summarise the main arguments in Empire as they apply to Argentina. Empire is the product of the tendential shift from US imperialism under pressure from the Multitude below. US imperialism has exhausted its power to extract surplus value by dominating countries like Argentina as semi-colonies or client states (which is why the current warlike regressions are seen as episodic exceptions). The ruling classes (of the non-American powers and multilateral sectors of the US ruling class) are now the proponents of Empire. Empire is de-territorialized so Argentina is not a separate sovereign state but part of Empire. Its locus of constituted power is the multinationals and multinational organisations that displace national institutions. The Argentinean Multitude is recomposed around biopower relations of oppression and exploitation to now unite former class opponents. This Multitude confronts Empire unmediated by the Argentinean state. Rather UN sanctioned policing ultimately regulates the extraction of the collective, creative, biopower of the Argentinean Multitude. In the Argentinazo the Multitude revolts and attempts to create its own constituent power.

Let us now see if Hardt and Negri’s conception of the Multitude up against Empire can explain the Argentinazo which opened a period of pre-revolutionary ferment. Does Hardt and Negri’s conception of the Multitude account for the uprising and subsequent events? Less than a year-and-a-half later the election of the left-liberal Peronist Kirchner in May 2003 has seen the Argentinean working class contained within the frame of national politics. This seems to be the result of the return of the radicalised middle class to the left Peronism of Kirchner, and the cooptation of large sectors of the unemployed into the state apparatus by the labour bureaucracy. Was the failure of the Argentinazo to complete its mission the result of a weakness of the Multitude against the constituted power of the Empire? Or perhaps Argentina remains trapped as a semi-colony of US and EU imperialism so that its crisis has been contained by the traditional institutions of the Peronist national bourgeoisie in alliance with the bureaucratic union leaders. Where is the evidence that Empire has displaced Imperialism in Argentina?

Argentine nation state displaced by “Empire”?

The theory of imperialism would point to Argentina being in a similar situation in Latin America to that of Russia in Europe in 1917. If not the ‘weakest link’ in those countries exploited by imperialism, the severity of its crisis is undoubted. Clearly this conception pits nations against nations. Argentina is a semi-colony oppressed by imperialism and is engaged in a struggle for self-determination. The Argentinean people recognise national oppression and this shapes their anti-imperialist politics. The Argentinean bourgeois have a class interest in acting as agents of imperialism, and this role includes containing the resistance of the popular masses by appearing paradoxically as defenders of the nation against imperialism. Peronism balanced these conflicting class interests for the Argentine bourgeoisie in the post-WW2 period in the form of the popular or patriotic front that drew the working class into a cross class nationalist alliance.

But, says Negri, the crisis of neo-liberalism and the shift to the post-modern global Empire is in part a response to successful colonial struggles against imperialism. The result is that the national (or local) is now re-constituted by the deterritorialised Empire that exploits biopower globally. This means that colonial and semi-colonial sovereign states no longer exist and that the national revolutions are transcended by a post-modern globalisation that obliterates national borders. The Empire now exploits the labour of the Multitude without the mediation of the nation state. Thus, for Negri, wars of re-colonisation are the backward aberration on the part of rogue ‘imperialist’ states that must be opposed. Not by equally backward national liberation struggles as advocated by some elements in the WSF, rather by a ‘vertical’ anti-globalising ‘movement of movements’ expressed by more progressive elements of the WSF.[9]

By contrast, the Marxist account of ‘neo-liberal globalisation’ does not posit the end of national politics. On the contrary, the crisis and restructuring of international capital requires the state to impose the law of value by means of neo-liberal austerity measures.[10] The state is required to devalue capital and measure both constant and variable capital in order to re-create the conditions for restoring the rate of profit.[11] Abstract labour as the measure of value is necessarily material combining both manual and mental labour in the production of commodities. Capital drives state policies that creates unemployment, underemployment, flexibilisation and casualisation in manufacturing, services, communications and knowledge industries.

Neo-liberal restructuring therefore means national state deregulation and restructuring of national capitals in all industries (including the privatisation of state owned assets) as part of the ongoing concentration and centralisation of capital globally to increase surplus-extraction and revive profits. This process requires that the global market directly asserts itself in national economies eliminating all barriers formerly managed by the nation state. It also requires that the nation state remains very active in managing the social and political ‘crises’ that result within the frame of national politics. Does this hold for Argentina?

Finance capital ‘re-cycles’ Argentina

At the beginning of the 20th century Lenin once referred to Argentina as a ‘British commercial colony’.[12] Despite its nominal political independence its economy was largely ‘owned’ by British banks. A large share of export earnings from Argentina’s internationally competitive primary production sector was exported as profits on foreign investment. In the post WW2 period, rising export earnings allowed Argentina to partially insulate its domestic economy, but this failed when prices slumped. The world capitalist crisis that began in the 1970’s exposed Argentina’s semi-colonial structural dependency and its indebtedness grew rapidly. The neo-liberal policies of the 1990s were designed to allow international capital to restructure the economy, buying up the best performing assets and closing down the least efficient. The cycle was complete. At the dawn of the 21st century, Argentina’s finances were once more recolonised by the international financial institutions.

I argue here that Argentina has always been semi-colony of British, and more recently, of US and EU imperialism, all of which are now trying to solve their economic crises at the expense of the Argentinean people. Argentinean workers and oppressed are in turn, ‘resisting’ being made the ‘fall guys’ of these imperialist plans. Not to recognise the persistence of imperialist crisis and anti-imperialist struggle is to ignore the main thrust of the Argentinazo – its nationalism –and to fail to confront the reactionary consequences of an anti-imperialist struggle that does not transcend nationalism.

In Argentina we have a fairly classic crisis of a breakdown of the economy due to the relentless extraction of surplus value. Was this caused by the policy failures of the multilateral financial institutions of Empire? In which case, Hardt and Negri are in the same camp as the neo-liberals and Blairites who propose a regulation of international finance to overcome such defaults to imperialism. Or was the crisis caused by deep-seated and continuous imperialist domination of Argentina?

In the case of the former, it is true of course that the so-called global finance institutions oversaw this process. Stiglitz argues that the crisis is one of financial mismanagement of the IMF and World Bank (2002, 69-70). Argentina went from IMF ‘showcase’ to IMF ‘basket case’. Bhagwati says that this was the deliberate policy of the Clinton administration to impose the rule of Washington and Wall St on the world economy (2000). They propose liberal humanitarian (Blairite-type) solutions to reform the international financial institutions and to ‘rescue’ Argentina.

Yet what if the crisis was not one of a mere failure of these institutions to implement the correct policies. Perhaps they acted exactly as they were supposed to in pumping profits back home in the interests of their shareholders i.e. the US (and to a lesser extent European) imperialist ruling class. In the final analysis the policies of these institutions are designed to serve the interests of international finance capital based exclusively in the imperialist countries. Any ‘rescue’ of Argentina on their part would therefore be designed to protect their longer term investments. Therefore, to project onto these institutions a global rationality that puts them in the service of a deterritorialised international capital is utopian.

Argentina as client state

Nor can we blame the favourite target of the intellectual apologists and media in the US and EU –the failure of Argentine national institutions. This neo-liberal modernisation theory ignores Argentina’s structural dependency. The military regime and the Alfonsin and Menem regimes, whatever policies they adopted, were increasingly incapable of acting independently of the world economic crisis and its worsening impact on Argentina.[13] These regimes were driven mainly by external pressures and shocks, principally the debt crisis (Rock, 2002) into adopting neo-liberal crisis management policies that generated a worsening crisis of political legitimacy.

For these reasons the state could not resolve the successive crises that resulted from the inability and refusal of Argentinean workers to create more surplus value to make more profits and pay back yet more debt. In the 1980s this led to falling profits. The Banks and firms in Argentina started to fail. The IMF and World Bank stepped in to rectify this with the whole structural adjustment package, demanding balanced budgets, cuts in social spending, wages and conditions for workers, and privatisation of state assets as conditions for more loans.[14]

International investors continued to prop up the bankrupt economy right up to the Argentinazo. In the period since, Duhalde and Kirchner have tried to do deals with the IMF and World Bank that will require Argentine workers to continue to pay the debt albeit in easier instalments. Far from the Argentinean state being sidelined by Empire, it remains a ‘client state’, firmly in centre stage as the repressive instrument of imperialism in the financial re-colonising process.[15]

What we see in reality is US imperialism, re-colonising its semi-colony Argentina (not an abstract case of the ‘global reconfiguring the local’) to take more direct control of the economy using the local client state as its agent. This poses clearly the solution: that of anti-imperialism against both the US and its local/national agents. This fact is the foremost political lesson in Argentina today. The single most popular demand raised by the unemployed, the occupying workers and the ruined middle class is “they all most go”! This refers to the ‘political class’ of the right and left who are all perceived as being the servants of imperialism.[16]

This is hardly a case of the Argentinean ‘multitude’ bypassing the state and acting directly, and vertically, against Empire. The ‘national question’ becomes increasingly posed as the social question i.e. class against class. It is against this pressing reality that we have to consider the question of whether Hardt and Negri have provided an analysis of the power of the Multitude able to replace that of the working class and oppressed people to complete this historic task.

The Argentinean ‘multitude’

If Empire is still US imperialism behind the ‘face lift’ of multilateral agencies, what of the opposition to Empire – the multitude? Let us see how Negri and Cocco view the role of the main sectors in struggle.

Negri and Cocco (2002) identify three elements that constitute the Argentinazo. First, are the unemployed. The Argentinazo happened despite, or rather because of, the rise of unemployment and the ‘dissolution of the fundamental wage relation’. “…the almost complete disappearance of the actively employed workforce represented by the Peronist unions and the state did not stop the recent, solid and radical social mobilisations.” Therefore, say Hardt and Negri, the Argentinazo was not caused by a classic workers uprising but by the ‘social movement’ of the unemployed, separated from the wage relation, and now part of the Multitude.


[a] The Unemployed

The piquetero movement[17] is a major development. Originating in the north of Salta around Mosconi and other towns in 1991, these protests threatened to spread all over Argentina. Police repression used against the piqueteros generated a rising militancy and armed defence by the movement. To contain this militancy, successive governments have handed out job programs administered by the traditional union leadership and by new layers of bureaucrats thrown up by the movement. The effect of this has been to dampen down the movement, but it has not quelled a series of national assemblies that have continued to make militant demands, challenge the bureaucratic leaderships, and develop a range of effective tactics. James Petras commented that after the Argentinazo the nature of the demands were very ‘left’. The original piqueteros 21 point program of July 2001 included demands to repudiate the national debt and nationalise the banks and industries, and subsequent assemblies have raised the demand for a ‘workers and peoples government!

How to explain the militancy of the leading layers of the reserve army of labour? The unemployed industrial workers figure strongly in Negri and Cocco’s analysis. They are evidence of the demise of the industrial proletariat as Empire has moved from industrial production to the social production of immaterial labour in Argentina. They are no longer in the capital wage labour relation, and nor are they citizens so represented, so this cannot explain their political role. Yet they have staged massive insurrections in the north of Argentina that have spread to other parts of the country. For Negri and Cocco then they are part of the Multitude, because of the ‘dissolution of the wage relation’, and because of their inclusion in the bio-political reproduction of production, where ‘marginalised’ workers complement the ‘flexibilisation’ of social production.[18]

Negri and Cocco explain the inclusion of the piqueteros in the Argentinazo as the ‘unity of singularities’ in the collective self-creation of the Multitude. Here they abstract from the concrete condition of unemployment to the imputed collective interests of the Multitude. This ignores the immediate interests of unemployed for work and for a living food basket. It overlooks the ability of the Duhalde regime to divide unemployed from employed on the basis of workfare schemes that tie the unemployed into the state welfare apparatus. Most important it glosses over the class barriers between unemployed industrial workers and the urban middle class. The irony is that the cross class alliance that emerged during the Argentinazo was motivated not by collective social labour, but by a spontaneous uprising against the regime for abandoning the interests of Argentineans as ‘social citizens’ constituted by the semi-colonial nation state. Negri and Cocco idealise the end of class differences brought about by Empire against the reality of different classes taking common refuge in the utopia of the failed patriotic front of Peronism. In the process Negri and Cocco divert attention from the real class alliances that have to be painstakingly built out of the wreckage of nationalism as the basis for socialism in Argentina.

Most Marxists would say that the nature of the crisis shows that the capital relation is still dominant. The neo-liberal program de-industrialised Argentina creating massive pools of unemployed especially in working class neighbourhoods of the big cities and the remote regions such as Salta in the north. More than 1200 companies have gone bankrupt and cast hundreds of thousands onto the scrap heap. These firms cover a range of domestic industries from steel, petrochemical, potteries, to more everyday food and textiles etc. Over 30% of Argentineans are now unemployed (and another 30% are ‘underemployed’) creating a reserve army of mainly displaced industrial workers who have recently and militantly entered national politics to demand jobs and decent welfare payments. The reality is that the unemployed see themselves as part of the working class aligned with employed workers.

For Marxists, unemployed industrial workers do not signify an end to the capital relation. Their role as a reserve army reinforces the capital relation. Thus at the level of appearances (distribution) they are divided from employed workers. By themselves they do not have a direct lever on the productive apparatus.[19] While road-blocks may bring transport, and some production, to a halt, they expose the piqueteros to state violence isolated from the employed workers organisations. For that reason, piquetero politics has been economistic in making immediate demands on the national state, even if using increasingly militant means of making them.[20] This means that unemployed are a force that can have only a limited progressive role. Traditionally Marxists have argued that the success of workers’ struggle must be decided one way or the other by the intervention of organised workers power at the point of production. Rather than idealise the unity of unemployed and employed as collective singularities (the ‘absolute democracy’ of the Multitude), Marxists find ways to unite the unemployed in defence of exiting jobs so that workers can use their labour to fight for jobs for all.[21]

[b] The Middle Class

Negri and Cocco’s second element of the Argentinazo is the ‘middle class’ which unites with the unemployed in the Multitude. “How was it possible to politically ally side by side the unemployed piqueteros excluded by the neo-liberal restructuring and suffering from job cuts and cuts in social spending, with the ‘ahoristas;’ –the small savers and private urban service workers whose wages were artificially inflated by monetary policy of the currency board? This was possible because these two elements have many more things in common than the traditional theory of classes [Marxism] reveals and in fact tries to conceal.” (Negri and Cocco).

In other words, what did the unemployed and the ‘ruined middle class’ have in common? In Argentina the term middle class is used loosely to mean well-paid professional workers, as well as self-employed and even small bourgeoisie.[22] It was the urban middle class, especially in Buenos Aires, that prospered under the economic nationalism of the post-war period, and managed to survive relatively intact during the neo-liberal years. But with the onset of the current crisis this middle class has been massively squeezed. It was hit hard by the collapse of the banking system in late 2001 and it is the ruined urban middle class that is the main force behind the formation of the Popular Assemblies (Assembleas Populares or PAs), and the massive rallies that brought down de la Rua in December 2001.

According to Hardt and Negri the rise of immaterial labour is displacing the traditional industrial factory worker and is now the leading edge of the Multitude (2000:53). This means also that the immaterial workers are the vanguard of the Multitude against Empire. Negri and Cocco make much of the failure of classic Marxism to explain the ‘cross class’ alliance of the unemployed and urban middle class. Implied in this is that the ‘urban middle class’ is comprised mainly of immaterial workers who have a strong identity of interest with the unemployed. We can test this by looking at the class composition of the Popular Assemblies and the demands raised by the PAs. Here we have combined salaried workers whose salaries were paid via the banks with self-employed and small employers. Hardt and Negri define immaterial labour in terms of provision of services that do not produce a material commodity such as intellectual, communications and linguistic work. Since such ‘immaterial’ or service workers are a significant element in the urban class structure, did they play a distinctive role in the PAs?

Are the immaterial workers the most politically advanced sector of struggle? The evidence so far suggests that this is not so. The PAs were formed spontaneously after the Argentinazo around the demands “all of them out”, non-payment of the national debt and the nationalisation of the banks. But these demands do not have a clear anti-capitalist content. They express an opposition to the ‘political class’ who are perceived as ‘in the pay’ of imperialism. At one level they also express nostalgia for a return to a national populist politics since abandoned by Menem and de la Rua. In the last analysis these are populist statist demands made on the basis of all citizens’ right to have their small savings protected by the national state from the multinational banks.

The PAs have in general also taken a strong stand against political party representation of the ‘left’ as well as the ‘right’ rejecting socialism as a solution to the national crisis. The broadening of the PA’s political demands to include solidarity with other sectors has been slow in developing and usually only in those PAs where the initiative of a minority linked to workers’ movements or political parties has outweighed the more traditional petty bourgeois elements. Most important, however, since the Argentinazo, among those PAs in the working class neighbourhoods, political alliances have formed with the piqueteros but also with the occupied factories. This reflects a differentiation between those PAs who have reverted to negotiations with the state, and those who have rejected ‘negotiations’ and ‘pacts’ with the state, and now fight for radical demands including the nationalisation of workplaces under workers control. Rather than supporting Hardt and Negri’s immaterial middle class as a new vanguard, we see here the ‘radicalised middle class’ recognising its common interest with the left wing of the industrial labour movement (self-organised as a unity of employed and unemployed) – a reality that appears to throw the concept of the Multitude completely out of play.

[c] Multitude as revolutionary subject

The third and last element of the Argentinazo put forward by Negri and Cocco (2002) is the role of the Multitude as revolutionary subject. Since they reject any revolution arising out of the capital-labour relation, the self-emancipation of the Multitude has no relationship to the classic struggle between workers and capitalists over ownership and control of the means of production. Therefore there is no perspective of building unions, occupying factories, taking over production and generalising this movement into strike committees, general strikes, and ultimately a seizure of state power.[23]


“The politics of the Multitude is constituent of the work of the Multitude and vice-versa, definitely outside the dialectics of ‘capital and wage labour’ whose synthesis is always the development of capital. Indeed, the constitutive power has nothing to do with the outdated interests of power: unity of the subject (people), the forms of their composition (social relations between individuals) and ways of government (monarchy, aristocracy and democracy, simple or combined).”

In other words, the constituent power of the Multitude will not contest ownership of the factory, challenge the bourgeoisie in parliament, or seek to overthrow governments. Rather its power is to resist and exit Empire by transforming it from within. So what has been transformed in Argentina since the Argentinazo? I would argue that the development of the factory occupations is the only significant transformation to take place in the development of the revolution. Not only is Negri completely blind to this, he cannot recognise that the other sectors or ‘movements’, the Popular Assemblies, and the Madres, are increasingly recognising the occupations as the key to the success of the revolution.[24]

As we have seen, Argentina was subjected to vicious neo-liberal restructuring of its protected industries. As the bankruptcies mounted in the last years, many employers simply walked out and abandoned their plant. Rather than accept that they had lost their jobs and join the unemployed masses, workers began to occupy the factories, shops and clinics to keep them producing. There are over 100 factories under occupation and they constitute a major advance as centres of potential workers control over production, but also organised community services including self-help, self-defence, and of cultural activities.

What began as sheer basic survival mode for most workers has proven to be a huge political school for revolution. This has produced a real challenge to the system of private property. Employers are trying to regain control and many attempts by police and hired thugs to break up the occupations have taken place. The workers have called on support from the piqueteros and the PAs and this has seen most occupations successfully defended. The defence of the occupations has become a catalyst for unity across all the sectors of struggle. Some have created jobs and are backing the call of the Subte (underground railway) workers for a 6 hour day and an extra shift. We now see the beginnings of a real unity of employed, unemployed, the ‘ruined middle class’, the ‘mothers’ and the students, coming together.

For Negri and Cocco, however, the occupations (some like Zanon go back over a year before the Argentinazo) do not figure in their analysis, since they are the old ‘horizontal’ backbone of the industrial proletariat and are an impediment to the emergence of the Multitude. As we shall see, this single omission renders their concept of the Multitude totally unreal as a revolutionary subject.

The key role of factory occupations

Of all these sectors in struggle, clearly the factory occupations pose the biggest challenge to capital. The occupations have now become the ideological testing ground for the whole movement. We do find a coexistence of production and politics here, but one in which production relations are determinant. Basic issues in this debate are: First, the workers have control over means of production. Second, they are proving that they can produce essential commodities without employers or managers. Third, this has inspired other elements to defend these occupations uniting sectors of resistance. Fourth, the political question of who should own and control these factories is being debated.

The state authorities and no doubt the US imperialists are alarmed by the threat posed by the occupations. It is trying to find a way to return the factories to their private owners by allowing workers to lease the factories and pay outstanding debts before they retain any of the proceeds. This is opposed by some of the key occupations like Brukman[25] and Zanon[26] where there is a campaign to get the state to nationalise factories under workers control and without compensation to the private owners.

What is at stake here surely is the classic Marxist concept of ‘dual power’ rather than Hardt and Negri’s misconception of ‘constituent power’. The new power that workers constitute is not against the constituted power of Empire, but is the power over the means of production owned and controlled by imperialism and backed by local state power. This can be the only meaning of ‘constituent power’ for the working class – i.e. workers’ power. In Argentina it is spoken of clearly, as does Hebe de Bonafini, as the basis for a workers and people’s power over their own lives. “If we win Zanon, we can win them all… we can be an example to the world”. [27]

Why have these sectors of struggle emerged? Returning to the question posed at the start, can they be explained (even predicted) on the basis of the Marxist theory of imperialism, or is it necessary to develop a new theory of Empire to do so? I suggest that what we find in Argentina today is a classic class struggle argued by Marxists for more than a century. Argentina is a semi-colony whose infrastructure has been largely destroyed by restructuring its productive base. But it is those traditional workers displaced by the neo-liberal de-industrialisation that have formed the powerful piquetero movement.

Similarly, the factory occupations are not the response of immaterial labour to a global empire, but the life and death struggle of manual workers for survival when their factories close down. The ruined middle class is partly composed of communications and social workers. Are they leading the ‘resistance’ to Empire? They have been politicised but their politics does not of itself go beyond radical opposition to the ‘political class’. It requires a radicalisation of the PAs on the part of those worker or ruined petty bourgeois elements in support of the leading sectors in struggle. A growing reserve army of impoverished industrial workers and a ‘declassed’ middle class, formerly united by a Peronist populism, and now united around the defence of production, are both symptoms of crisis-ridden semi-colonial capitalism and not Empire.

While the divisions within the proletariat and middle class are historically deep and wide (the legacies of the dictatorship and Menenism) the severity of the crisis has radicalised some sectors of the middle class into an alliance with employed and unemployed workers against the US, IMF and the Argentine ‘political class’. Again, these historic divisions are those we would expect from the theory of imperialism. Peronism was a system of national patronage in which large segments of the labour movement were clients of the national bourgeoisie. It is the inability of the Argentine bourgeoisie to use its political patronage to buy off the more militant sectors in struggle that has created the ‘crisis of Peronism’.[28] So the Multitude in Argentina looks very much like the old proletariat rising up against its long-time local and imperialist exploiters and oppressors and raising the possibility of a socialist solution to the crisis.

The question of state power

The demand ‘all of them out, not one should remain ‘ is interpreted by some as a full-scale challenge to the bourgeois state, and by others as an invitation for workers’ leaders to contest elections. This difference of opinion was recently centred on the question of boycotting the upcoming elections for the Presidency called by Duhalde,[29] and the question of the Constituent Assembly. Everyone, whatever their political colour, sees the Argentinean state as the locally constituted power. How appropriate that the debate over who should hold state power should be so clearly posed as a test of Hardt and Negri’s ‘constituent power’!

The militant piquetero assemblies with the backing of the more radical PAs and factory occupations have consistently called for workers to organise independently of the state and put forward the demand for “workers to power”. This amounts to the demand that the workers and the oppressed people replace the bourgeois state with a new state. Yet it is not widely perceived as the classic Leninist/Trotskyist ‘Workers’ government’ or workers’ ‘dictatorship.[30] There is widespread confusion about the form of such a state. Yet there is a serious move towards dual power as the class struggle tendency calls for mass actions such as more road blocks, indefinite general strikes and the formation of self-defence committees. The question of power is being posed also by those who advocated an ‘active boycott’ against the forthcoming elections to bring Duhalde down.” [31]

Some left reformists, for example the ‘Citizens’ Forum’ sponsored by Elisa Carrio, Luis Zamora and CTA chair de Gennaro, see the elections as an opportunity to put forward a Constituent Assembly under the existing constitution. This of course cannot be a challenge to constituted power. Others want the Constituent Assembly to come out of an active boycott which either means that the ‘active boycott’ is expected to fail or they know in advance that organs of dual power will fail (PO-Workers’ Party). Yet others want the mobilisation of workers direct action to result in a Revolutionary Constituent Assembly (PTS-Socialist Workers Party).[32]

What we have here is a case of old-fashioned class politics, where the various currents on the left contest the leadership of the proletariat. Those who want to contest the elections short of an active boycott and general strike to bring down Duhalde are falling into the electoral trap. After a year of pre-revolutionary struggles and the gradual uniting of the sectors in struggle, Duhalde is using the elections to steer the workers’ movement into a blind alley. It is no accident that those on the left who take this line are those who have historically taken a stage-theory approach to national liberation.[33]

For this reason it is crucial for those on the class struggle left to take a lead in organising and mobilising all the sectors in struggle under the banner of direct democracy. This is necessary to establish the political independence of the working class as the revolutionary class subject capable of leading and winning a socialist revolution. This class independence will grow out of the struggle for national congresses of rank and file delegates of all the sectors in struggle dedicated to putting forward and acting on a program of demands such as the piqueteros 21 demands of 2001. It is also expressed in the formation of self-defence organisations to defend the interests of the workers and oppressed people from state and military reaction.

The independence of the working class is the key to the fate of the ruined middle class whose politics can easily be drawn into radical right or fascist movements directed at the working class. The remains of the Peronist movement can easily turn into a fascist front backed by the military to smash any new Argentinazo. Yet the stronger the proletarian movement the more will the ruined middle class gravitate to its leadership. But because this poses the question of state power and private property, the middle class has to be convinced that its survival as petty bourgeois is no longer possible, and that socialism will at least provide them with a future less than barbaric.

This is why the program of the proletariat and oppressed people should include demands that allow the ruined middle class and self-employed farmers, artisans etc to keep what petty property they have, so that they can be included in the future plans for the economy. Further, demands that seek to nationalise the big banks and big factories, agricultural co-operatives and small farms should be integrated into the plan to ensure that food and other necessities are produced. It will become clear through this experience that small holders, and the self-employed, were never exploited by the workers but by the rich owners of capital.

The unfinished national revolution

I argue that the analysis above demonstrates is that it is not Hardt and Negri’s Empire or the Multitude that figure in the Argentinean crisis, but the class forces found in Lenin’s ‘imperialism’ and Trotsky’s ‘uneven and combined development’. Argentina’s crisis can be understood as one that results from US imperialism attempting to solve its own crisis at the expense of the workers and people of not only Argentina but of the oppressed workers and peasants of Latin America.

In the first instance a successful Argentinean national revolution must be a workers’ and poor peoples’ revolution in one country. In the process is will become clear that this revolution must become a socialist revolution to succeed. This is because national revolutions do not miraculously transform themselves into international movements that can transform and disarm Empire from within, but come face to face with the armed reaction of imperialism. Nor will such a revolution survive without the support of a federation of socialist republics in Latin America – at least Chile and Brazil, or Mexico and Venezuela. But that alone will not be sufficient. It will not overcome the problem of backwardness and economic scarcity that remains the hallmark of the colonial and semi-colonial world. Unless one or more imperialist states forms the basis of such a socialist federation, LA ‘revolutions’ will succumb to sustained imperialist military and economic embargos and to their own relative economic backwardness.[35]

The US has a history of military intervention in Latin America. Its ‘new world order’ requires a stepping up of that intervention. That is why it promotes the various counter-revolutionary wars it calls ‘Plans’ such as the Plan Colombia. It has recently included these incursions as part of the ‘war on terror’ to change ‘regimes’ in so-called ‘failed states’. The outcome of the revolution in Argentina will be decided in the last instance by the international solidarity of workers in the advanced capitalist states refusing to allow their ruling classes to use the ‘war on terror’ as a pretext for ‘preventative wars’ to smash the popular and workers revolution against imperialism and capitalism.

References

Balakrishnan, Gopal (2000) ‘Hardt and Negri’s Empire’. New Left Review, 5 Sept/Oct. http://newlefreview.net/NLR23909.shtml

Beasley-Murray, Jon (2001) ‘Lenin in America’. Review of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire, Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 2000

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Bhagwati, Gadget (2000) The Winds the Hundred Days. The MIT Press, Cambridge.

Blunden, Andy (2001) ‘Negri & Hardt’s Concept of Immaterial Labour.’ http://home.mira.net/~andy/blackwood/empire03.html

Brown, Nicholas and Mire Szeman/Antonio Negri and Michael Hardt (2002) ‘Subterranean Passages of Thought’: Empire’s Inserts.’ Cultural Studies 16 (2) 193-212.

Callinicos, Alex (2001) ‘Toni Negri in Perspective’ International Socialism Journal, No 92

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Hardt, Michael and Antonio Negri (2000) Empire. Harvard University Press. Cambridge.

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Hardt, Michael (2002b) ‘Porto Alegre: Today’s Bandung?’ New Left Review, 14, March-April.

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Holloway, John (2002) ‘Going in the Wrong Direction Or Mephistopheles: Not Saint Francis of Assisi’. Historical Materialism, Vol 10 (1)

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http://www.generation-online.org/ 2/February 2003

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Montag, Warren (2001) ‘Review of ‘Antonio Negri, Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State.’ Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. Historical Materialism, Vol 9 (196-204).

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Negri, Antonio (1999) Insurgencies: Constituent Power and the Modern State. University of Minnesota Press. Minneapolis

Negri, Antonio ‘ (2000) Alma Venus: Prolegomena to the Common’

http://www.generation-online.org/t/almavenus.htm

Negri, Antonio (2002a) ‘S11 the class in the Western mind/the Imperialist backlash on Empire. Interviewed by Ida Dominijanni

generation_online digest (16 September)

Negri, Antonio (2002b) ‘Ruptures Within Empire; The Power of Exodus. An Interview with Toni Negri by Guiseppe Cocco and Maurizio Lazzarado

http://www.generation-online.org/empireruptures.htm

Negri, Antonio (2002c) ‘Value and Affect’

http://www.generation-online.org/t/valueaffect.htm

Negri, Antonio (2002d) Approximations: Towards an ontological definition of Multitude. http://www.generation-online.org/t/approximations.htm

Negri, Antonio (2002e) ‘The Imperialist backlash on Empire: S 11 a clash in the Western mind. Interview by Ida Dominijanni

http://www.generation-online.org/t/backlash.htm

Negri, Antonio (2002f) ‘Porto Alegre, Sad Empire: Stephane Mandard interview Toni Negri’ http://www.generation-online.org/t/portoalegre.htm

Negri, Antonio (2002g) ‘ ‘Empire and the Multitude: A dialogue on the new order of globalisation. Antonio Negri and Danilo Zolo.

http://www.generation-online.org/t/empiremultitude.htm

Negri, Antonio and Giuseppe Cocco (2002) ‘O Trabalho Da Multidao e o exodo Constituinte: o “Quilombo” Argentino’ http://www.generation-online.org/t/17December 2002 My translation from Portuguese.

Petras, James (2002a) ‘The Unemployed Workers’ Movement in Argentina’ Monthly Review, 53 (8) January.

Petras, James (2002b) ‘US Offensive in Latin America: Coups, Retreats and Radicalization’ Monthly Review, 54 (1) May.

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http://www/spiked-online.com/printable/00000006DAA75.htm



[1]Most of the commentary from the ‘left’ has been welcoming. In particular, Negri is seen as reviving an optimism of the intellect that has been overcome by pessimism in recent years (Beasley-Murray, 2001). Zizek asks if Empire is the Communist Manifesto for the 21st century (2001). He then has second thoughts and returns to his rediscovery of Lenin as messiah (Zizek, 2001). The return to a forthright and even enthusiastic focus on class struggle is regarded as healthy, even if doubts remain about Negri’s failed workerist politics of the 1970’s (Sheehan, 1979, Wright, 1996) carrying over to the new millennium and underestimating Capital’s power to impose its will (Holloway, 2002). Others have criticised Hardt and Negri for developing concepts that are not directly related to actually existing anti-capitalist struggles (Munck, 2001). There is an almost unhealthy idealisation of ‘America’ (Beasley-Murray, 2001) but no real reality testing when the US bombs Afghanistan (Negri, 2002; Zizek, 2002b). Where is the evidence that the multitude can constitute power against constituted power? Yet, despite these reservations, the book is seen as a challenge to both left and right that demands a response. In particular it demands a response from those who would see in Hardt’ and Negri’s ‘Empire’ a dangerous diversion from opposition to the ‘US Empire’ (Gowan, 2001).

[2] I have major problems with their method of analysis. This is particularly so in the attitude towards ‘resistance’ that substitutes capitalist class relations for the collective ‘singularities’ of the Multitude on a global scale. Ultimately, Hardt and Negri employ a non-Marxist method that rejects dialectics and the contradiction between use-value and exchange value underpinning capitalist social relations. History becomes the result of the ‘accumulations of class struggles’ (Chingo and Dunga, 2001). Negri tries to intellectually override the historic barrier of capital to labour by investing in the Multitude the spontaneous capacity to free its use-value from exchange value (the market) in act of collective subjective resistance.

[3] “It is exactly in the tragedy of Argentina that we find, in a way still more powerful, the work and politics of the Multitude. In Argentina, the Multitude appears as the contender against the Empire. The uprisings of 19 and 20 December 2001 knocked down not only the government, but opened up a formidable period of experimentation and political, economic and social innovation. The blockading of roads by the piqueteros, the carcerolazos of the urban middle class, the systematic siege of the banks by the ahorristas, the neighbourhood and inter-neighbourhood assemblies, the self-management of the occupied factories by the sacked workers and the supportive economic networks, constituted a new configuration of the movement of movements.” (Negri and Cocco, 2002)

[4] Negri: ‘I think we could say that the American leadership is deeply weakened precisely by the imperialist tendencies that it occasionally expresses…the military superpower of the US is, as we know, largely neutralised by the impossibility of being used in its nuclear potential. And this is good news. From the monetary point of view, the US is increasingly exposed and weakened on financial markets: and this is also great news. In other words, with all probability, the US will soon be forced to stop being imperialist and recognise themselves in Empire.” (2002g).

[5] Perhaps these might develop further into the international agencies proposed by Stiglitz (2002) or Soros (1998) to regulate the anarchy of international finance? These writers are neo-liberals who have ‘converted’ to a post-Keynesian or ‘Third Way” position that owes much to the revival of ‘ultra-imperialism’. (See note below).

[6] The classic debate on ‘Ultra-imperialism’ was between Kautsky and Lenin. Kautsky argued that the imperialist powers did not need to be rivals, but could unite as an ‘internationally united finance capital’ i.e. ‘ultra-imperialism’ Lenin (1964:271). Thus the workers movement could prevent wars by appealing to capital’s interest in global integration. This theory foreshadows Hardt and Negri’s view that the ‘multitude’ can force imperialism to mutate into Empire. Lenin’s response to Kautsky serves as a response to Hardt and Negri. “Ultra-imperialism” is ‘ultra-nonsense’ because monopolies (MNCs today) are driven to compete economically by means of trade and military wars. To suggest that global finance capital can overcome the unilateral divisive tendencies of industrial capital and create global peace makes it out to be a progressive force, very similar to the way Hardt and Negri put forward the possibility of Empire as a multilateral transcending of imperialism.

[7] “It is in that sense that the Multitude is a class concept. It is always productive and in movement. Considered from the point of view of the movement, the Multitude is exploited in the process of production; seen from a spatial point of view, the Multitude is still exploited as part of productive society i.e. in the social cooperation of production. The concept of the Multitude as a class should be seen as different from the concept of the working class. Indeed the working class is a limited concept, from the point of view of production (essentially industrial workers) and that of social cooperation (not many assembly workers left). If we make the Multitude the new class concept, the notion of exploitation will be redefined as the exploitation of cooperation: not cooperation of individuals, but of singularities, exploitation of the assembly of the singularities, of the movements that compose the assembly of the assemblies that makes up the movements.” (Negri and Cocco 2002)

[8] “In the Argentinazo, the end of the political neo-liberalism appears as the end of constituent power and the political potential of the Multitude. A traditional analysis of its social composition would bump immediately into its fragmentary and irreconcilable elements: urban middle class on one side, and unemployed proletarians from the periphery on the other. Can such an analysis explain the peculiar conjunction and composition of interests arising from the neo-liberal period? Can it explain the complete ending of any form of representation and delegitimising of all instances of constituted power? For beyond the difficulties that the Argentine movement may be facing and will face, these constituent elements remain and they will remain like an essential launch pad for the movement of movements itself to think its own concept of the Multitude. This includes the possibilities to link together in the development of constituent power of the cooperative Multitude its work and its capacity to oppose capitalist power. The Argentine movement constituted itself in an event without defined (pre-determined) purpose, in a rupture with the collective perception. ”(Negri and Cocco 2002)

[9] Hardt and Negri seem to have swallowed whole the neo-liberal ‘globalisation thesis: the description of the surface features of the economic crisis of world capitalism since the early 1970s that does not penetrate to the underlying causes of crisis. Thus they see the penetration of national economies by international capital as evidence of Empire, and the breakdown of economic nationalism as loss of sovereignty and evidence of the Multitude. However, the superficiality of such a view has been exposed to tough rebuttals from Marxists as ‘globalony’. Globalisation is still imperialism, if somewhat ‘recycled’ (Petras and Veltmeyer, 2002).

[10] At its heart neo-liberal economics merely assert the primacy of the operation of the law of value by which commodities exchange at their value determined by the socially necessary labour time required to produce them. This requires an attack on economic nationalism that regulates to protect the home market from international competition, thereby suppressing the law of value. In the case of Argentina, deregulation and the operation of the currency board, forced Argentina to open up to flows of finance and trade, and removed controls over its money supply. Instead of economic ‘development’ it created indebtedness and austerity policies to pay the debt.

[11] Hardt and Negri assert that value and its measurement are unimportant. See Day (2002), Wright (1996) and Callinicos (2001) for an analysis that traces this approach back to the Autonomist Marxist movement in Italy in the 1970s. The unreality of this approach to value is given by the fact that the national debt is nothing but a measure of value owed to external creditors and paid for by increasing the rate of surplus value by means of post-fordist flexibilisation and by cuts in working class consumption of value.

[12] This was one of the ‘transitional forms’ of state, neither colonies proper, nor imperialist, but “diverse forms of dependent countries which, politically, are formally independent, but in fact, are enmeshed in the net of financial and diplomatic dependence, typical of this epoch.” Lenin, (1964:263).

[13] The 1990s under Menem saw Argentina exposed to structural adjustment. The IMF/WB etc imposed a policy of balanced budgets and privatisation of state assets. Who benefited? The owners of capital invested in Argentina and their local agents. Repayments on the national debt were kept up which meant that the shareholders in the IMF, World Bank continued to profit. Who are these owners? The big multinational banks and the US Treasury!

[14] State assets were bought up cheaply by US and EU MNCs. Who where these MNCs? An example: Enron. The opening up of Argentina was engineered by the IMF/WB institutions but on behalf of the big banks and big MNC conglomerates. So it seems that finance capital was the big beneficiary. And that finance capital has one main location, the USA.

[15] Who oversaw this profiteering? The local state policed this process, backed up by multinational police operations under the name of the ‘war against drugs’ or ‘terrorism’, as well as UN convened military exercises (in Salta in the north of Argentina). While multinational and UN resolutions were used to mount these ‘police operations’, it was always US intelligence and troops that were in control. So despite the appeal to UN and multilateral agencies, it was always the US unilateral interests that underpinned this policing. No Empire here please, we’re Yankees!

[16] There is a very strong link between the Argentinean ruling class and the US as well as some of the EU states. The political regimes act as the direct local agents of imperialism, either in the form of Menem’s neo-liberal regime, or the reactionary crisis regimes of de la Rua and Duhalde, and now the left Peronist Kirchner. These regimes are nationalist ‘client’ regimes balanced between the masses and imperialism. Yet as their role in serving imperialism becomes clearer their ability to pose as anti-imperialists becomes weaker.

[17] The piqueteros are unemployed workers who ‘picket’ (block) roads in protest at their lack of jobs and decent unemployment benefits.

[18] Though Negri and Cocco don’t spell this out they are here referring to the effects of unemployment in disciplining social labour. I.e. one third of Argentina’s workers are casualised to different degrees, in job schemes, part-time jobs, and the ‘black economy’. This is Empires regime of accumulation and mode of regulation.

[19] cf Petras (2002a) more optimistic view of the capacity of the piqueteros to interrupt production.

[20] There is a huge debate in Argentina today among the left parties about the best way of uniting the unemployed with the employed (and other sectors as well).

[21] This is the politics of the class struggle pole in the movement around the occupied factories as I discuss below.

[22] This term is not scientific as it includes members of different and opposed classes i.e. salaried employees along with the self-employed and small employers.

[23] Negri: “The most interesting thing that the reading of the movements shows is that today, to the formation of imperial power, is not opposed a discourse of ‘seizure of power’, but rather of ‘exodus’ (2002g)

[24] The ‘Madres de Plaza de Mayo’ (Mothers of the Plaza of May) who rally in national independence square in Buenos Aires every week and have been a major force in bringing other sectors in struggle together. This has challenged some of the traditional left organisations who see the killing of some 30,000 by the military dictatorship as a ‘human rights’ issue. There has been a reluctance on the part of the Peronist unions (who were implicated in the military regime as was the Communist Party) to join forces with the Madres. The result has been separate marches and protests dividing the mass movement. In October 2002, Hebe de Bonafini visited the Zanon factory occupation in Neuquen and forged an important link between the mothers and the occupying workers independently of the collaborationist bureaucrats.

[25] Brukman is a relatively small clothing factory in Buenos Aires that is important because its workers have been in the leadership of many struggles and are leading the fight for the factories to be nationalised under workers’ control rather than be ‘cooperatised’ or handed back to owners with no guarantees for workers. Brukman was retaken on April 18, 2003. Thousands of workers rallied in support, but were repelled by police armed with tear gas and live ammunition. A police cordon was set up for several blocks but this did not stop 30,000 supporters marching in defence of Brukman on May 1. These supporters were drawn from local popular assemblies, from unemployed organisations, the Madres of the Plaza, students, and the left parties. On May 3 the Brukman workers met with their supporters to launch a campaign to rally support nationally around 4 points to defend the occupations and retake Brukman. These are: 1) Freedom for the jailed Salta piquetero leaders; 2) the retaking of Brukman by the workers; 3) A living wage for employed and unemployed on work plans (work creation); 4) Genuine and worthwhile jobs for all!

[26] Zanon is a ceramics factory situated in the province of Nequen to the west of Buenos Aires. It has been subjected to a number of attempts by bosses, police and union thugs to evict the workers and sell off the factory to Chilean interests. It was the factory recently visited by Hebe de Bonafini (see footnote above). Zanon is a shining example to all. Zanon ceramics are being used everywhere. In Patagonia (extreme south) peasants have occupied land and the Mapuche indigenous people have occupied land designated as a golf course. One old woman said “Here we are working the land, and no one is going to get us out. Not even the police or army”. The Tigre Supermarket in Rosario had dedicated its top floor to culture, drama and a library.

[27] For Negri and Cocco the Mothers add a strong moral force to the Multitude, that does not draw directly on the proletariat, but which provides an example of collective action vitally necessary to unite all the sectors in struggle. How is this conceived in terms of resistance to constituted bio-power? First, the ‘mothers’ are rendered outside class as ‘human rights’ activists. Empire cannot explain the origins of the Mothers as a class response to a former military counter-revolution against the revolutionary uprisings of the 1960s and 1970s. Klein points out that the Mothers now openly declare that their children were not only ‘innocent’ but political opponents of the dictatorship (2003). These origins are clearly vindicated when Hebe de Bonafini visits Zanon and says workers’ power is in workers production! Hardt and Negri should visit Zanon! What are the historic precedents of the role of women in socialist revolution? The day after the recent December 20, 2002 anniversary of the Argentinazo, the occupied Brukman factory hosted a Brecht play ‘The Mothers’. Here Brecht pays homage to the role of women during the 1905 revolution in Russia. It is one of many such homages in the communist literature in particular the February and October revolutions in Russia. They represent ‘mothers’ not as reproducers of biopower in the historical abstract, but mothers as workers, and of workers, who reproduce wage labour under capitalist social relations. That is why the worker-actors who performed “The Mothers’ at Brukman substituted some Argentine characters for the original Russian. The ‘Mothers’ are the women workers of Argentina today. The owner of the factory becomes Mr Brukman. In this way revolution today discovers its history in the heat of struggle. And it is not lost in the ‘crowd’; it is conscious capitalist class struggle.

[28] The so-called ‘crisis of Peronism’ could be interpreted by H&N as evidence of the end to national governance, and the direct confrontation between Empire and the Multitude. But Hardt and Negri still have to show why we need their theory of Empire when the theory of imperialism predicts this outcome.

[29] Originally called for March 2003, these elections have been postponed by Duhalde as it looked like his right-wing Peronist rival Menem was gaining support.

[30] While it is used to include petty bourgeois and liberal bourgeois on the right, on the left ‘people’ means all those oppressed by capitalism and imperialism. In that sense it is used in the same way the Lenin used ‘people’ to mean workers and poor peasants.

[31] ‘Active Boycott’ means to stop the elections by overturning Duhalde’s government in favour of a workers’ and popular government and that has become a call to overthrow Kirchner.

[32] This is not the place to enter into the debate on the Constituent Assembly in Argentina. For an exchange on this question see the archive of Argentina Solidarity where PO-Workers Party supporters defend the Constituent Assembly as a necessary stage in the national revolution to prepared the way for socialist revolution against the Socialist Workers Party that favours a Revolutionary Constituent Assembly called after a workers revolution, and those who say that the question of the Constituent Assembly is secondary to the struggle for dual power in the workers organisations, the general strike and formation of self-defence committees. See http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Argentina_Solidarity/

[33] Most left parties in Argentina have a history of adapting to the national bourgeoisie in ‘patriotic fronts’ or ‘popular fronts’ on the basis that before socialism is possible, first a nation must unite across classes to overthrow imperialism. This approach is based on the Stalinist theory of stages Stalin used to justify popular fronts with Western bourgeoisies who were friendly to the Soviet Union and would ally with it against its enemies. It is in direct opposition to the Leninist and Trotskyist position of ‘permanent revolution’ that holds that only workers and poor peasants can make a successful national revolution, because the national bourgeoisie have more interests in common with imperialism than with the working class. This means that national independence from imperialism must also be a socialist revolution against the national bourgeoisie (Trotsky, 1969).

[34] These attacks have radicalised the masses in Peru, Venezuela, Chile, Brazil and Bolivia that demonstrate that anti-imperialist resistance to imperialism has the potential to become continent wide. See Petras (2002b)

[35] The 2nd Congress of the Comintern recognised that national revolutions in the semi-colonies cannot defeat imperialism alone. The struggle of the Argentinean masses (and in the rest of LA) to survive and to take power at home must have the support of workers in the US heartlands and the other imperialist powers. Otherwise the US military will succeed in reversing if not defeating the revolution and re-imposing a client state of its own choice following the long tradition of US intervention in Latin America, and most recently extended in the Middle East to a policy of ‘preventative war’ against Iraq.

 





A Modern Greek Tragedy

29 01 2008

Review of Vincent O’Sullivan’s

Long Journey to the Border: A Life of John Mulgan

Penguin Books 2003

John Mulgan

Introduction

John Mulgan has a big name in New Zealand. He is portrayed in the literary culture and even the popular culture as a national hero. His reputation is larger than life because of the ‘mystery’ of his death, an irony given that he must have viewed his suicide without sentimentality.

His only novel ‘Man Alone’ has been a set text in schools and universities for decades. Its hero, Johnson, stands for basic values such as toughness, self-reliance, and the independence of the ‘common man’ of action and few words. That title is taken from Hemingway’s To Have and To Have Not: “a man alone ain’t got no fucking chance”. For Mulgan it means that human freedom and democracy has to be grounded in the individual self-reliance and resilience of agricultural communities resistant to modern ‘fascism of the right or of the left’.

For that reason Mulgan has been adopted as the role model of the left liberal intelligentsia in New Zealand and is emblematic of the post-World War 2 Keynesian compromise which attempted to balance the rights of private property with the interest of the greater community. Mulgan is portrayed by his biographers as the intellectual who best steered between the twin evils of extreme capitalism and state socialism (Paul Day and James McNeish), and who probably paid the ultimate price for this act of personal heroism with his own life.

In my view Mulgan’s personal heroism is not in question. But heroism is not an adequate explanation of Mulgan’s real significance. What if his task was made humanly impossible because he could not personally transcend the contradiction, starkly posed by depression and world wars, without taking sides between capitalist barbarism or degenerated socialism? In that case, his heroic attempt to try to resolve this dilemma by defending democracy as a solitary intellectual makes Mulgan a hopeless case. He becomes a ‘Man Alone’ separated from the community of his choice and his life becomes a modern Greek tragedy.

Vincent O’Sullivan’s recent biography is a wonderfully illuminating picture of Mulgan’s life. It is true to Mulgan since it interprets his life as Mulgan himself might have. It does not step outside Mulgan’s ideological frame of the solitary intellectual. It accepts, as Mulgan did, the centrality of the defence of democracy against fascism and against Stalinism. It defines Mulgan’s importance as the voice of the maturing, independent, and increasingly self-conscious intelligentsia in NZ that sees itself as inseparable from the generation of British, US, and European intellectuals who faced up to the existential questions of war and peace, democracy and fascism, capitalism and socialism.

What I want to argue in this essay is that taking Mulgan’s own standpoint to reflect on his life cannot fully account for his significance. I will argue that Mulgan was trapped by his fidelity to a belief in the sovereign individual, and like many intellectuals of that period who gave their lives in one or other cause (most risked their lives by thinking) he became a victim of that very belief – itself an ideology masking the true nature of the bourgeois self as alienated, self-defeating and powerless. To make this argument however, it is necessary to step outside the liberal frame of O’Sullivan’s biography and adopt a critical Marxist theory of the intelligentsia.

My Approach

I want to use arguments derived from the dead Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci and the very much alive Spanish ‘Althusserian’, Juan Carlos Rodriguez. Gramsci’s influence on Western Marxism and the rise of ‘cultural studies’ today is really too important to ignore when locating prominent intellectuals within modern capitalist society. Rodriguez is a more acquired taste derived from Gramsci by way of Althusser and heavy on the theory of ideological production. These approaches share the Marxist assumption that writers are intellectuals who serve to reproduce the key ideas that meet the material interests of the ruling classes –traditional intellectuals – in competition with intellectuals thrown up by the challenge of the revolutionary classes from below – organi